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This dissertation explores some ways in which logics for defeasible reasoning
can be applied to questions in epistemology. It’s naturally thought of as developing
four applications:
The first is concerned with simple epistemic rules, such as “If you perceives
that X, then you ought to believe that X” and “If you have outstanding testimony
that X, then you ought to believe that X.” Anyone who thinks that such rules have
a place in our accounts of epistemic normativity must explain what happens in cases
where they come into conflict—such as one where you perceive a red object and are
told that it is blue. The literature has gone in two directions: The first suggests that
rules have built-in unless-clauses specifying the circumstances under which they fail
to apply; the second that rules do not specify what attitudes you ought to have,
but only what counts in favor or against having those attitudes. I express these two
different ideas in a defeasible logic framework and demonstrate that there’s a clear
sense in which they are equivalent.
The second application uses a defeasible logic to solve an important puzzle
about epistemic rationality, involving higher-order evidence, or, roughly, evidence
about our capacities for evaluating evidence. My solution has some affinities with
a certain popular view on epistemic dilemmas. The third application, then, is a
characterization of this conflicting-ideals view in logical terms: I suggest that it
should be thought of as an unconventional metaepistemological view, according to
which epistemic requirements are not exceptionless, but defeasible and governed by
a comparatively weak logic.
Finally, the fourth application is in the burgeoning debate about the epistemic
significance of disagreement. The intuitive conciliatory views say, roughly, that you
ought to become less confident in your take on some question X, if you learn that
an epistemic equal disagrees with you about X. I propose to think of conciliationism
as a defeasible reasoning policy, develop a mathematically precise model of it, and
use it to solve one of the most pressing problems for conciliatory views: Given that
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Introduction
This dissertation is an exercise in what one might call nontraditional formal
epistemology. It is both common and natural to define formal epistemology in op-
position to its more traditional cousin: Where traditional epistemology approaches
(normative) questions related to belief, knowledge, and reasoning relying on the
classical method of conceptual analysis, formal epistemology approaches these very
same questions drawing on tools from mathematics and logic. In principle, epistemo-
logical questions could be tackled using various formal frameworks, but, as a matter
of fact, they are usually tackled using one of the two popular ones. The first is the
Bayesian framework, or, roughly, a combination of probability theory and induc-
tive logic. And the second is normal modal logic, or modal logic that can be given
a possible worlds semantics. These are the standard formal tools in epistemology,
and it is actually not uncommon to think that formal epistemology just is the ap-
plications of one of them—especially, the Bayesian framework—to epistemological
questions. Such applications, then, are what I think of as standard or traditional
formal epistemology; and what’s going on in this dissertation can be understood
in opposition to it. For what I’ll be concerned with throughout the text is tackling
epistemological questions, drawing on an entirely different framework, namely, the
logics for defeasible reasoning.
The first such logics were developed in the field of artificial intelligence in re-
sponse to the challenge to represent the information that would let a machine exhibit
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intelligent behavior. Efforts to meet this challenge quickly made it clear that ordi-
nary logic is utterly inadequate for this task, as much of this information takes the
form of defeasible generalizations. Think of statements like “Birds fly” and “Things
that look red are red” which express sensible principles of reasoning—principles
we’d seem to constantly rely on in our everyday life—even though they allow for
exceptions. Defeasible logics, then, are logics of such defeasible generalizations, and
their study has long since grown into a significant area of research, intersecting the-
oretical computer science and philosophical logic.1 But, more importantly for our
purposes, defeasible logics can also be applied to normative questions in philoso-
phy. In fact, the overall goal of this dissertation is to make a case for the following
thesis: Logics for defeasible reasoning can be of great help in answering questions
about the structure of epistemic normativity and furthering important debates in
epistemology.
My strategy for making this case is to develop three independent and equally
important applications of defeasible logics to questions from epistemology. Accord-
ingly, the dissertation is divided into three parts.
The first part aims at a better understanding of simple epistemic rules, such
as the following two:
(Perception) If a (rational) agent perceives that X, then she ought to believe
that X; and
(Testimony) If a (rational) agent has outstanding testimony that X, then she
1For a good introduction to the applications of (defeasible) logics to problems from artificial
intelligence see (Thomason 2018).
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ought to believe that X.
It is natural to think that rules like these have a role to play in our accounts of
epistemic normativity. But anyone who thinks that Perception, Testimony, or other
rules like them are genuine immediately faces the challenge of explaining what hap-
pens in cases of epistemic conflict, or situations where such rules support opposing
conclusions. Just think of a case where an object in front of you looks red and an
extremely reliable source tells you that this object is blue. Were we to apply the
two rules in this case, we would seem to have to conclude that you ought to be-
lieve both that the object in front of you is red and that it is blue. There are two
plausible strategies of response to this problem, and they both weaken the above
statement of the rules. According to the first, simple epistemic rules have implicit
hedges or unless-clauses that specify the circumstances under which the rule doesn’t
apply. According to the second strategy, the “ought” that occurs in the consequent
of epistemic rules is to be substituted with “has reason”.
These two views of simple rules are usually thought of and presented as being
distinct. In the first part of this dissertation, I do two things. First, I express both
ways of thinking about simple rules in a mathematically precise way, using a de-
feasible logic framework. Second, I show that these two seemingly different ways of
thinking are, in fact, much closer than standardly thought. Indeed, there’s a straight-
forward sense in which they are equivalent. And it’s not only that the models of these
views handle particular cases in the same ways. We can define certain notions famil-
iar from traditional epistemology—including those of an epistemic reasons, defeat,
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and defeater—in each of these models, and they come out corresponding one-to-one.
The correspondence result isn’t of theoretical significance only, but also has some
far-reaching consequences for the two views on rules.
In the second part, the focus shifts from epistemic rules to epistemic require-
ments. It’s naturally seen as doing two things. First off, I use defeasible logic to
work out a solution to an important puzzle about epistemic rationality: In case
one’s (total) evidence can be misleading about what it itself supports—as some
epistemologists have recently argued—then two intuitive and widely accepted epis-
temic requirements can come into conflict, suggesting that there are dilemmas of
rationality. My defeasible logic-based solution has a number of attractive features
when compared to the other solutions from the literature. However, it also comes
with an unorthodox perspective on epistemic requirements, a perspective on which
they are defeasible. I also show—and this is the second major idea of this part of the
dissertation—that we can naturally make sense of defeasible epistemic requirements
as (regulative) epistemic ideals, and that the defeasible logic used to solve the puz-
zle can be naturally seen as the formal backbone of the conflicting-ideals view that
David Christensen (2007a, 2010a, 2013) has been advocating for in his recent work.
In effect, I’m proposing to understand this view as a move away from the default
metaepistemological position according to which epistemic requirements are strict
and governed by a strong, but never explicitly stated logic, toward the more uncon-
ventional view, according to which requirements are defeasible and governed by a
comparatively weak logic. When understood this way, the view is not committed to
the existence of dilemmas.
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In the third part, I apply the logics for defeasible reasoning in the context
of the debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement. More specifically,
I use them to get a better handle on conciliatory views on disagreement and the
logical structure of conciliatory reasoning. On the view that emerges, conciliationism
is a second-order defeasible reasoning policy, saying roughly the following: If your
best (first-order) reasoning suggests that X and it’s rational for you to think that
an epistemic peer disagrees with you regarding X, you should not conclude that
X under normal circumstances. Within the defeasible logics that I use to model
conciliationism, the phrases “it’s rational for you to think” and “under normal
circumstances” have precise content. In the course of the three chapters that make up
the third part, I do not only develop a precise model of conciliationism, but also use it
to address a pressing—perhaps, the most pressing—challenge for conciliatory views:
Given that there are disagreements about the epistemic significance of disagreement,
conciliatory views can turn on themselves and—as Adam Elga (2010) has argued—
thereby, also issue inconsistent directives.
The three parts are followed by an appendix that contains the proofs of all
important observations.
5
Part I DEFEASIBLE RULES
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Chapter 1: Two logics for defeasible rules
1.1 Epistemic rules and epistemic conflicts
Consider the following two rules:
(Perception) If an agent’s epistemic situation includes a perception that X,
then the agent ought to believe that X.1
(Testimony) If an agent’s epistemic situation includes outstanding testimony
that X, then the agent ought to believe that X.2
Both of these rules have received a fair amount of attention in the recent epistemol-
ogy literature, and it is natural think that they—and, perhaps, also other simple
rules like them—have a role to play in our accounts of epistemic normativity. But
anyone who accepts that there are simple rules like these must also explain what
happens in cases of epistemic conflict, or situations in which such rules either sup-
port conflicting conclusions, or get undermined. Suppose that an object in front of
you looks red, but an extremely reliable source tells you that it is blue. Or suppose
that someone you consider an authority in epistemology tells you that Testimony
is false. What should you do in these cases? If we apply the rules in the first one,
1Cf. Boghossian (2017), Chisholm (1980), Huemer (2000), Pollock (1995); Pollock & Cruz (1999)
Pryor (2000).
What’s meant by an epistemic situation here? Well, it’s natural to think that, whatever theory
of epistemic normativity turns out to be correct, it is very likely to specify certain descriptive
features of the agent’s situation as relevant to determining which doxastic states the agent ought
to have. These features may include the agent’s evidence, facts about her condition, her past, or
other kinds of facts. The totality of all of these normatively-relevant features is what I call the
agent’s epistemic situation—cf. (Titelbaum 2015, Sec. 2).
2Cf. Bradley (2019), Elga (2007, 2010), and Titelbaum (2015).
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we are quickly lead to conclude that you ought to believe that the object is red and
that it is blue! And if we apply Testimony in the second, we are lead to conclude
that you ought to disbelieve it—which is at least somewhat odd, if we think that it
is a genuine epistemic rule.3
Both of the two most plausible strategies of response to the problem weaken the
above statement of rules, or suggest that such rules must be defeasible.4 According
to the first, Perception, Testimony, and other simple rules have implicit hedges or
unless-clauses that state the circumstances under which the rule doesn’t apply. One
could then say that in the first problematic scenario the conflict between Perception
and Testimony is only apparent, because, say, Testimony doesn’t apply when you
have perceptions to rely on. According to the second strategy, the “ought” that
occurs in the consequents of simple rules is to be changed for “has a reason”. The
thought here is that simple rules (by themselves) do not specify what doxastic
attitudes you are required to have, but only what counts in favor or against having
them. Applying this contributory-rules strategy to the same scenario, we would
say that there’s indeed a conflict between Perception and Testimony, but that it is
resolvable, because, say, your perception outweighs the testimony.5
3Two clarificatory notes here: First, notice that the example I’m using is a special case of a
situation where a rule gets undermined, namely, a situation where the rule self-undermines—cf.
(Titelbaum 2015, Sec. 4). Second, notice that the conclusion I draw depends on an inter-level
coherence principle, saying that it is never epistemically permissible to believe that you ought to
disbelieve X and believe X all the same. Given the goals of this part of the dissertation, nothing
important hinges on us assuming that it is genuine. I’ll discuss my take on this principle in Chapter
3.
4Here the term defeasible is used in a loose sense, getting at the intuitive idea that a rule may
engender an ought in one situation and then fail to engender an ought in a situation that differs
from the original one only by a margin.
5The authors who have pursued the first general strategy in epistemology include Bradley
(2019), Elga (2010), and Titelbaum (2015), and those who have pursued it in the moral domain
include Holton (2002) and Scanlon (2000). The list of authors who may have pursued something
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We will state the two strategies precisely later. For now note two things about
them. First, they are naturally thought of and typically presented as distinct.6 And
second, it’s neither obvious, nor uncontroversial that either one of them succeeds
in responding to the problem while retaining a conception of simple rules that’s
sufficiently close to the one we started with. To take one example, Darren Bradley
(2019) has recently argued that the second strategy fails, and that the first one,
once spelled out in full detail, reduces to an extreme version of particularism in
epistemology.
This part of the dissertation has two goals: The first is to express both ways
of thinking about rules in a mathematically precise way, using a simple formal
framework motivated by the work from logics for defeasible reasoning. The second
goal is to show that these two seemingly different ways of thinking about rules are
much closer than is standardly thought. Indeed, there’s a straightforward sense in
which they are equivalent. As will become clear, this result is not of only theoretical
significance, but also provides important important insights into the nature of both
views on rules.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents the basic formal
concepts and formalizes the problem that epistemic conflicts give rise to. Sections
akin to the second strategy in epistemology includes Christensen (2007a, 2010a, 2013), Horty
(2012), Pollock (1995); Pollock & Cruz (1999). The view is much more wide-spread in ethics,
where it is associated with W. D. Ross (1930). (Such authors as Lance & Little (2007), McKeever
& Ridge (2006), and Väyrenen (2009) appear to defend views that combine the two strategies.) The
two strategies (and their combination) seem to me to exhaust the space of plausible responses to
the problem that don’t do away with simple rules as such. A third, much less plausible, alternative
is to bite the bullet and accept ubiquitous existence of epistemic dilemmas, or situations in which
the agent fails epistemically no matter what doxastic state she adopts. The author who is the most
likely to sympathize with this response is Hughes (2017).
6See, for instance, (Bradley 2019) in epistemology and (Dancy 2004, Sec. 1.2) in ethics.
9
1.3 and 1.4 develop, respectively, a model of the hedged-rules view and a model of the
contributory-rules view. The first section of the subsequent Chapter 2 will establish
the central result—that the contributory-rules view is equivalent to a restricted
version of the hedged-rules view—and make use of the result to show how the hedged-
rules view can account for two phenomena it is standardly thought not to be able
to handle. Throughout this discussion we will focus on cases where simple rules
support conflicting conclusions, as opposed to the ones where rules get undermined.
But the topic of undermining will take central stage in Section 2.2 where I will
discuss the limits of the contributory-rules view and establish a further equivalence
between the full hedged-rules view and a mixed view, according to which rules are
both contributory and hedged.
1.2 The problem formalized
As our background, we assume the language of ordinary propositional logic with the
standard connectives. The turnstile ⊢ will stand for classical logical consequence:
Thus, where X and Y are propositional formulas, X ⊢ Y means that Y is a classical
consequence of X. For the sake of convenience and in order to avoid unnecessary
clutter in our formalization of particular cases, we will assume that our background
language allows for materially inconsistent atomic formulas, which will let us express
statements, such as “The object in front of you is red” and “The object in front
of you is blue,” that can’t jointly be true at the same time. Also, in order to have
a more natural way of stating Perception and Testimony, we extend the language
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with three designated predicates, Perceive(⋅), Testimony(⋅), and Believe(⋅). Not
surprisingly, Perceive(X) captures the idea that the agent has a perception that X;
Testimony(X) that the agent has outstanding testimony that X; and Believe(X)
that the agent believes that X. The reference to an agent is important. Even though
we do not represent the agent in the language, all the formulas we’ll encounter should
be thought of as relativized to an agent situated in some epistemic situation. We
will also make use of the customary deontic operator ◯(⋅). A formula of the form
◯Believe(X), then, expresses the idea that the agent ought to, or is rationally
required to, believe that X.7 A few quick remarks on the sense of ‘ought’ that I have
in mind here: It should be understood in the epistemic, rather than pragmatic or any
other sense; it should be understood as relative to the agent’s epistemic situation;8
and it should be understood as all things considered, as opposed to pro tanto.
Now we turn to the question of how to express Perception, Testimony, and
other simple rules in this language. One might be tempted to use material condi-
tionals, formalizing them as Perceive(X) ⊃ ◯Believe(X) and Testimony(X) ⊃
◯Believe(X), respectively. However, given our goals, it will be better to think of
them by analogy with the inference rules of natural deduction systems—for, eventu-
ally, we will want to turn Perception and Testimony into defeasible rules. Just like
the rule of conjunction elimination sanctions one to conclude X (as well as Y ) when-
ever one has been able to establish X&Y , a simple epistemic rule can be thought
7Following the usual practice in epistemology, I use ‘ought to’ and ‘rationally required to’ as
synonyms.
8Some epistemologists focus on the sense of the ‘ought’ in which you ought to believe X only if
it is true that X, but that’s not the sense that I have in mind here. I’m interested in the sense of
‘ought’, according to which you ought to believe X if it is justified in your epistemic situation—cf.
Bradley (2019).
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of as sanctioning drawing a certain type of conclusion whenever one’s epistemic sit-
uation includes a certain type of feature. One standard way of stating conjunction










It’s worth highlighting an important technical detail: Strictly speaking, what we have
here—in the case of conjunction elimination, as well as Perception and Testimony—
are not rules, but rule schemas. How are rules and schemas related? Well, on the
one hand, rules result from instantiating rule schemas with particular propositional
formulas. And on the other, rule schemas let one state the rules that share a common
form in a concise way. It’s fairly common to elliptically refer to rule schemas as
rules—and I will occasionally do so too—but we shouldn’t forget that rules and
schemas are distinct notions that shouldn’t get confounded.
In what follows, we will focus on rules more than on rule schemas, and we
will use the letter r (with subscripts) to denote rules. Also, for reasons of presen-
tation, we will sometimes write rules not in their tree-form, but rather as pairs of
formulas ⟨X,Y ⟩ with the first element X standing for the premise of the rule, and
the second element Y standing for its conclusion.9 It will also be useful to intro-
duce two functions, Premise[⋅] and Conclusion[⋅], for picking out the premise and
9Compare to the way rules are represented in input/output logic—see e.g., (Makinson & van der
Torre 2000, 2001) and (Parent 2011).
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conclusion of a given rule. Thus, if r stands for the rule ⟨X,Y ⟩, then Premise[r]
is the proposition X and Conclusion[r] is the proposition Y . The second func-
tion will also be lifted from individual rules to sets of rules: Where R is a set of
rules, Conclusion[R] is the set containing the conclusions of all the rules in R, or
Conclusion[R] = {Conclusion[r] ∶ r ∈R}.
We’ll represent epistemic situations as pairs of the form ⟨W ,R⟩, referring to
them as epistemic contexts and denoting them with the lowercase c (again, with
subscripts). Any epistemic context will contain two elements. The first element W,
called the hard information, is a set of ordinary propositional formulas, expressing
the descriptive features of the situation. The second element R is a set of epistemic
rules, or pairs of formulas of the form ⟨X,◯Believe(Y )⟩.
Definition 1.1 (Epistemic contexts) An epistemic context c is a structure of
the form ⟨W,R⟩, where W is a set of propositional formulas and R is a set of
epistemic rules.
As our first illustration of this notion, consider the simple case where you’re looking
at an object in front of you and it looks red. Letting R stands for the proposition that
the object in front of you is red, we can encode this situation in the epistemic context
c1 = ⟨W ,R⟩ whereW contains the formula Perceive(R), standing for the proposition




, saying that you ought to believe that the object is red if it looks red to you.
It’s natural to think that one important task of epistemology consists in iden-
tifying the simple epistemic rules that would let us link the descriptive features of
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any epistemic situation with the doxastic attitudes that the agent ought to have
in that situation. With the formal notion of an epistemic context in hand, we can
think of this task as follows: There is a(n infinite) set of contexts that capture vari-
ous sorts of epistemic situations, and these contexts share a common set of rules R.
The epistemologist’s task, then, is to figure out (i) what is the shape of the rules in
R (or what is the form of the rule schemas) and (ii) what is the logic of interaction
between these rules that we need, for it to be the case that the ◯-formulas that
follow from each context c match what we intuitively think is rationally required
from the agent in the epistemic situation that c stands for.
One’s first-pass hypothesis might be that the rules in R will be the simple
rules of the sort we have discussed and that the logic of their interaction will be
classical. The formal framework lets us state this hypothesis in a precise way. We
start by introducing the notion of a triggered rule.
Definition 1.2 (Triggered rules) Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩ be an epistemic context. The
rules from R that are triggered in c are those that belong to the set Triggered(c) =
{r ∈R ∶W ⊢ Premise(r)}.
So the rules that are triggered in a context are all and only those rules whose premises
can be derived from W by classical logic. It’s easy to see that r1 is triggered in the
context c1. Since Perceive(R) is in W and Premise[r1] = Perceive(R), we have
W ⊢ Perceive(R).
But we still need to specify how to get to the ◯-formulas. There are a few
different ways to do this, but, given our goals, we can simply adopt the most straight-
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forward one, taking the conclusions of all the rules that are triggered in the context:10
Definition 1.3 (Consequence, first pass) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be an epistemic con-
text. Then the ought statement
◯X follows from c if and only if ◯X ∈ Conclusion[Triggered(c)].
Applying this definition to our example, it’s very easy to see that the statement
◯Believe(R) follows from c1. Since r1 is the only rule triggered in c1, the set
Conclusion[Triggered(c1)] equals {◯Believe(R)}. And it’s only one step from
here to see that ◯Believe(R) follows from c1, as desired.
At this point already we could state the problem that epistemic conflicts give
rise to. But before we do that, it’ll be useful to introduce another formal notion,
namely, that of a contrary rule.





two rules from R. Then the rules r
and r′ are contrary in the context c, written as contraryc(r, r′), if and only if Y
and W are inconsistent.
Now recall the troubling epistemic situation we started with where an object in
front you looks red and an extremely reliable source tells you that it is blue. Let
R be as before and let B stand for the proposition that the object in front of
you is blue. We can, then, encode this situation in the context c2 = ⟨W,R⟩ with W
10I’ve chosen this definition to keep the formalism as simple as possible. Were the setting more
formally-oriented, we could’ve, for instance, used the following definition: ◯X follows from ⟨W,R⟩
if and only if ◯X follows from Conclusion[Triggered(c)], given standard deontic logic. For a nice
presentation of this logic see (McNamara 2019, Sec. 2).
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. Note that the latter rule says that you ought to believe
that the object is blue if you have outstanding testimony that it is blue. It’s easy
to see that r1 and r2 are both triggered in c2, and that both ◯Believe(R) and
◯Believe(B) follow from c2, suggesting that you ought to believe that the object
is red and that it is blue. This, of course, is preposterous. Notice too that r1 and
r2 qualify as contrary rules—in the end, R and B are materially inconsistent. This
latter fact, in turn, point in the direction of a more general statement of the problem:
In any context c = ⟨W ,R⟩ where two or more contrary rules from R get triggered,
the agent will be required to have inconsistent beliefs.
In order to respond to this problem, we need to change either the way we think
about simple rules, or the logic that lets lets us derive the ◯-formulas, or both.
1.3 Hedged-rules strategy
1.3.1 What type of hedges?
The first general strategy of response suggests that simple rules have built-in
hedges or unless-clauses specifying the circumstances under which the rules don’t
apply. The literature has taken this strategy in two different directions: One idea is
that the content of rule hedges is normative, the other that it is descriptive.
The first idea is exemplified by Elga (2010) and Mike Titelbaum (2015), both
of whom developed their views responding to cases where Testimony gets (self-
)undermined, as opposed to cases where rules support contrary conclusions. On
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Titelbaum’s view, in particular, the hedge of a genuine epistemic rule must refer to
“truth about what rationality requires”, and the rule Testimony must be replaced
by Testimony∗:
(Testimony∗) If an agent’s situation includes outstanding testimony that X,
then the agent ought to believe that X—unless X contradicts an a priori truth
about what rationality requires, or, simply, unless ◯¬Believe(X).11
Notice how the unless-clause helps with the problematic cases of self-undermining:12
Supposing that Testimony∗ is a genuine epistemic rule, and that rationality requires
that you believe it, Testimony∗ will simply not apply to any (misleading) testimony
against it. Notice too that this wouldn’t be particularly useful if the agent had
no way of telling whether or not rationality does indeed require that she believes
Testimony∗. But on Titelbaum’s view, this is something the agent can establish a
priori :
[E]very agent possesses a priori, propositional justification for true beliefs
about the requirements of rationality in her current situation. An agent
can reflect on her situation and come to recognize facts about what that
situation rationally requires. Not only does this reflection provide her
with justification to believe those facts; that justification is ultimately
empirically indefeasible (Titelbaum 2015, p. 276).
Titelbaum’s view is certainly interesting, but many epistemologists have pushed
back against it, mostly on the basis of its extremely counterintuitive consequences.
11Compare to the statement of “Properly Restricted Testimony” on p. 274 of (Titelbaum 2015).
12In fact, the clause does much more. In effect, it makes the rule impossible to undermine.
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For instance, the view would have it that a self-conscious fallible agent is to retain
full confidence in Testimony∗ under all circumstances, no matter how much empirical
evidence against it she may have.13 What’s more, independently of the view’s success
as a response to cases of undermining, it is of no help as a response to the problem
of conflicts between rules. So this first way of thinking about rule hedges doesn’t
seem to hold much promise, and we will not discuss it any further.
On the second way of thinking, the hedges of simple rules refer to the de-
scriptive features of the agent’s situation. It appears that Bradley (2019) is the only
one to systematically develop this idea in the context of epistemology, but it has
been developed earlier in the ethics literature.14 To see how this idea could help, we
turn to a simple example. Consider an epistemic situation where a reliable source
tells you that some object is red and another, equally reliable, source tells you that
the same object is blue. Applying Testimony in this situation quickly leads to the
conclusion that you ought to believe that the object is red and that is blue. But
suppose that we supplement Testimony with a hedge, as follows:
(Hedged Testimony) If an agent’s epistemic situation includes outstanding
testimony that X, then the agent ought to believe that X—unless the situation
also includes testimony that is contrary to X and at least as good.
This rule fails to apply in your situation. Why? Well, you do have an outstanding
testimony that the object is red, but the conditions that are specified in the hedge
are satisfied too: Your situation also includes an equally good testimony to the
13See e.g., (Christensen 2013, pp. 88–9) and (Bradley 2019, pp. 4–7).
14See footnote 5 for references. We will touch on hedged rules in ethics in Sections 2.1.2–2.1.3.
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contrary. Consequently, it’s not the case that you ought to believe that the object
is red. And parallel reasoning applies to the testimony that the object is blue.
Now let’s try capture this idea in the formal framework.
1.3.2 Strategy formalized
The first step is to change the notion of a rule. We have been thinking of simple
epistemic rules as ordered pairs of formulas of the form ⟨X,◯Believe(Y )⟩. And it’s
fairly natural to think of hedged epistemic rules as ordered triples of formulas of
the form ⟨X,◯Believe(Y ),Z⟩, where the first two element, X and ◯Believe(Y ),
are still, respectively, the rule’s premise and conclusion, and the third element Z is
the rule’s hedge. There’s more than one way of specifying the shape of the hedge,
but we will require that it is a set of negated formulas, or that Z is of the form
{¬Z1, . . . ,¬Zn}. Hedged rules too can be represented in a tree form, as follows:
X ∶ ¬Z1, . . . ,¬Zn
Y
.
A hedged rule of this form should be red as, “If X obtains, then conclude Y , unless
either Z1, or . . ., or Zn obtain”. Or, alternatively, it can be read as, “If X obtains,
and it can be assumed that not-Z1 and . . ., and not-Zn, then conclude Y .”15
We will retain the functions for selecting rule premises and conclusions: Where
r stands for the hedged rule ⟨X,Y,Z⟩, Premise[r] is the proposition X and Conclusion[r]
is the proposition Y . In addition, we will introduce another function to have access
to rule hedges. Since sometimes this function will get applied to hedgeless rules, its







Z if r is a hedged rule of the form ⟨X,Y,Z⟩
∅ otherwise, that is, if r is of the form ⟨X,Y ⟩
So, upon being given a rule, the function outputs its hedge, if the rule has one, and
otherwise it outputs the empty set. Above, we used the (formal) notion of a context
to capture epistemic situations. Now we will capture such situations using hedged
contexts, or contexts whose sets of rules can, and normally will, contain hedged
rules.
Definition 1.5 (Hedged epistemic contexts) A hedged epistemic context is a
structure of the form ⟨W,R⟩, where W is a set of propositional formulas and R is
a set of epistemic rules, possibly hedged.16
Now consider a scenario where one reliable source tells you that the object in front
of you is red and another reliable source tells you that that very object is blue.
We can encode this scenario in a hedged context c3 = ⟨W,R⟩ where W consists of









16A technical note: It’s in general possible for a context to contain two rules whose premises
and conclusions are the same, but hedges different. Intuitively, however, any pair of such rules
is deviant—instead of two rules with different hedges, there should be only one rule specifying
all the conditions under which the rule fails to apply. I will assume that hedged contexts never
contain such deviant pairs of rules, or that the definition of a hedged context is subject to the
following constraint: For any r, r′ ∈ R, in case Premise[r] = Premise[r′] and Conclusion[r] =
Conclusion[r′], then r = r′.
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Of course, we still need to specify how to derive ◯-formulas from hedged contexts.
When working with hedgless rules, we simply collected the conclusions of all the rules
triggered by the context’s hard information. Now we add an extra condition: The
hard information must not only trigger the rule, but it must also not exemplify any
of the features listed in the rule’s hedge. The notion of an admissible rule captures
both conditions.
Definition 1.6 (Admissible rules) Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩ be a hedged context. The rules
from R that are admissible in c are those that belong to the set
Admissible(c) = {r ∈R ∶ r ∈ Triggered(c) and, for no ¬Z ∈Hedge[r], W ⊢ Z}.
Now let’s apply the notion to the context c3. It’s not hard to see that neither the
rule r3, nor r4 come out admissible. Why? Well, take r3: Its premise Testimony(R)
does follow from W , and so it qualifies as triggered. However, its hedge contains the
formula ¬Testimony(B) and Testimony(B) follows from W. Analogous reasoning
applies to r4.
With the notion of an admissible rule in hand, all we need to do to specify how
to get the ◯-formulas from a context is substitute Admissible(c) for Triggered(c)
in Definition 1.3 from the previous section.
Definition 1.7 (Consequence, hedged) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a hedged epistemic
context. Then the ought statement
◯X follows from c just in case ◯X ∈ Conclusion[Admissible(c)].
It’s straightforward to see that neither ◯Believe(R), nor ◯Believe(B) follow from
c3, as desired. So far, so good. However, part of the problem with epistemic conflicts
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is that we always seem to be able to come up with further cases of conflicts between
rules. Thus, suppose that, right after you receive the two conflicting testimonies, you
take a look at the object yourself, and find out that it looks red to you. Intuitively,
under these circumstances, you ought to believe that the object is red. The new
situation can be captured using the context c4 = ⟨W,R⟩ where W contains the
propositions Testimony(R), Testimony(B), and Perceive(R), while R includes
two rules we have encountered before, r1 and r3, as well as an updated version of












A routine check will convince you that the only rule that’s admissible in this context
is r1. So, ◯Believe(R) does, while ◯Believe(B) does not follow from c4. There’s
a natural question about the relation between r4 and r′4 that you might have at this
point: Should we say that the hedge of the simpler rule changes once you look at
the object, or should we, rather, say that r4 was the rule r′4 all along? Let’s bracket
this question for a second and think about the way this epistemic vignette could
develop further.
Suppose that, after you have taken a look at the object, the Epistemology
Oracle approaches you and tells you that the object is in fact blue.17 Surely, now
the right thing for you to do is to believe what the oracle says! We will capture this
17I learned about the existence of epistemology oracles from White (2005).
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latest (and final) development of the situation using the context c5 = ⟨W,R⟩ where
W is as it was in c4, except for now it also includes the formula TestimonyO(B),
standing for the Oracle’s testimony, and the set of R includes the following rules:
Perceive(R) : ¬TestimonyO(B)r′1 = ◯Believe(R)
,








Notice the changes in the above rules r1 and r3. First, the instance of Percep-
tion r′1 now too has a hedge that makes it inapplicable in any situation where
TestimonyO(B) obtains. Second, the hedge of the rule r′3 now also includes the
formula ¬TestimonyO(B). This should make good sense. The Epistemology Ora-
cle’s testimony that the object is blue provides for a type of circumstance in which
the original instance of Testimony shouldn’t apply, independently of whether or not
the original contrary testimony Testimony(B) is present. Let’s quickly convince
ourselves that the above definition of consequence gives us the intuitively correct
result: There’s only one rule that’s admissible in the context c5, namely, r5. The
other three rules are all triggered, but they all are precluded from being added to
the set of admissible rules because of their hedges. As a result, only ◯Believe(B)
follows from the context, as desired.
The sequence of cases we have discussed motivates the following thought. The
hedge of any given rule from R is actually not the simple set that I have presented
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it to be, but, rather, a much more extensive one, a set that specifies all the possible
circumstances under which the rule would fail to apply, most of which we haven’t
even conceived of yet, let alone discussed. I think this idea is correct, and that it is
a natural consequence of the strategy we’re pursuing. The one author who develops
the hedged-rules view in epistemology, Bradley (2019), doesn’t only think so too, but
also takes this to mean that the view reduces to a position according to which there
is but one unwieldy, incredibly complex, and not finitely expressible “Über-rule” (or,
to put it in different terms, that the view reduces to a version of particularism in
epistemology). What this Über-rule does, by stipulation, is specify the appropriate
doxastic responses for all the epistemic situations that one might find oneself in.18
The main reason for Bradley’s suggestion that the hedged-rules view may reduce to
an Über-rule view appears to be the prospect of rule hedges being “open-ended”, as
opposed to containing a finite number of exceptions. Thus, he writes:
Starting with simple rules, can the exceptions be finitely stated? Ideally,
we would like to have finite exceptions, as this would allow a manageable
set of rules that could be used to guide our deliberation. [..] I don’t know
if this is possible, so I will concede the point, and defend the possibility
that the exceptions are open-ended (Bradley 2019, p. 12).
How shall we make sense of this open-endedness? Well, here I think we have to
think back to the distinction between rules and rule schemas, and to make sense of
the question that Bradley is posing as a question about schemas, not rules. Take
18For discussion of the Über-rule see (Bradley 2019, Sec. 8), (Christensen 2010a), (Christensen
2013), and (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014).
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some simple rule schema, such as Testimony. Now refocus on its instances which,
let’s suppose, you take to be hedged rules. Then there are two options. In case it
turns out that there’s a finite number of types of features that occur in the hedges
of these rules, we will be able to write down an informative and, in the best case
scenario, also usable schema covering all of them. For instance, all of the instances
of Testimony we have encountered so far can be captured by the following schema:
Testimony(X) : ¬BetterTestimony(Y ), ¬Perception(Y )
◯Believe(X)
,
with the background assumptions that it would be irrational for the agent to believe
both X and Y , and that BetterTestimony(Y ) expresses the intuitive thought that
the agent’s testimony for Y is at least as good as her testimony for X. (Let me
emphasize that I’m not suggesting that this is the true Hedged Testimony schema,
but only that it captures all the cases we have discussed. The true schema would be
more complex, but still have the same general shape.)
If, on the other hand, it turns out that there are infinitely many types of
features that occur in the hedges of instances of Testimony, if it turns out that the
circumstances under which these rules fail to apply are utterly different, then we
will not be able to write down a rule schema that would cover all of them and be
as informative as the one above. For were we to opt for informativeness, taking into
account all of the rules, we’d seem to have no other option but listing these rules
one by one—rules of which there’s infinitely many. And were we to opt for a schema
that can actually be written down, we would end up with something along the lines
of, “If an agent’s epistemic situations includes an outstanding testimony that X,
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then she ought to believe that X—unless something comes in the way”.
While there’s something about the first schema that makes it seem intuitively
preferable to the open-ended one, I am not quite sure what exactly is wrong with the
latter. I am also not sure why the view on which hedged rule schemas are open-ended
reduces to the Über-rule view, as Bradley suggests.19 Nevertheless, I am going to
concede the point and suppose that it does. In the end, this question—as well as the
question of whether or not a view on which hedges are open-ended is a successful
response to the problem posed by epistemic conflicts—is orthogonal to the goals I’m
pursuing in this chapter. We will formulate a version of the hedged-rules view on
which hedges contain a finite number of exceptions in Section 2.1 and revisit the
question again in Section 2.2.2.
1.3.3 Reasons, defeat, and defeaters
Having developed a feel for the way hedged rules and context function, we
turn to the question of how to think about some familiar epistemological concepts
in the formal model, most notably, those of epistemic reason, defeat, and defeater.
This is important because it will help us highlight the close connections between the
hedged-rules view and the contributory-rules view—which we will turn to in Section
19As the above quote illustrates, Bradley concedes the possibility of open-ended hedges. And
since he goes on to counter arguments against the Über-rule view, it’s clear that he takes open-
endedness to be tantamount to postulating such a rule. But why this is the case is never really made
explicit. The closest we get to an explanation is the suggestion that, “Th[e Über-rule] position can
be generated by conjoining an infinite number of simple rules or positing a finite number of simple
rules with at least one infinitely long hedge” (Bradley 2019, p. 13)—cf. Holton (2002). I suspect
that Bradley is motivated by the lack of a firm grasp on the shape that the hedged-rules view
takes, once we allow that rule hedges are open-ended: Let them be open-ended, and it might just
as well be that you end up with some rules whose hedges are as complex as the Über-rule is.
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1.4.20
It should be clear that, in the model, the hedged rules connecting the descrip-
tive and the normative are to be taken as primitive, and that other notions are to
be defined in their terms. Let’s start with reasons. Suppose we have an agent who
finds herself in a nontrivial epistemic situation that’s captured using some hedged
context c = ⟨W ,R⟩. What are the epistemic reasons that the agent has in this situa-
tion? Now, my proposal is that we identify them with the premises of those hedged
rules that are triggered in this context. More specifically, the proposition X is to
be defined as a reason for Y , in the context c = ⟨W,R⟩ if an only if there is a rule
X : ¬Z1, ⋯, ¬Znr =
◯Y
in R such that r ∈ Triggered(c). In this case, we can say
that r provides a reason for Y , that X’s being a reason for Y depends on r, and
that X and Y stand in the reason relation. To see how this proposal works in a
concrete situation, we’ll look at the hedged context c5 = ⟨W ,R⟩ which we used to
capture the final development of our three-part epistemic vignette. All of the four
rules from R we discussed, namely, r1, r′3, r
′
4, and r5, came out triggered in the con-
text of c5. So, on the proposal, all of their premises are to be qualified as epistemic
reasons that the agent has. And more specifically, the propositions that you have an
outstanding testimony that the object is red, Testimony(R), and that you perceive
the object to be red, Perceive(R), are your reasons for believing that it is red, and
the propositions that you have an outstanding testimony that the object is blue,
Testimony(B), and that you have the Oracle’s testimony that the object is blue,
20Although we will highlight these connections using the concept of a reason, we could do the
same focusing on other concepts, such as epistemic justification.
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TestimonyO(B), are your reasons to believe that the object is blue.
Next question: How are we to make sense of defeat and defeaters? It is both
natural and standard to have them related to the notions we have just defined,
namely, reasons and the reason relation.21 However, given that in the present frame-
work rules are basic and reasons are made sense in their terms, we will be thinking
of defeat as a notions that, in the first instance, too applies to rules. As before, let
us fix a context c = ⟨W ,R⟩ and zoom in on some rule r from R. We will say that
r is defeated when it is among the rules that are triggered but not admissible in c.
In other words, r is defeated in c if and only r is in Triggered(c) and there is a ¬Z
in Hedge[r] such that W ⊢ Z. Not surprisingly, we will say that the formula Z is a
defeater of r. How does this play out at the level of reasons? Well, suppose that some
proposition X is a reason for Y , and that X’s being a reason for Y depends on the
hedged rule r. We would say that X is defeated as a reason for Y by a consideration
Z when r is defeated by Z.
To have a concrete illustration, let’s take a look at the context c5 again. We
have noted already that the rule
Testimony(B) : ¬Testimony(R), ¬Perceive(R)
r′4 = ◯Believe(B)
is triggered in c5 and that Testimony(B) being a reason for believing that B depends
on it. Since r′4 is not among the rules that are admissible in c5, it is defeated in c5.
21For instance, Pollock (1974) in his classic treatment works with his technical notion of a prima
facie reason for belief: To say that X is a prima facie reason for some agent to believe that Y is to
say that in the absence of any other information the agent would be justified in believing that it
wouldn’t be true that X unless it were true that Y . A defeater, then, is a prima facie reason for
thinking that this is not the case, or that it would not be true that X unless it were also true that
Y —see (Pollock 1974, pp. 41–2).
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But which consideration is it defeated by? Well, it actually happens to have two
defeaters! Both Testimony(R) and Perceive(R) are in the hard information W of
the context, and both of them are listed in the rule’s hedge. So r′4 is defeated by
Testimony(R), as well as by Perceive(R).
So our model of the hedged-rules view is fairly simple, but it is expressive
enough to give a precise characterization of some central epistemological concepts.
We could use it to capture further concepts too, and we will use it when thinking
about the well-established distinction between rebutting and undermining defeat in
Section 2.2. But for now, we have defined all of the concepts we need, and we can
turn to the competitor of the hedged-rules view. Before we do that, however, it will
be worthwhile to mention an alternative way of thinking about hedges to forestall
a potential objection.
1.3.4 Digression: An alternative way to think about hedges
It’s possible that at this point you think that our model of the hedged-rules
view is unnecessarily complex, and that we could have, in fact, developed a simpler
model, a model that doesn’t retreat from the classical logic to a defeasible one, had
we only expressed hedged rules in a different way. More specifically, you may think
that I should have formulated such rules not as triples of the form ⟨X,Y,Z⟩, but,
rather, as pairs of formulas with the first element specifying both the premise of the
rule and its hedge, and the second element specifying its conclusion. Let’s consider
an example to make this line of thought more concrete. One of the rules that we
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needed to account for the three-episode vignette was:
Testimony(R) : ¬Testimony(B),¬TestimonyO(B)r′3 = ◯Believe(R)
.




A clear benefit of using r6 over r′3, so the thought goes, is that we don’t even
need a fancy logic that can handle hedges, and that classical logic alone suffices for
generating intuitively appropriate ◯-formulas from contexts.
Unfortunately, this line of reasoning is wrong. Admittedly, there’s something
that r6 with classical logic in the background get right, namely, that ◯Believe(R)
will not follow in the contexts where it shouldn’t, namely, those that include the for-
mulas Testimony(B) and TestimonyO(B). But the problem is that ◯Believe(R)
will not follow in those contexts where it should follow either. To see this consider
the epistemic situation where you’re given only one piece of information, namely,
that the object in front of you looks red. We can encode it in the (unhedged) context
c6 = ⟨W,R⟩ where W is comprised of Testimony(R) and R includes the rule r6.
Now note that the rule r6 alone doesn’t let us get the formula ◯Believe(R) from
Testimony(R). Why? Well, for the rule to get triggered, that is, for it to be the
case that W ⊢ Premise[r6], the context’s hard information W would also need to
include ¬Testimony(B) and ¬TestimonyO(B). But it doesn’t.
There is a way, familiar from the defeasible logics literature, to force the rule
r6 to get triggered in the context c6, as well as all the other contexts that contain
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Testimony(R), but neither Testimony(B), nor TestimonyO(B). Described at a
high level, the trick is to treat all the formulas as false, unless specified otherwise.
Were we to make use of this trick, upon receiving c6, the formalism would treat
Testimony(B) and TestimonyO(B) as false, or, as it were, add ¬Testimony(B)
and ¬TestimonyO(B) toW; and this would allow the rule r6 to get triggered. In the
literature, this is know as the closed-world assumption or closed-world reasoning.22
However, making use of this trick also means departing from classical logic and
embracing a defeasible consequence relations. So defeasible logics appears to be
inseparable from the hedged-rules view.
One last question: Why opt for a view on rules where hedges and premises
are kept distinct, as opposed to one where they aren’t and supplementing it with
the closed-world assumption? The answer is simple: The former makes for a more
nuanced and more expressive view. (This will become clear in Section 2.1)
1.4 Contributory-rules strategy
1.4.1 General strategy and the model
The second general strategy for responding to the problem that epistemic
conflicts give rise suggests that simple epistemic rules are, in fact, contributory.
On this proposal, Testimony doesn’t say that you ought to believe that X in any
epistemic situation that includes outstanding testimony that X, but only that you
have a reason to believe that X in any such situation. How does this help with the
22See (Reiter 1978).
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problem? Well, suppose that you’re in a situation where the object looks red to
you, but a reliable source tells you that it is blue. If Perception and Testimony are
contributory, we only get the conclusions that you have a reason to believe that the
object is red and that you have a reason to believe that the object is blue. Reasons,
of course, are pro tanto, and so a dilemmic conflict gets reduced to a conflict that
we can live with.
But how are we to capture contributory rules, and the corresponding view, in
the formalism? Let’s start with Contributory Perception. One way of expressing it
is:
Perceive(X)
There’s a reason to Believe(X)
.
Now, if all one cares about is avoiding the problem, then this schema certainly does
the job, as “There’s a reason to Believe(X)” is never going to be in contradiction
with any statement of the form “There’s a reason to Believe(Y ),” even if X and Y
are inconsistent. But there’s also a good reason to be dissatisfied with this schema.
Recall that simple rules were supposed to get us from a description of any particular
epistemic situation to the doxastic attitudes that the agent ought to have in that
situation. In our formal setting, this is the question of which ◯-formulas follow from
a given epistemic context. The problem is that it isn’t clear how we are to get to
the statement ◯Believe(X), or, perhaps, ◯Believe(Y ), from “There’s a reason
to Believe(X)” and “There’s a reason to Believe(Y ).” Here one might, of course,
say that this will depend on the relative weights of the relevant reasons, and that’s
exactly right. However, the suggestion doesn’t actually bring us much to deriving
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◯-formulas from contexts. (Note too that a statement of the form “There’s a reason
to Believe(X)” doesn’t even tell us what the reason for believing X is.)
Luckily, there’s a better way to capture contributory rules. Taking a cue from
John Horty (2012) and John Pollock (1995, 1999), we can think of Contributory











. Intuitively, r7 should be understood as saying
that Testimony(R) favors or counts in favor of believing R, or that the testimony
that the object in front of you is red counts in favor of believing that it is red. Note
that there’s no presumption that the epistemic situation, against the background of
which we are thinking about r7, must include Testimony(R). Rather, the favoring
relation should be thought of as hypothetical: If Testimony(R) obtained in the
situation, then it would favor believing R. Functionally, what r7 does for us in
the model is let us infer Believe(R) once Testimony(R) has been established by
default. The qualification “by default” is very important, and it is added because
the presence of Testimony(R) in an epistemic situation does not yet guarantee that
it will be possible to infer Believe(R), as other rules might come in the way. (We
will see how this works in detail in just a little bit.) A huge advantage of thinking
of contributory rules in this way is that there’s a method for deriving ◯-formulas
from such rules and their interaction within a hand’s reach.
It’s both standard and natural to associate contributory rules with relative
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weights—in the end, they express the favoring relations, and everyone agrees that
those come with relative weights.
To capture these weights in the formalism, we will introduce a new device: a
priority relation over rules.23 Where r and r′ are simple (unhedged) epistemic rules,
a statement of the form r ≤ r′ will mean that r′ is at least as strong as r, or that r′
has at least as much weight as r. We will require that the relation ≤ satisfies some
natural properties. First, it must satisfy the reflexivity property,
r ≤ r′,
according to which each rule is at least as strong as itself. Second, the relation ≤
must also satisfy the transitivity property,
r ≤ r′ and r′ ≤ r′′ entail r ≤ r′′,
according to which whenever r′′ is at least as strong as r′ and r′ is at least as strong
as r, r′′ must be at least as strong as r. Any relation satisfying reflexivity and
transitivity is called a preorder, and so I will sometimes refer to ≤ as a preorder. It
will also be useful to introduce some shorthand: When we have r ≤ r′ without r′ ≤ r,
we will write r < r′. And when we have both r ≤ r′ and r′ ≤ r, we will write r ∼ r′.
In Sections 1.2 and 1.3, we captured epistemic situations using the notion of a
context, which was always a pair of the form ⟨W,R⟩. Here we will capture epistemic
situations using the notion of a weighted context that adds a third element to the
pair, namely, a preorder ≤ on the rules in R.
23This is a standard move—see e.g., (Pollock 1995) and (Horty 2012).
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Definition 1.8 (Weighted epistemic contexts) A weighted epistemic context c
is a structure of the form ⟨W,R,≤⟩, where W is a set of ordinary propositional
formulas, R is a set of contributory rules, and ≤ is a preorder on R.24
Our first weighted context c7 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ will capture the familiar epistemic situa-
tion where one reliable source tells you that the object in front of you is red and
another, equally reliable source, tells you that this object is blue. This context’s hard
information W contains the propositions Testimony(R) and Testimony(B). And








with r7 ≤ r8 and r8 ≤ r7, or r7 ∼ r8. Notice that r7 ∼ r8, in effect, says that r7 and r8
have the same weight.
The next step is to specify how the ◯-formulas are to be generated from
c7 and other weighted contexts. When dealing with regular contexts from Section
1.2, we acquired such formulas from the rules that were triggered. Now we add an
extra condition: A rule must not only be triggered, but also there must not be
another rule that would outweigh it. What are the conditions under which one rule
outweighs another? Well, the first one is that the two rules must support contrary
conclusions. And here we need to extend our notion of contrary rules so that it






of some weighted context c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ are contrary in it, written
as contraryc(r, r′), if and only if Y and W are inconsistent. The second condition
24Just as we did in the case of hedged contexts, we build it into the definition of a weighted
context that it doesn’t contain multiple rules having the same premise and conclusion, or require
that, for any two r, r′ ∈R, in case Premise[r] = Premise[r′] and Conclusion[r] = Conclusion[r′],
then r = r′.
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for one rule outweighing another is that both are triggered. And the third that the
outweighing rule has at least much weight as the rule that gets outweighed. Once
this is realized, the following definition should look very natural.
Definition 1.9 (Binding rules) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a weighted context. The rules
from R that are binding in c are those that belong to the set
Binding(c) = {r ∈R ∶ r ∈ Triggered(c) and
there is no r′ ∈ Triggered(c) such that
(1) r ≤ r′ and
(2) contraryc(r, r′)}.
Let’s see this definition at work, when applied to c7. Both rules r7 and r8 are trig-
gered in this context, but neither one of them qualifies as binding. Why doesn’t r7
qualify? Well, the rule r8 is as strong as r7 and also contrary to it, contraryc(r7, r8),
since R and B are materially inconsistent. And similar reasoning applies to r8. The
◯-formulas following from weighted contexts, in turn, will be determined by the
following definition:
Definition 1.10 (Consequence, weighted) Let c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ be a weighted epis-
temic context. Then the statement
◯X follows from c just in case X ∈ Conclusion[Binding(c)].
Notice the two differences from the first-pass definition from Section 1.2. First,
Binding(c) has been substituted for Triggered(c). And second, X has been changed
for ◯X in the final expression, reflecting the change in the structure of rules.
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Since the set Conclusion[Binding(c7)] is empty, neither ◯Believe(R), nor
◯Believer(B) follows from the weighted context c7, just like they didn’t follow
from the corresponding hedged context c3.
Now let’s try to capture the subsequent unfolding of the story. The second
episode—that is, the one where you look at the object and see that it’s red—can be
encoded in the weighted context c8 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩, where W contains Testimony(R),





; and we have r7 ∼ r8 < r9. The third and final episode,
in turn—the one in which the Epistemology Oracle tells you that the object is
blue—can be encoded in the weighted context c9 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩, where W is like in




; and we have r7 ∼ r8 < r9 < r10. It’s straightforward
to verify—which we won’t do here—that the context c8 entails ◯Believe(R) and
that the context c9 entails ◯Believe(B). Note that the situation wouldn’t be any
different if the rules r9 and r10 would be present in the first two contexts. That is,
were c7 and c8 to have the same set of rules (plus the ordering) as c9 does, the result
would still be that, in the first episode, you ought to suspend belief about the color
of the object, that, in the second episode, you ought to believe that the object is
red, and that, in the third, you ought to believe that the object is blue.
Notice that the two alternative ways of capturing the little epistemic vignette—
using hedged contexts and weighted contexts—lead to the same recommendations:
neither the formula ◯Believe(R), nor ◯Believe(B) follows from both c3 and c7,
only ◯Believe(R) follows from both c4 and c8, and, then, only ◯Believe(B) fol-
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lows from both c5 and c9. This prompts the question of whether or not such close
correspondence will be observed more generally. We will soon see that the answer
to this question is affirmative—with some qualifications—which, in turn, suggests
that the views are extensionally equivalent. What’s more the connections between
the views actually run deeper than mere extensional equivalence. But to see this,
we must look at the most natural way of understanding reasons and defeat in the
model of the contributory-rules view.
1.4.2 Reasons, reason strength, and defeat
Again, we take the rules as primitive, understanding them as standing for the
favoring relations, and define the other notions in their terms. Suppose we have an
agent finding herself in some epistemic situation that we capture using the weighted
context c = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩. How are to think of the epistemic reasons that the agent has in
this situation? Well, here my proposal parallels the one we discussed when thinking
about the hedged-rules view: Reasons should be identified with the premises of those
rules that are triggered in this context. More specifically, the proposition X is to
be defined as a reason for Y in the context c = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩ if and only if there is
a rule Xr =
Y
in R that is triggered in c. In this case, we would again say that r
provides a reason for Y , that X’s being a reason for Y depends on r, and that X and
Y stand in the reason relation. To see the proposal at work, consider the weighted
context c9 = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩, which expresses the final episode of our running example. We
















, and noted that all of them
are triggered in the context. As a consequence, the premises of all of these rules
qualify as reasons that you have. And, to be more precise, Testimony(R) and
Perceive(R) are your reasons for believing that the object is red and Testimony(B)
and TestimonyO(B) are your reasons to believe that the object is blue.
Contrary to our model of the hedged-rules view, in the contributory rules one
it is very natural to talk about various relations that can obtain between reasons.
For instance, we can give a precise characterization of the intuitive ideas of when
two reasons conflict, as well as when one reason is stronger, or has more weight,
than another. Let c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ be a context and let X and Y be epistemic reasons
in this context, X a reason for Z and Y a reason for W . Then X and Y conflict,
or are conflicting reasons, if and only if the rules that they depend on are contrary.
What about the relative strength of reasons? Using the same abstract example, we
would say that X is at least as strong of a reason for Z as Y for W if and only if
the rule r that X depends on is at least as strong as the rule r′ that Y depends on,
that is, if and only if r′ ≤ r. Extension to other relations are straightforward: X as
a reason for Z is strictly stronger than Y is for W if and only if X is at least as
strong as Y and Y is not at least as strong as X. X is a weaker reason for Z than
Y is for W if and only if Y is stronger than X. And the strengths of X as a reason
for Z and Y as a reason for W are incomparable if and only if neither X is stronger
than Y , nor Y is stronger than X.
Now let’s turn to the notions of defeat and defeaters. We can characterize them
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in two equivalent ways. The first appeals to the formal notion of binding rules from
previous section; the second proceeds in terms of conflicts between reasons and their
relative strengths. Yet again, we fix a weighted context c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ and suppose
that, in it, some proposition X is a reason for Y and that X being a reason for Y
depends on the rule Xr =
Y
. Then we say that X is defeated as a reason for Y
in the context of c when the rule r is not among the set of rules that are binding
in c. Looking at our definition of bindingness, we see that this implies that there is
another rule r′ in R that is, first, contrary to r, second, triggered in c, and, third,
at least as strong as r (that is, r ≤ r′). In this case, we say that the premise of this
further rule r′ is a defeater of r and, hence, X as a reason for Y . Alternatively, we
can say that X is defeated as a reason for Y in the context of c when there’s also a
reason Z (for some W ) in c that’s in conflict with X as a reason for Y and that is
at least as strong a reason for W as X is for Y . In this case, again, Z is a defeater
of X as a reason for Y .25





Since it is triggered in c9, the proposition Testimony(B) qualifies as a reason to
believe that B. But given the fact that r8 is not among the rules that are binding in
c9, it is defeated. And just as it was in the case of the corresponding hedged context




is triggered in the
context c9, contrary to r8, and as strong as r8 is, and so its premise Testimony(R)





contrary to, and stronger than r8, and so its premise Perceive(R) too qualifies as a




Chapter 2: Connections and implications
2.1 Correspondence between the views and some implications
2.1.1 Contributory equals restricted hedged
Now we have two models—the model of the hedged-rules view from Section
1.3 and the model of the contributory-rules view from Section 1.4. They offer fairly
different pictures of simple epistemic rules, defeat of such rules, as well as cases of
epistemic conflict. According to the first model, epistemic rules have built-in hedges
that specify the conditions under which the rule doesn’t apply. Defeat is understood
in terms of these conditions: When one of them obtains, the rule gets defeated
and fails to apply. Consequently, any situation where two epistemic rules support
contrary conclusions should be thought of as a conflict that’s only apparent, because,
in it, at most one of these rules applies. According to the second model, epistemic
rules are contributory, and they specify what counts in favor of or against the agent
having an attitude, as opposed to specifying (individually and independently of
other rules present) what beliefs the agent ought to have. Defeat is understood in
terms of presence of other rules that support contrary conclusions and are stronger
than the given one. Consequently, any situation in which two epistemic rules support
contrary conclusions should be thought of as a situation of genuine conflict, but a
conflict that is resolvable due to the contributory character of the rules involved.
In spite of these differences, the two models turn out to be equivalent in the
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following sense. There’s a simple procedure that lets us transform any weighted
context into a closely corresponding hedged context (of a particular shape): A con-
sideration X qualifies as a reason in the hedged context if and only if it qualifies as a
reason in the original weighted context; X comes out as a defeated reason in the new
context if and only if it comes out defeated in the original context; and ◯X follows
from the hedged context if and only if ◯X follows from the weighted context. Sim-
ilarly, there’s a simple procedure that lets us transform any hedged context (from a
specific class of such contexts) into a corresponding weighted context: Yet again, X
is a reason in one context if and only if it is a reason in the other; X is a defeated
reason in one context if and only if it is a defeated reason in the other; and ◯X
follows from one context if and only if it follows from the other. The equivalence
holds under certain natural restrictions, which I want to be explicit about.
Let’s start with the contributory-rules view. Our regimented version of the
view should be thought of as consisting of two parts. The first part concerns the
logic of interaction between contributory rules, and what it says is that it just is the
defeasible logic we specified in Section 1.4, the logic that lets us get to ◯-formulas
from any given weighted context. The view’s second part concerns the shape of the
overall set of weighted contexts, and we can express it as a constraint on an arbitrary
weighted context c, referring to the contexts that satisfy the constraint as regular.
Definition 2.1 (Regular weighted contexts) Let c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ be a weighted
context. We say that c is regular if and only if, for any two rules r, r′ ∈R such that
contraryc(r, r′), either r ≤ r′ or r′ ≤ r (or both).
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This constraint can be seen as expressing the original motivation behind the contributory-
rules view, namely, to avoid the counterintuitive conclusion that cases in which sim-
ple rules conflict are dilemmic. Since contributory rules were proposed in response
to the problem of epistemic conflicts, the constraint seems to be well in place.1
Similarly, our regimented version of the hedged-rules view is best thought of
as a two-part view. The first part, again, concerns the logic of interaction between
hedged rules. And the second part, again, concerns the overall set of hedged contexts.
This time, however, there’s not one but two constraints a context has to satisfy to
qualify as regular.
Definition 2.2 (Regular hedged contexts) Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩ be a hedged context.
We say that c is regular if and only if
(1) for any two rules r, r′ ∈ R such that contraryc(r, r′), either ¬Premise[r′] ∈
Hedge[r] or ¬Premise[r] ∈Hedge[r′] (or both); and
(2) for any rule r in R, the hedge of r is the set {¬Premise[r′] ∶ r′ ∈ R′} where
R′ ⊆ {r′ ∈ R ∶ contraryc(r, r′)}, or, in English, each rule’s hedge can contain
only negations of the premises of those rules that are contrary to it.
The first constraint requires little argument. It is, again, just what motivated the
hedged-rules strategy in the first place. What it effectively does is ensure that, in
any context where two contrary rules get triggered, at least one fail to apply.
1Admittedly, the constraint rules out the possibility of epistemic dilemmas for contributory-
rules view. Is this problematic? Well, given that the contributory- and the hedged-rules views
are both thought of ways of avoiding a commitment to the existence of dilemmas, that a similar
constraint will rule out dilemmas for hedged-rules view, and that, in this part of the dissertation,
we’re mainly interested in the connections between the two views on rules, there doesn’t seem to
be anything problematic.
44
What about the second constraint? On the intuitive level, it may be best
thought of as a restriction on what rule hedges can do. In effect, it allows that
hedges do one thing only, namely, provide a way out of clashes between simple
rules. Admittedly, one might argue that this is controversial, but there are some
good reasons to have it in place—reasons, that is, that have nothing to do with the
fact that we need it to establish the correspondence between the models—and we
will return to the issue in Section 2.2. For now, note the following: When ethicists
talk about hedged rules—or views resembling the hedged-rules view—they often
suggest that rule hedges will only refer to other rules, and the constraint can be
naturally seen as a way of capturing this idea in our framework.2
To emphasize the closeness of any two corresponding pairs of contexts in the
actual statement of the result, it will be useful to introduce the notion of a rule’s
counterpart in a different context. Thus, given a rule r from some context c, whether
hedged or contributory, we will say that its counterpart in a different context is the
rule (if any) that has the same premise as r and the conclusion of which corresponds
to that of r.
Definition 2.3 (Counterparts of rules) Let r be a hedged rule of the form X : Z
◯Y
and c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ a weighted context. If there’s a rule r′ ∈ R with Premise[r′] = X
and Conclusion[r′] = Y , we say that r′ is the (weighted) counterpart of r in the
context c, written as counterpartc(r) = r′.
Let r be a rule of the form X
Y
and c = ⟨W ,R⟩ a hedged context. If there’s a
2See, for instance, (Dancy 2004) and (Holton 2002).
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rule r′ ∈ R such that Premise[r′] = X and Conclusion[r′] =◯Y , we say that r′ is
the (hedged) counterpart of r in the context c, written as counterpartc(r) = r′.
The result itself are the following two observation—both of which are verified
in the Appendix:
Observation 1 Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a regular hedged context. Then there is a regular
weighted context c′ = ⟨W ′,R′,≤⟩ such that
(1) W ′ =W;
(2) for every rule r′ ∈R′, there’s a counterpart rule r ∈R;
(3) X is a reason for Y in c if and only if X is a reason for Y in c′;
(4) X is defeated as a reason for Y by a consideration Z in c if and only if X is
defeated as a reason for Y by Z in c′; and
(5) ◯X follows from c if and only if ◯X follows from c′.
Observation 2 Let c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ be a regular weighted context. Then there is a
regular hedged context c′ = ⟨W ′,R′⟩ such that
(1) W ′ =W;
(2) for every rule r′ ∈R′, there’s a counterpart rule r ∈R;
(3) X is a reason for Y in c if and only if X is a reason for Y in c′;
(4) X is defeated as a reason for Y by a consideration Z in c if and only if X is
defeated as a reason for Y by Z in c′; and
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(5) ◯X follows from c if and only if ◯X follows from c′.
Observations 1 and 2 reveal a very close connection between the two models.
But what do they tell us about the relations between the views that these two models
represent? For starters, if the two models represent the views adequately—as I think
they do—then the observations, through points (5), certainly show that the views
are extensionally equivalent, or that the views captured by the models provide the
same answers to the question of what beliefs the agent ought to have in some given
epistemic situation. While the extensional equivalence of the views might not come
as that much of a surprise—in the end, they were proposed as responses to the same
problem—the observations establish more than a mere extensional equivalence .
First, points (3) and (4) suggest that there’s a one-to-one correspondence between
other normative notions in these views. If we look back at how the concepts of a
reason and defeat were defined in Sections 1.3.3 and 1.4.2, we should find this quite
surprising. While the definitions of the first notion, reason, run parallel, the same
can’t be said about the notion of defeat. And second, the two observations also
reveal the conditions under which the hedged-rules view and the contributory-rules
view are extensionally equivalent: The correspondence holds only for those contexts
that satisfy the constraints expressed in the definitions of regular contexts. One
constraint (the no-dilemmas constraint) is shared by both types of contexts, but the
other one isn’t. So it reveals what shape rule hedges must have for the hedged-rules
view and the contributory-rules view to be equivalent. Also, note the following: With
this constraint in place, we are dealing with a restricted version of the hedged-rules
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view; and it is the restricted version that’s equivalent to the contributory-rules view.
We will discuss the full version of the view in Section 2.2 and see that it is more
expressive.
Before we do that, however, I want to show how the close connections between
the views revealed by the result can be used to show that some received ideas
about the hedged-rules view are mistaken. So, in the remainder of this section, I
will zoom in on two phenomena that the hedged-rules view is standardly taken to
fail to account for; explain how they can be accounted for in the contributory-rules
view; and then mimic the explanation in the hedged-rules view. What are the two
phenomena? Well, the first one is more transparent in the moral domain. It’s what
we might call the residual badness that’s observable in at least some situations where
the agent acts just as she ought and yet still has some reason to regret not having
acted otherwise. The second phenomenon is what we might call the composition
of reasons : It’d seem that there are at least some situations where two (or more)
weaker considerations together defeat a consideration that’s stronger than each of
them taken in isolation.3
2.1.2 Residual badness and regret
While the importance of residual badness and the regret that comes with it
is widely recognized in moral philosophy, the status of this phenomenon in epis-
temology is less clear. In fact, the question of whether or not it even needs to be
3Both residual badness and composition of reasons are often brought up in arguments against
the hedged-rules view, but, as we will see, wrongly so. Dancy (2004), for instance, associates the
hedged-rules view with Holton (2002) and Scanlon (1998, 2000) and points to the two phenomena
to argue against it—see especially (Dancy 2004, pp. 22–9).
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accounted for in epistemic contexts is controversial. I suspect that, upon reflection,
most epistemologists would say that the phenomenon is real, even if they would
add that the epistemic situations that involve residual bad-making features are less
common and far more unusual than the situations that involve such features in the
moral domain. In the end, the recent work of Christensen (2007a, 2010a, 2013) on
higher-order evidence and related issues seems to have convinced most people that
there are peculiar epistemic situations such that, even if the agent responds to the
them by adopting the doxastic attitudes that she ought, there’s still something bad
or regrettable about the doxastic state that she ends up in.4 But not all epistemol-
ogists are convinced. Bradley (2019), for instance, has suggested that if the agent
does what she ought to (epistemically) and doesn’t comply with a defeated epistemic
rule as a result, the situation doesn’t involve any residual bad-making features and
there’s no place for regret, whether this regret be epistemic or otherwise.5 I myself
side with the majority (or what I think the majority is), but nothing in my argument
will depend on this. For what I will do is establish the following conditional claim: If
there are epistemic situations involving residual bad-making features, then we can
account for them using contributory rules, as well as hedged rules.
Given that the phenomenon is less controversial in ethics, it will be more
4Christensen’s own stance on the issue appears very clearly in the following passage: “[..I]t seems
to me that we should continue to recognize a sense in which there is often something epistemically
wrong with the agent’s beliefs after she takes correct account of [higher-order evidence]. There’s
something epistemically regrettable about the agent’s being prevented, due to her giving [higher-
order evidence] its proper respect, from following simple logic, or from believing in the hypothesis
that’s far and away the best explanation for her evidence” (Christensen 2010a, p. 204).
5See (Bradley 2019, p. 9). I don’t find Bradley’s argument at all convincing. All he does is
appeal to our intuition in situations where the defeated rule is strongly undermined—we’ll take a
closer look at such cases in Section 2.2.1. But, clearly, the fact that it intuitively seems to us that
there’s no place for regret in this type of situations doesn’t establish that there there’s no place
for regret in any type of situation.
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convenient for us to shift attention from epistemic contexts to moral ones, as well
as from simple epistemic rules to their counterpart in the moral domain, what we
might call moral duties or moral principles. Not surprisingly, this means that we
need to make some slight adjustments to the interpretation of the formal language
we have been using. Most importantly, we must broaden the meaning of the deontic
operator ◯(⋅). Henceforth, a formula of the form ◯X, with X ≠ Believe(Y ) for
some Y , should be read thus: According to the dictates of morality, it ought to be
the case that X, or, simply, it morally ought to be the case that X. Above we used
the notion of a context to express epistemic situations, but we can just as well use it
to capture moral situations. One important difference between epistemic and moral
contexts is that the conclusions of the rules of the latter won’t include any formulas
of the form Believe(X). For moral duties or principles will speak to what ought to
happen, as opposed to what beliefs the agent ought to have.
Now let’s zoom in on the phenomenon, starting with the following timeworn
example:
Drowning Child: You have promised your friend Taylor to have a din-
ner with her. Your route to the restaurant takes you past a pond, and,
as you are walking past it, you notice that a child has fallen in. The
child is crying in distress, and all your evidence suggests that it is going
to drown, unless you do something about it. However, if you rescue the
child, you will get your clothes wet and muddy, and won’t make it to
the dinner with Taylor.
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Perhaps everyone would agree that you ought to save the child, thereby missing the
dinner with Taylor. So were you to save the child, you’d be acting as you ought.
However, even if you did that, you’d likely still feel some regret about letting Taylor
down by not keeping your promise to her. In fact, it seems that such a feeling of
regret would be appropriate, and that you would owe her an explanation and an
apology.
It’s widely agreed that a major selling point of contributory moral principles,
what W. D. Ross (1930) called prima facie duties, is that they naturally account
for residual bad-making features and regret involved in situations like the Drowning
Child. How? Well, let’s say that you think of the ethical system as consisting of
duties, involving the duty to keep one’s promises and the duty to help those who
are in need. Then we would say that, in the particular circumstances that obtain in
Drowning Child, the duty to save the child is much stronger, and that it outweighs
the duty to keep promises. However, the latter duty remains in place, in spite of
being outweighed, and the presence of this residual duty explains why the feeling of
regret and an apology to Taylor are appropriate.
Let’s now see how this can be captured precisely in our model of the contributory-
rules view, or, rather, the view on which moral principles are contributory. The first
step is to express the case in a (moral) context. Let Promise stand for the propo-
sition that you have promised to dine with Taylor; Dine for the proposition that
you dine with her; Drowning for the proposition that the child is drowning in the
pond and needs your help, and Save for the proposition that you save the child. We
assume that Save and Dine are materially inconsistent. The relevant instance of the
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duty to keep one’s promises can be captured by means of the rule Promiser11 =
Dine
,
saying that your promise to Taylor is a reason for you to dine with her, or that, by
default, you ought to dine with Taylor if you have promised to do so. The relevant





, saying that the child’s drowning is a reason for you to save
it. The entire situation can then be encoded in the context c10 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩, where
the hard information W is comprised of Promise and Drowning, while R includes
the rules r11 and r12 with r11 < r12. It’s easy to check that the formula ◯Save follows
from c10, supporting the intuitive conclusion that you ought to save the child.
But we may also want to capture the residual badness involved in this situation
and others like it. One straightforward way to do so is by associating it with what we
might call residual reasons, or reasons that are in force in the situation and yet do
not have a corresponding ought, or reasons that get outweighed by stronger ones.
Accordingly, we can say that, given some weighted context c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩, regret
about not Y -ing is appropriate if, in c, there’s at least some reason X to Y , and yet
all the reasons for Y -ing are defeated. The fact that Promiser11 =
Dine
is triggered
in c10 means that you have a reason to dine with Taylor, namely, Promise. But
this reason is defeated by a stronger one, namely, Drowning, and, given that you
don’t have other reasons to dine with Taylor, all of your reasons to dine with her are
defeated. And that’s enough to conclude that regret about not-Dine is appropriate.
Can we capture residual badness and regret in the hedged-rules model? It turns
out that we can, and quite easily. First, let’s express the Drowning Child in a hedged
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context. Take the context c11 = ⟨W,R⟩ where W is the set {Promise,Drowning}









It’s easy to see that the formula ◯Save follows from c11, and that Promise comes
out as a reason for Dine, as the only one and also as a defeated one. And there
appears to be nothing in the way of reusing the above statement of the conditions
for when regret is fitting: Given some regular hedged context c = ⟨W,R⟩, regret
about not Y -ing is appropriate if there’s at least some reason to Y , and yet all the
reasons for Y -ing are defeated. With this, the regret about not dining with Taylor
is, again, well in place.
So it looks like we can capture residual badness and regret not only in the
contributory-rules model, but also in the hedged-rules one. This suggests that the
received opinion that one has to appeal to contributory rules (or duties) in order to
account for regret is mistaken, and that the hedged-rules view is, in fact, sufficiently
versatile to account for it too. A question remains, however: What sustains the
common opinion about the hedged-rules view and regret? Why hasn’t the move we
have just made been made before? Well, my best guess is that this is due to the
implicit and very strong assumptions about the shape of rules (or moral principles)
and the logic that governs their interaction. For illustration, let’s take a look at the
way Richard Holton (2002) introduces moral principles—which exemplifies a very
common way of thinking. Holton invites us to imagine a set of descriptive, but
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morally relevant one-place predicates {F1(⋅), F2(⋅), . . . , Fm(⋅)}, such as “is a killing”,
“is done in self-defense”, as well as a moral predicate Fc(⋅), such as “you (morally)
should do” or “you are (morally) permitted to do.” He then goes on to suggest that
these predicates can occur in a moral principle of the form
∀x([F1(x)&F2(x)&⋯&Fm(x)] ⊃ Fc(x)),
as well as in a corresponding set of descriptive sentences {F1(a), F2(a), . . . Fm(a)}.
Two specific principles he considers run thus:
(1) ∀x(x is a killing ⊃ you shouldn’t do x),
(2) ∀x(x is a killing & x is done is self defence ⊃ you may do x).
From here, it should be easy to see how Holton thinks of a principle applying (or not
applying) in a given situation: A principle applies in a situation if and only if the
situation—that’s conceived of as a set of descriptive propositions—can be subsumed
under the principle—conceived of as a universally quantified proposition.6 Why is
this important? Well, on any way of thinking about principles sufficiently close to
this one, a principle will always either fully apply in a situation, or it will wholly fail
to apply, and there will be no place for any sort of middle ground in between. And
without such middle ground, there’s no place for residual duties that could account
for residual badness and regret. In our model, by contrast, a rule’s premise is distinct
from its hedges. As a result, we can distinguish between a rule not applying at all
6Admittedly, Holton’s own view on principles is more nuanced. He goes on to suggest that each
principle, as well as each description of a moral situation must also include a special That’s it
clause. However, this is orthogonal to the point I’m making in the main text.
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and a rule not applying because one of the conditions specified in its hedge obtains
and associate regret with the latter type of cases.
Notice what we have arrived at: Whether we are dealing with a weighted
context or a hedged one, any situation involving multiple triggered rules supporting
opposing conclusion will also involve residual bad-making and regret. Admittedly,
it is natural to wonder if regret is really appropriate in any situation of conflict
between rules or principles, and especially so when conflicts are epistemic. In Section
2.2 we’ll consider a situations where regret does not seem appropriate and discuss
how it fits into the overall picture. Before we do that, however, let’s look at the other
phenomenon that’s standardly taken to cause trouble for the hedged-rules view.
2.1.3 Composition of reasons
The vexed topic of composing reasons has been discussed in both ethics and
epistemology.7 However, only in the ethics literature has it been linked to the dif-
ferent views on rules and argued to cause trouble for the hedged-rules view. So we
will, again, focus on the practical domain. Consider the following example, adapted
from Campbell Brown (2014):
Whiskey vs. Water: Imagine you have to decide whether to drink
whiskey or water. Each option is supported by exactly one reason. If you
choose whiskey, you’ll be happy; if water, healthy. Plausibly, you ought
to do whatever is supported by the strongest reason, and let’s say this is
7For (formal) work on this topic see (Brown 2014), (Delgrande & Schaub 2004), (Gómez Lucero
et al. 2009, 2013), (Horty 2012, 91–5), (Nair 2016), (Pollock 1995, pp. 101–2), (Prakken 2005, 2019),
(Schroeder 2007, pp. 123–45).
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drinking whiskey (happiness outweighs health). But now suppose there’s
a second reason for drinking water: it’s cheap. This new reason, like the
old one, is less strong than the reason for drinking whiskey (happiness
outweighs money). So, as before, drinking whiskey is favored by the
strongest reason. Yet this may no longer be what you ought to do. By
combining together considerations of health and money would seem to
defeat the stronger consideration of happiness that neither could defeat
alone.8
Now, how are we to make sense of the idea that considerations of health and money
combine to give you sufficient reason to drink water? The proponents of contribu-
tory rules are standardly taken to have an answer ready at hand: Supposing, purely
for the sake of simplicity, that there are simple rules corresponding to all the con-
siderations at play in Whiskey vs. Water and that these rules are contributory, one
can say that the weights of the pro-water rules combine to trump the pro-whiskey
rule. The proponents of hedged rules, on the other hand, are supposed to have a
hard time answering this question: Supposing that the rules at play in the situation
are all hedged, it is hard to resist the following conclusion. Were only the consider-
ations of health and happiness to be relevant, we would surely say—or would have
to say—that the situation at hand is one where a condition specified in the hedge
of the pro-water rule obtains, and that this rule fails to apply as a result. What’s
more, we’d say the exact same thing about the other pro-water rule in a situation
where only the considerations of money and happiness are relevant. But, then, it’s
8See (Brown 2014, pp. 779–80).
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hard to resist the conclusion that the overall situation of Whiskey vs. Water is one
where the pro-water rules fail to apply, and that, therefore, there’s no way they
could defeat the pro-whiskey rule.
This line of reasoning appears to be quite convincing at first, but the propo-
nents of the hedged-rules view do actually have a way to respond to it. This becomes
manifest once we look at the case at hand through the lens of our formal frame-
work. The first step will be to see how reason composition can be captured in the
model of the contributory-rules view, the second to extrapolate it to the model of
the hedged-rules view.
Let Whiskey stand for the proposition that you drink whiskey; Water for
the proposition that you drink water; Happiness for the proposition that drink-
ing whiskey would make you happy; Health for the proposition drinking water
would make you healthy; and, finally, Money for the proposition that, were you to
drink water, you would save money. We will also assume that Whiskey and Water
are materially inconsistent.9 Now we could try encoding Whiskey vs. Water in the











with r15 < r17
and r16 < r17. What do the rules say? Well, the first one says that the fact that water
would make you healthy speaks in favor of drinking water; the second says that the
fact that water would let you save money speaks in favor of drinking water; and,
finally, the third rule says that the fact that whiskey would make you happy speaks
9We can easily fill in the details of the story in a way that would justify the constraint that you
can’t drink water as well as whiskey. Perhaps, water is relatively expensive and you simply don’t
have enough money to afford both.
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in favor of drinking whiskey. It’s not difficult to see that the context c12 entails the
formula ◯Whiskey supporting the conclusion that you ought to drink whiskey. But
this is, of course, the wrong result. For we stipulated that, in the case at hand, what
you ought to do all things considered is drink water.
But it shouldn’t be all that surprising that c12 delivers the wrong result, as the
information that considerations of health and money combine is utterly absent from
it. I know of only one way to supplement the context with it, and it’s due to Horty
(2012) who has used a framework that’s similar to ours to model interaction between
reasons. Horty considers the question of composing reasons only briefly, suggesting
that we model it by supplementing contexts with additional rules.10 Adjusting the




and setting it to be stronger than the pro-whiskey rule r17.
The result is the contexts c9 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ where W is just as it was before, R now
also includes r18, and the priority relation tells us what it did before, as well as
that r17 < r18. Unlike c12, the updated context c13 does entail the formula ◯Water,
supporting the intended conclusion that you ought to drink water.
There’s reason not to be entirely satisfied with this way of handling the case:
Nothing of importance would seem to hinge on us supposing that r15, r16, and
r17 are instances of some simple moral principles, prima facie duties, or whatever
we think is the analogue of simple epistemic rules in the moral domain. But the
rule r18 can’t be interpreted in this way. Instead, we must think of it as being
derived from the simple r15 and r16, and derived by a mechanism that lies outside
10See the discussion in (Horty 2012, pp. 91–4).
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our formal model.11 The defeasible logic framework we have been using has plenty
of benefits—in the end, it let us formulate two precise, concrete, and transparent
theories about the shape of simple rules and the way such rules interact in situations
of conflict—but it simply doesn’t have much to say about the way simple rules
combine. The main reason is that the phenomenon itself is highly irregular. In some
cases—like Whiskey vs. Water—two reasons supporting the same conclusion will
indeed combine, but in other cases two reasons supporting the same conclusion
might not only fail to combine, but may actually diminish each other’s initial force,
or cancel it entirely. The formal framework is good for capturing regularities, but if
there are no regularities in the phenomenon, then it shouldn’t be all that surprising
that the framework doesn’t provide insights into it. Nevertheless, the phenomenon
itself is real, and, while not having a worked-out theory about it, we can still capture
it in part by including the rule r18 in the context and suggesting that it is derived
from the two pro-water rules r15 and r16.
Now, in light of the result established in Section 2.1, we know that there is
a hedged context corresponding to c13 that contains a counterpart for each rule in
R and delivers the exact same result. What does it look like? Well, it’s the context




















Of course, the formula ◯Water follows from c14, suggesting that the hedged-rules
view can, in fact, capture cases where weaker considerations combine to defeat
a stronger one, much like the contributory-rules view can. The rule r22, again,
shouldn’t be thought of as an instance of some simple rule schema, but as one
that’s derived from the simple rules r19 and r20. What’s more, the context c9 would
seem to put us in a position to identify the crucial assumption in the reasoning to
the conclusion that the hedged-rules view can’t account for composition of reasons:
Zoom in on some hedged rule r and take any situation satisfying at least one of the
conditions specified in the hedge of r. Then, it’s not only that the conclusion of r
won’t get detached in this situation, but also that r can’t have any other effects on
the situation. In particular, r can’t contribute to the derivation of another stronger
rule with the same conclusion. The preceding discussion suggests that the propo-
nent of the hedged-rules view can deny this assumption and say that what happens
in cases like Whiskey vs. Water is that the two pro-water rules combine to create
a stronger rule, in spite of the fact that they fail to apply, in the sense that their
conclusions don’t get detached.
In case you are dissatisfied with this way of handing cases involving composing
reasons, I have one more consideration for you. I think that our discussion makes
the following clear: If the phenomenon of composing reasons poses a problem at all,
then it is a problem for both the hedged-rules model and the contributory-rules one.
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This, in turn, suggests that with regard to this phenomenon—just as it was with
regard to the phenomenon of residual badness and regret—the hedged-rules view
does as well as the contributory-rules view.
2.2 Undermining
Hitherto all the cases of epistemic (and nonepistemic) conflicts we have con-
sidered were cases where simple rules supported contrary conclusions. But cases of
this sort do not exhaust the space of epistemic conflicts. For there are also situations
where simple rules get undermined. Just suppose that you find yourself in a situation
where you are looking at what seems to be a red object and where the Epistemology
Oracle tells you that Perception—Hedged Perception, Contributory Perception, or
whatever the correct rule turns out to be—is not a genuine rule. It’s very natural to
think that in this case the Oracle’s testimony defeats Perception, that, therefore, it’s
not the case that you ought to believe that the object in front of you is red, and that
this situation is different from the one where the Oracle tells you that the object in
front of you is blue. Our treatment of epistemic conflicts would be incomplete if we
didn’t discuss the way the two different views on rules might handle situations of
this sort.
2.2.1 The limits of the contributory-rules view
It’ll be useful to have a concrete scenario involving undermining defeat on the
table. Consider the following case, due to Jonathan Dancy:
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Drug: Suppose that you have taken a drug that makes blue things look
red and red things look blue to you. Furthermore, you have all the ev-
idence to believe that you have taken this drug and you know how it
works. Now you look at an object in front if you. It looks red.12
Intuitively, what you ought to do in this situation is believe that the object in front
of you is blue. What’s more, it also seems that you don’t have the slightest reason
to believe that this object is red. Normally, an object’s looking red would provide
reason for believing that it is red, but in this case the fact that you’ve taken the
drug and your knowledge of its workings would seem to reduce the effects that your
perception would normally have to nothing.
Dancy (2004, 2017) appeals to cases like Drug—as does Bradley (2019) fol-
lowing him—to argue that views on which rules are contributory can’t be correct.13
The issue is supposed to be that, when we apply some contributory version of Per-
ception to Drug, we end up with the conclusion that you actually do have a reason
to believe that the object is red, or that there’s at least something speaking in favor
of you believing that the object is red, which appears counterintuitive. Note too
that the problem is supposed to be fully general: Contributory rules will deliver
wrong verdicts in all structurally similar cases, as they “[..] say that a feature that
is a reason to believe X is always a reason to believe X” (Bradley 2019, p. 8, my
emphasis). Some authors do not accept this pessimistic verdict.14 But let’s bracket
12The case is adapted from (Dancy 2017).
13Dancy himself, of course, doesn’t talk about contributory rules. He uses the case in his main
argument against the view called generalism, according to which there are no universal moral
principles.
14See e.g., (Horty 2012, Ch. 6) and (McKeever & Ridge 2006).
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that for a minute, and see what our formal model of the contributory-rules view has
to say about the case.
What weighted context would we use to capture the case? Let’s start with the
hard information. Let R be as before—that is, the proposition that the object in
front of you is red—and let Drug stand for the proposition that you’ve taken a drug
that has the effects described in the passage. Then, the context’s hard information
would include the formulas Perceive(R) and Drug. What about the rules? First off,





has to be present in any situation where Perceive(R) obtains. But if we don’t want
the formula ◯Believe(R) to follow from the context, we need an additional rule that




which we can make sense of in the way we made sense of derived rules when dis-
cussing composition of reasons: In the case at hand, the information about the drug’s
effects and the fact that the object looks red to you combine, jointly speaking in
favor of you believing that the object is blue. Unfortunately, we don’t have a good
way to model the composition process, and so we resort to a black box standing for
it, a black box in the form of r23. Putting this together, we acquire the weighted
context c14 = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩, where W = {Perceive(R), Drug} and R includes r9 and
r23, with r9 < r23. It’s easy to check that the formula ◯Believe(B) follows from
c14. But, while this is a welcome result, the context c14 doesn’t actually give us all
that’s intuitively desirable: Since the rule r8 is triggered in the context, Perceive(R)
qualifies as a reason to believe R, even if a defeated one. So the model implies that
there’s at least some reason for you to believe that the object is red. What’s more,
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our discussion of regret in Section 2.1.2 invites a further counterintuitive conclusion:
It is appropriate for you to regret not believing that the object is red. (Generalizing
from c14, it’s difficult to see how we could avoid the counterintuitive conclusions,
given how limited the resources of the model of the contributory-rules view are:
Being an instance of the Perception schema, r8 has to be in place in any context
representing Drug. And given that the object in front of you looks red to you, r8
will get triggered. If it is not to be among the binding rules, the context must also
include some rule r that’s contrary to r8 and at least as strong as it is. But the claim
of r8 will remain standing in the presence of any such rule.)
Now let’s switch gears and try to capture Drug, using the hedged-rules view.
Consider the hedged context c15 where W contains the formulas Perceive(R) and









Yet again, r24 should be thought of as an instance of the Perception schema and r25
as a derived rule. It’s easy to see that ◯Believe(B) follows from c10, as desired.
Unfortunately, however, Perceive(R) again comes out as a reason to believe R.
Now, my strategy for avoiding the coutnerintuitive conclusion will be to revise
the notion of defeat from Section 1.3.3, distinguishing between two types of defeat
and associating only one of them with residual reasons (and regret that may or may
not come with them). Recall how defeat was defined. Given a context c = ⟨W ,R⟩
and a rule r that’s triggered in it, we said that r is defeated by some consideration
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Z if and only if ¬Z ∈ Hedge[r] and Z follows from the context’s hard information.





from R are said to be contrary just in
case Y and W are inconsistent. With these two notions in hand, we can actually
capture the distinction between rebutting and undermining defeat in the model, as
follows:
Definition 2.4 (Rebutting and undermining defeat, hedged view) Let c =
⟨W ,R⟩ be a hedged context and r a rule from R that’s triggered in it. Then:
(1) r is rebutted by a consideration Z in c if and only if r is defeated by Z and
Z = Premise(r′) for some r′ ∈R such that contraryc(r, r′);
(2) r is undermined by a consideration Z if and only if r is defeated by Z and
there is no r′ ∈R such that Z = Premise(r′) and contraryc(r, r′).
How does this distinction help with the Drug scenario? Well, I propose that we
slightly modify the conditions under which a consideration X qualifies as a reason
for Y . Henceforth, we will say that X qualifies as a reason for Y in a context c only
in case the rule r, which X’s being a reason for Y depends on, is both triggered
and not undermined in the context c. (Note that in case the rule r gets rebutted,
X will still come out as a reason for Y .) It’s easy to see that the r24 is defeated in
the context c15. For the proposition Drug qualifies as its defeater: We have both
¬Drug ∈Hedge[r24] and W ⊢Drug. However, Drug is not a premise of some other
rule that would be contrary to r24, and so it is an undermining, and not a rebutting
defeater.
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At this point you may wonder if a similar sort of move, to refine the notion
of defeat, can’t be made in the contributory-rules model. Well, it can’t, and the
result from Section 2.1 can be used to explain why. As a first step, note that the
context c15 does not actually qualify as a regular hedged context. Recall the second
constraint on regular contexts: If c = ⟨W,R⟩ is regular, then the hedge of any rule
r from it can contain only the negations of the premises of those rules from R that
are contrary to it. But the formula ¬Drug is not the negation of any rule from R,
let alone a rule that’s contrary to r24. So while c15 appears to be a perfectly fine
representation of the case, it is not regular. Recall that the result from Section 2.1
established that the contributory-rules view is equivalent to a restricted version of
the hedged-rules view. Drug can be captured using hedged rules, but we have to go
beyond the restricted version, or use a context that’s not regular, to do so.
The fact that c15 doesn’t have a weighted counterpart may indicate that we
won’t be able to adequately capture Drug in the contributory-rules model, but it
doesn’t firmly establish it. So here’s an argument that does: Our result shows that
every weighted context has a hedged counterpart that’s regular. But the only type
of defeat that regular hedged contexts allow for is rebutting defeat. So weighted
contexts allow only for rebutting defeat, and one needs undermining defeat in order
to capture Drug. The following observation supports the crucial second premise—its
simple proof is given in the Appendix:
Observation 3 Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a regular hedged context and r a rule from R
that’s triggered in c. Then, if r is defeated in c, it is rebutted.
66
So our formal model supports the claims of Dancy and others that the contributory
rules-view misdiagnoses cases like Drug, and that, therefore, the view just can’t be
correct.
I can think of two ways the proponents of contributory rules might try resisting
these claims. The first is to point out the seeming arbitrariness in our definitions of
rebutting and undermining defeat: Why did we associate the former with residual
reasons (and regret), rather than the other way around? Couldn’t we just as well
have stipulated that X favors Y only if the rule that X’s being a reason for Y
depends on is not defeated? The answer to this question is simple: We could have
done that, and it would give us the intuitively correct result in Drug, but only at
expense of producing counterintuitive results in a whole plethora of other cases,
that is, all of the epistemic (and, perhaps, nonepistemic) situations where residual
reasons have a place. The second way to resist the claims is by suggesting that our
formal model of the view is defective and doesn’t capture it in full. This line of
thought requires a more complex response.
2.2.2 Mixed view
Suppose a proponent of the contributory-rules view insists that our model of
the view is defective. What should we say in response? Well, I think we should
invite them to explain what the model is lacking and, then, once they do that, we
would add the missing piece to the model. But one thing to look out for in this
process of enhancing the model is that the model we end up with is still a model
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of the contributory-rules view, as opposed to a mixed view, on which rules are both
contributory and hedged. Let me offer an illustration of how this can happen.
Dancy’s Drug scenario is discussed in some detail in (Horty 2012, Sec. 6).
Working with a defeasible logic framework that’s similar to, but also more expres-
sive than, ours, Horty develops a model that is naturally though of as a model of
interaction between contributory rules, much like our model from Section 1.4.15 And
he encodes the Drug case into a contexts that does deliver the intuitive verdict that
the right thing for you to do is to believe that the object in front of you is blue, as
well as that there’s absolutely no reason to believe that it is red.16 How? Well, the
model allows for a special type of exclusionary rules which, when triggered, take
other rules out of consideration. Horty’s representation of the Drug is similar to
our c14, except for that it also includes an exclusionary rule that’s triggered by the




out of consideration, nullifying its effects. I don’t have anything against Horty’s
representation of the scenario, but I also think that the view on rules it implies is
not the simple contributory one anymore. Why? Well, if we have an exclusionary
rule r that gets triggered when X obtains and that takes some other rule r′ out of
consideration, then we can just as well think of X as a circumstance under which
r′ fails to apply.17 Or, to put it in more familiar terms, we can just as well think
of r′ as a hedged rule with ¬X in the hedge, and forgo even mentioning the spe-
15Horty himself presents it as a model of the way reasons interact to support conclusions. How-
ever, rules are basic in the framework, just as they are in ours.
16See, especially, (Horty 2012, pp. 231–2).
17I’m glancing over some details here: One exclusionary rule can be taken out of consideration
by another one, which means that r being triggered doesn’t yet imply that r′ will be taken out of
consideration. These details are not important for the point I’m making.
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cial exclusionary rule r. However, in light of the fact that r′ is a contributory rule,
Horty’s model seems to entail a mixed view on rules, according to which rules are
both contributory and hedged.
Where does this leave us with regard to the idea that we couldn’t capture
Dancy’s case because of the limitations of the formal model, not the (simple) con-
tributory view? I can’t claim to have shown that this idea is wrong, but there appears
to be very good reason to be skeptical about it. What’s more, it’d seem that the
proponent of contributory rules herself should be interested in exploring the mixed
view—since, at this point, conceding that contributory rules can have hedges seems
like a dialectically more promising option than insisting that the formal model is
inadequate. So that’s what we are going to do in the rest of this section: formulate
and explore the mixed view in our framework.
It shouldn’t come as surprise that all we need to do to capture this view in our
framework is combine ideas from Sections 1.3 and 1.4. First off, the contributory
and hedged versions of Testimony and Perception will have the following form:
Testimony(X) : ¬Z1, . . . ,¬Zn
Believe(X)
Perceive(X) : ¬Z1, . . . ,¬Zm
Believe(X)
What makes them different from the corresponding (absolute) hedged schemas are
the conclusions, which are formulas of the form X, as opposed to ◯Believe(X). And
what makes them different from the corresponding (simple) contributory schemas
is the presence of a hedge.
Epistemic situations will be encoded in what we’ll call mixed epistemic con-
texts. Any such context is a triple c = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩ where W, again, states what the
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descriptive features of the situation; R contains instances of rule schemas like the
above two; and ≤ is a preorder on them.
Definition 2.5 (Mixed epistemic contexts) A mixed epistemic context c is a
structure of the form ⟨W,R,≤⟩, where W is a set of ordinary propositional formulas,
R is a set of contributory rules, possibly hedged, and ≤ is a preorder on R.
We can encode the Drug scenario in the mixed context c16 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ where W =









and where the priority relation is empty. At this point we must ask the perpetual
question: How are we to get to the ◯-formulas from mixed contexts like c16? The
first step is to formulate a notion that’s equivalent to those of admissible and binding
rules. And here I simply combine the ideas behind them:
Definition 2.6 (Optimal rules) Let c = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩ be a mixed context. The rules
from R that are optimal in it are those that belong to the set
Optimal(c) = {r ∈R ∶ (i) r ∈ Triggered(c),
(ii) there is no ¬Z ∈Hedge[r] such that W ⊢ Z, and
(iii) there is no r′ ∈ Triggered(c) such that
(1) r ≤ r′ and
(2) contraryc(r, r′)}.
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And, again, we can simply plug this notion into the definition of consequence that
was formulated back in Section 1.2.
Definition 2.7 (Consequence, mixed) Let c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ be a mixed epistemic
context. Then the statement ◯X follows from c just in case X ∈ Conclusion[Optimal(c)].
It’s not difficult to see that ◯Believe(B) does, while ◯Believe(R) doesn’t follows
from the mixed context c16, as desired: The only rule that qualifies as optimal is
r23. The rule r26 is triggered in c16 and so satisfies condition (i). There’s no other
rule in R that would be contrary to r, weightier, and triggered; and so r26 satisfies
condition (iii). However, the hedge of r26 is entailed by the hard information W,
which means that it fails to satisfy condition (ii).
How are we to think about reasons and defeat in this mixed model? The
first thing to note here is that we can easily distinguish between rebutting and
undermining defeat, and in a way that may look more natural than the one we used
in the case of our model of the (absolute) hedged-rules view.
Definition 2.8 (Rebutting and undermining defeat, mixed) Let c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩
be a mixed context and r a rule from R that’s triggered in it. Then:
(1) r is rebutted by a consideration Z in c if and only if Z = Premise[r′] for
some rule r′ such that r′ ∈ Triggered(c), contraryc(r, r′), and r ≤ r′;
(2) r is undermined by a consideration Z in c if and only if ¬Z ∈ Hedge[r] and
W ⊢ Z.
Accordingly, we can say that a consideration X qualifies as a reason for Y in the
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context c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ when the contributory hedged rule that X’s being a reason
for Y depends on is triggered in c and not undermined by any other consideration.
Now, given this way of understanding reasons in the model, we get the intuitive
verdict for c16: Since the rule r26 is undermined by the proposition Drug, its premise
Perceive(R) does not qualify as a reason for believing that the object is red. So all
is good here.
Given that we were able to show that the (simple) contributory-rules view is
equivalent to a restricted version of the hedged-rules view, one may wonder about
the relations between the newly formulated mixed view and the full version of the
hedged-rules view. The following two observations show that the two views are,
again, equivalent—both observations are verified in the Appendix:18
Observation 4 Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩ be a hedged context subject to the following con-
straint: For any two rules r, r′ ∈R such that contraryc(r, r′), either ¬Premise[r′] ∈
Hedge[r] or ¬Premise[r] ∈Hedged[r′]. Then there’s a mixed context c′ = ⟨W ′,R′,≤⟩
such that
(1) W ′ =W;
(2) for every rule r′ ∈ R′, there’s a counterpart rule r ∈ R;
(3) X is a reason for Y in c if and only if X is a reason for Y in c′;
18Extending the definition of rule counterparts to take into account the mixed view is straight-
forward: Let r be a hedged rule of the form
X : Z
◯Y
and c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ a mixed context. If there’s
a rule r′ ∈R such that Premise[r′] =X and Conclusion[r′] = Y , we say that r′ is the counterpart
of r in the context c, written as counterpartc(r) = r
′. Going in the other direction, let r be a
rule and c = ⟨W,R⟩ a hedged context. If there’s a rule r′ ∈ R such that Premise[r′] = X and
Conclusion[r′] = ◯Y , we say that r′ is the (hedged) counterpart of r in the context c, written,
yet again, as counterpartc(r) = r
′.
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(4) X is rebutted as a reason for Y by a consideration Z in c if and only if X is
rebutted as a reason for Y by Z in c′;
(5) ◯X follows from c if and only if ◯X follows from c′.
Observation 5 Let c = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩ be a mixed context subject to the following con-
straint: For any two rules r, r′ ∈R such that contraryc(r, r′), either r ≤ r′ or r′ ≤ r.
Then there is a hedged context c′ = ⟨W ′,R′⟩ such that
(1) W ′ =W;
(2) for every rule r′ ∈ R′, there’s a counterpart rule r ∈ R;
(3) X is a reason for Y in c if and only if X is a reason for Y in c′;
(4) X is rebutted as a reason for Y by a consideration Z in c if and only if X is
rebutted as a reason for Y by Z in c′;
(5) ◯X follows from c if and only if ◯X follows from c′.
What’s more, I strongly suspect it should be possible to establish another
correspondence result, that is, to show that our model of the mixed view is equivalent
to Horty’s model with its special type of exclusionary rules.19 But whether or not
this is indeed the case will have to be left for future work.
Where does this leave us with regard to various views on simple rules and
cases involving undermining defeat? Well, it looks like the mixed view and the full
19I have already noted that Horty’s framework is more expressive than the one I’m using. Hence,
my claim asks for a qualification: I suspect that the model of the mixed view is equivalent to a
fragment of Horty’s model.
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version of the hedged-rules view can adequately deal with such cases, while the
contributory-rules view and the restricted version of the hedged-rules view—that
corresponds to it—cannot adequately deal with them. But does this also mean that
the former views are overall superior to the latter? Here the matter is less clear.
When we formulated the hedged-rules view back in Section 1.3.2, we also discussed
a worry about it: In case it turns out that rule hedges are open-ended, or that there
are infinitely many types of descriptive features that would make the instances of
Testimony, Perception, and other rules schemas fail to apply, then the hedged-rules
view may well reduce to the unattractive Über-rule view. Unfortunately, I don’t
know how to respond to this worry, and so it lingers as a potential threat to the full
hedged-rules view and the mixed view.
The contributory-rules view and the restricted hedged-rules view, on the other
hand, do have a ready response to the worry. According to the former, rules don’t
even have hedges, and so it’s not even clear if the worry applies. And while one
could suggest that the view might still reduce to the Über-rule position, if it turned
out that we need infinitely many simple rule schemas to account for each and every
epistemic situation, this though just doesn’t seem to be plausible.20 So, if there’s a
way to deal with the problem that cases of undermining defeat create—perhaps, one
can argue that there simply isn’t ay need for residual reasons in epistemology and
change the formal notion accordingly—then the contributory-rules view would be
on safer ground than either the full hedged-rules view or the mixed view. And so, in
20See Bradley (2019) and Holton (2002) who suggest that a view on which there are infinitely
many rules reduces to something like an Über-rule view. See also McKeever & Ridge (2006) who
argue that those authors who have tried compiling lists of basic moral principles have ended up
with rather short lists.
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fact, would be its hedged counterpart. How come? Well, supposed that the number
of simple epistemic rule schemas is finite, we can be sure that their hedges will also
be manageable. For, in light of the correspondence result from Section 2.1, we know
that any rule that fails to apply in a situation doesn’t apply because of a descriptive
features that also triggers some other rule. But if there’s a finite number of simple
rule schemas, then the number of types of such features will be finite too. From here,
the list of exceptions to any rule schema will be finite too, and not open-ended.
All in all, the contributory-rules view and the restricted hedged one appear to
have no place for undermining defeat, but have a ready response to the particularist
challenge about the prospect of the complexity of the view spiraling out of control.
The mixed view and the full hedged view can account for undermining defeat, but
are still in need of a convincing response to the challenge.
2.3 Summary
We started with the observation that situations of epistemic conflict give rise
to a serious challenge for the idea that there are at least some simple epistemic rules.
In response to this challenge, one can adopt a view on which such rules have built-in
hedges, a view on which they are contributory (rather than strict), or a view that
combines the first two. We expressed these three seemingly very different responses
to the challenge in a simple framework and went on to establish some correspon-
dence results between them. The (unhedged) contributory-rules view turns out to be
equivalent to a restricted version of the (absolute) hedged-rules view, and the mixed
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view, on which rules are both hedged and contributory, turns out to be equivalent to
the full version of the (absolute) hedged-rules view. These correspondence results do
not only establish that the views are extensionally equivalent, but also that they are
connected at a deeper level. The simpler views have trouble adequately accounting
for undermining defeat, but have a ready response to the particularist worry about
the view’s complexity. The more complex views can account for such defeat, but
they will also have to provide an adequate response to the challenge.
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Part II DEFEASIBLE REQUIREMENTS
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Chapter 3: Misleading higher-order evidence and conflicting ideals
This second part of the dissertation has two goals. The first is to discuss a
further application of the model that we used to capture the conciliatory-rules view:
After a slight amendment, it can be used to develop a solution to an important
puzzle about epistemic rationality. This solution has a number of attractive features
when compared to the other solutions from the literatures, but it also comes with an
unorthodox perspective on rationality requirements, one on which they are defeasi-
ble. The second goal, then, is to situate this perspective in the existent literature.
More specifically, I show that we can naturally make sense of defeasible epistemic
requirements as (regulative) epistemic ideals, and that the defeasible logic we use
to solve the puzzle can be naturally seen as the formal backbone of Christensen’s
(2007, 2010, 2013) conflicting-ideals view. In effect, I’m proposing to understand
this view as a move away from the default metaepistemological position according
to which epistemic requirements are strict and governed by a strong, but never
explicitly stated logic, toward the more unconventional view, according to which
requirements are defeasible and governed by a comparatively weak logic.
The puzzle in question involves a clash between two widely-accepted require-
ments of rationality.1 According to the first—the evidential requirement—epistemic
rationality requires that you have the doxastic attitudes that are supported by your
(total) evidence. According to the second—the inter-level coherence requirement—
1This puzzle has been noticed independently by several authors, including Lasonen-Aarnio
(2020), Littlejohn (2018), and Worsnip (2018).
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rationality requires that your doxastic attitudes are in line with your beliefs about
whether or not these attitudes are supported by your evidence. We will state the two
requirements more precisely in the next section, but for now simply note that they
are distinct, intuitively plausible, and have been supported by strong arguments.2
The trouble is that they come into conflict if we think—as I think we should—that
it’s possible for evidence to be radically misleading regarding what it itself supports.
That is:
Misleading total evidence (MTE): It’s possible that (1) your total evi-
dence supports some doxastic attitude; and that (2) your total evidence sup-
ports believing that your total evidence doesn’t support this doxastic attitude.3
The best, if still contested, illustrations of this sort of evidence from the literature are
cases in which agents receive superb, yet misleading higher-order evidence. Here’s
one example:
Prof. Moriarty’s Drug: Sherlock Holmes is a master sleuth famously
good at assessing evidence. After investigating a murder that took place
at the manor on the hill he concludes (correctly) that the maid is the one
who did it. Not long afterwards Holmes finds out, from a very reliable
source, that his archnemesis Professor Moriarty had slipped a drug into
his morning tea. Holmes knows the drug’s effects too well: In all but 5%
2For a defense of the evidential requirement see (Conee & Feldman 2004) and (Lasonen-Aarnio
2020), among others. For extended defenses of the inter-level coherence requirement see (Feldman
2005), (Horowitz 2014), (Lasonen-Aarnio 2020), (Sliwa & Horowitz 2015), and (Worsnip 2018),
among others.
3The label “Misleading total evidence” comes from (Worsnip 2019).
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of detectives, the ability to assess evidence gets distorted, and in a way
that is not noticeable to them. What Holmes doesn’t know is that he is
among the lucky 5% that are immune to the drug.4
Advocates of (MTE) are pulled to the idea that Holmes’ first-order evidence—
roughly, the clues lying around the house—is sufficient evidence to believe that the
maid did it, and that his higher-order evidence—roughly, the information speaking
to his capacity for evaluating clues—is sufficient evidence to believe that his (total)
evidence does not support believing that the maid did it. Thus, Moriarty’s Drug
would seem to be a case in which both (MTE1) and (MTE2) obtain.5
Once this much is granted, we quickly get into trouble: Holmes’ evidence sup-
ports believing that the maid did it, as well as believing that his evidence doesn’t
support believing that she did. In light of this, the evidential requirement appears
to demand that Holmes believes that the maid did it, as well as that his evidence
doesn’t support believing that she did. The coherence requirement, on the other
hand, appears to demand that Holmes doesn’t believe that the maid did it if he
also believes that his evidence doesn’t support believing that she did. A minute’s
reflection, then, reveals that were Holmes to comply with the first requirement, he
4This vignette amalgamates cases from (Christensen 2007a) and (Coates 2012).
5For the most forceful arguments in favor of (MTE) see (Lasonen-Aarnio 2020, Sec. 3) and
(Worsnip 2018, 2019); see also (Coates 2012), (Littlejohn 2018), and (Weatherson ms). It’s been
suggested to me that (MTE) is more controversial than my setup of the puzzle suggests, as multiple
authors have argued against it. But while (MTE) may be less intuitive of a starting point than
the two requirements, I’ve yet to see an argument against it that wouldn’t be motivated by a prior
commitment to one of the requirements. As a result, I think of those arguing against (MTE) as
responding to the puzzle by denying it—see footnote 19 for a list of references. Also, it’s worth
highlighting that the solution I’m going to present should be of interest independently of the
particular puzzle—and thus the truth of (MTE)—as it naturally generalizes to any puzzle involving
a conflict between epistemic requirements.
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would thereby violated the second, and the other way around. So, supposing the two
requirements are indeed genuine, Holmes simply can’t do what epistemic rationality
requires him to do, implying that Moriarty’s Drug describes a rational dilemma.
What are we to say in response to this? That one of the requirements isn’t
genuine? That total evidence can never radically mislead about itself? That there
are two independent domains of epistemic rationality, a domain that concerns having
attitudes that track one’s evidence and a domain concerned with having the right
sort of fit between one’s attitudes? Or, perhaps, simply bite the bullet and concede
the existence of dilemmas? Well, although these responses have been explored in the
literature, all of them incur intuitive costs and no single one has emerged as a clear
winner.6 And so we are still left with a genuine puzzle about rationality, a puzzle
that has drawn and continues to draw much attention, in epistemology and outside
it.
The main goal of this chapter is to present a solution to this puzzle which—
unlike any of the others—lets us preserve the two requirements, the possibility of
radically misleading (total) evidence, as well as the unity of epistemic rationality,
all while denying that there are dilemmas. There’s a sense in which this solution is
implicit in Christensen’s conflicting-ideals view. (According to this view, there are
inherently unfortunate epistemic situations in which the agent is unable to act in
accordance with all the “epistemic ideals” that apply to them, and not due to their
cognitive limitations, but, rather, the way these ideals relate to each other.7) But the
6I should say upfront that I will not engage with these responses in what follows, focusing on
developing my preferred solution instead. I will, however, provide a fuller classification of responses
with pointers to the literature in Section 3.1.2.
7Various tragic epistemic scenarios of this sort are discussed in, e.g., (Christensen 2007a, 2013,
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route that will get us to the solution is both new and nonstandard. What’s more,
taking it will help us understand the conflicting-ideals view itself much better.8
The core idea is this: There’s an implicit assumption in the literature about what
we might call the logic of interaction between requirements, and the disconcerting
result—that is, the commitment to dilemmas—follows only if this assumption is in
place. The conflicting-ideals view, then, can be naturally thought of as rejecting this
assumption and holding that this logic is weaker than standardly thought, and that
rationality requirements are, in fact, defeasible.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section will 3.1 restate
the puzzle in a formal notation similar to the one we used in the previous chapters.
This exercise will help us unearth the hidden assumption, as well as put us in a
position to apply (an enhanced version of) the model we defined back in Section 1.4
to solve the puzzle—this will be the task of Section 3.2. As we’ll see, there’s good
reason to think of this model as the formal backbone of the conflicting-ideals view.
3.1 The puzzle formalized
3.1.1 Preliminaries
Before we turn to the notation, three notes are in order. First, following Alex
Worsnip (2018, 2019), we’ll be thinking of evidential support as a two-place relation
2016), (Leonard 2020), (Pryor 2018), and (Schechter 2013).
8It’s noteworthy that the literature focusing on the puzzle usually takes Christensen to hold
a view that concedes the existence of rational dilemmas. See e.g., Lasonen-Aarnio (2020), Silva
(2017), and Worsnip (2018) all of whom suggest that he embraces dilemmas. All three authors
propose it as one interpretation of Christensen’s views, but no other interpretation is ever discussed.
82
that obtains between bodies of evidence and doxastic attitudes. It’s worth highlight-
ing that this way of thinking comes with a certain sort of agent-neutrality: Once
you fix the body of evidence, the doxastic attitudes it supports are also fixed. This
doesn’t mean that we’re doing away with the agent—any body of evidence will be
some agent’s body of evidence—but it does mean that we can suppress the agent
in the notation. Second, we’ll try to remain as noncommittal as possible about the
nature of evidence and evidential support relation. What I’m going to say should be
compatible with various ways of thinking about evidence—as a set of propositions,
facts, or mental states—as well as various ways of spelling out the support relation.
And third, we’ll restrict attention to all-or-nothing attitudes—this is not to take a
stance in the debate about the relation between credence and full belief, but to keep
things manageable.9
Our background language will, again, be the language of propositional logic
with all the standard connectives. We supplement the language with the constant
E that will stand for an agent’s total body of evidence. (Sometimes E will stand
for a particular body of evidence, and at other times for an arbitrary one—the con-
text will always let disambiguate.) Further, we will make use of three operators,
two of which we have seen before: The one-place Believe(⋅) will be used to capture
all-or-nothing doxastic attitudes. Thus, Believe(P ) says that the agent believes
P , and Believe(¬Q) says that the agent disbelieves Q.10 The two-place operator
9As is known too well, issues surrounding misleading higher-order evidence do not disappear
once one moves to the credence-based framework—see e.g., (Christensen 2010a). So sticking with
the more parsimonious all-or-nothing attitude-based framework seems like a methodologically
sound move.
10We can also easily express suspension of judgment, either as ¬Believe(P )&¬Believe(¬P ),
or by introducing a new predicate Suspend(⋅). But this particular epistemic attitude won’t have
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Z⇒, in turn, will be used to formulate claims about the evidential support relation.
Thus, E Z⇒ Believe(P ) says that the body of evidence E supports believing P , and
E Z⇒ Believe(¬Q) says that E supports disbelieving Q. Note that Z⇒ is meant to
stand for all things considered support. When an attitude Believe(X) is not sup-
ported by the evidence, we will write E /Z⇒ B(X). We will also form more complex
expressions, including formulas that capture second-order beliefs—an agent’s beliefs
about whether a certain attitude is supported by their evidence—as well as formu-
las that assert the existence of support between E and such beliefs. For example,
Believe(E Z⇒ B(P )) says that one believes that one’s evidence supports believing P ;
and E /Z⇒ Believe(E Z⇒ Believe(P )) says that the evidence doesn’t support having
this second-order belief. Finally, we’ll make use of the customary deontic operator
◯(⋅). The requirements of epistemic rationality set up a certain epistemic standard,
and so a statement of the form ◯X should be read as saying that, according to the
standards of epistemic rationality, it ought to be the case that X. In what follows,
we will often refer to this standard as the epistemic ought.
With this notation in hand, the puzzle can be brought into plain sight. It’s
comprised of three claims. The first captures the evidential requirement:
Evidential requirement (ER): [E Z⇒ Believe(X)] ⊃◯Believe(X)
In English: If your evidence supports believing X, then you ought to believe X.
This thesis is very intuitive, with many epistemologists considering it a platitude.11
Also, it—or something close to it—lies at the heart of the popular philosophical
much of a role to play in the discussion.
11Cf. (Silva 2017) and (Worsnip 2018).
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view called evidentialism.12 The second claim captures the coherence requirement:
Inter-level coherence requirement (ILC):
(1) ◯[Believe(E Z⇒ B(X)) ⊃ Believe(X)]
(2) ◯[Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(X)) ⊃ ¬Believe(X)]
In English: (1) Rationality requires that you believe a proposition if you believe that
your evidence supports that belief. (2) Rationality requires that you do not believe
a proposition if you believe that your evidence doesn’t support that belief. Much of
the appeal of (ILC) derives from the intuition that there’s something seriously wrong
with agents who believe, act, or assert in accordance with mismatched attitudes of
the sort (ILC) prohibits. Note the difference in the formal statement of (ER) and
(ILC). In the former the ought occurs in the consequent, while in the latter it ranges
over the entire conditional. This reflects the distinction between narrow- and wide-
scope rationality requirements that goes back at least to (Broome 1999).13 Assigning
(ER) and (ILC), respectively, narrow and wide scope is standard in the literature.14
12In fact, we can define evidentialism via (ER): An agent is epistemically rational if and only
if their attitudes satisfy (ER). For a concise introduction to evidentialism see (Conee & Feldman
2008). For book-length defenses see (Conee & Feldman 2004) and (McCain 2014).
13Narrow-scope requirements demand that a particular attitude is adopted once the conditional’s
antecedent is satisfied. Wide-scope requirements are supposed to give the agent more freedom.
Consider Alice who finds herself believing that her evidence supports a belief in p. There are
two ways for her to comply with (ILC1)—and we’re supposing that complying with it is all that
matters. Alice can either adopt a belief toward p, or she can drop her initial belief. For more on
narrow vs. wide scope see, e.g., (Broome 2007, 2013). For a recent criticism of the distinction see
(Fogal f).
14See e.g., (Lasonen-Aarnio 2020), (Silva 2017), (Worsnip 2018). Those familiar with the de-
bate about the normativity of rationality might have the following thought here: On some
views in the debate, such structural requirements as (ILC) are either nonnormative—see e.g.,
(Kolodny 2005)—or simply nonexistent—see (Kiesewetter 2017) and (Lord 2018). So the propo-
nents of such views wouldn’t accept (ILC) and, thereby, also avoid the puzzle. But while they
would avoid the particular puzzle we focus on here, they have to deal with a closely related
one. Here’s why. Denying (ILC) standardly goes in hand with accepting disjunctions of (non-
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The third and final claim is the possibility of total evidence that’s radically
misleading regarding itself. We have noted already that many epistemologists would
characterize Holmes’ evidence in Moriarty’s Drug as evidence of just this sort. That
is, they would say that his total evidence supports both believing that the maid did
it, and believing that his evidence doesn’t support believing that she did. Letting
M stand for the proposition that the maid committed the murder, we acquire:
Misleading total evidence (MTE):
(1) E Z⇒ Believe(M)
(2) E Z⇒ Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M))
Note that Moriarty’s Drug is only an example, and that we have a puzzle in case it’s
metaphysically possible that there’s some body of evidence E and some proposition
X with both E Z⇒ Believe(X) and E Z⇒ Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(X)).15
3.1.2 Deriving the disconcerting result
Now all the pieces are in place, and we can construct a proof showing how ex-
actly (ER), (ILC), and (MTE) lead to the conclusion that Moriarty’s Drug describes
a dilemma. We start with facts describing evidential support:
(1) E Z⇒ Believe(M) (MTE1)
structural) requirements ◯¬Believe(E Z⇒ Believe(X)) ∨ ◯Believe(X) and ◯¬Believe(E /Z⇒
Believe(X)) ∨◯¬Believe(X), and, when these are combined with the other components of the
puzzle, very similar problems arise. For a discussion of the kindred puzzle see (Kiesewetter 2017,
Ch. 9.6.2).
15Cf. (Lasonen-Aarnio 2020) and (Worsnip 2018).
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(2) E Z⇒ Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)) (MTE2)
These determine the relevant instances of (ER):
(3) [E Z⇒ Believe(M)] ⊃◯Believe(M) (ER)
(4) [E Z⇒ Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M))] ⊃◯Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)) (ER)
Two applications of modus ponens result in (5) and (6)—which say, respectively,
that Holmes ought to believe that the maid did it, and that Holmes ought to believe
that the evidence doesn’t support believing that the maid did it:
(5) ◯Believe(M) from (1) and (3)
(6) ◯Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)) from (2) and (4)
Next comes the following instance of (ILC):
(7) ◯[Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)) ⊃ ¬Believe(M)] (ILC2)
This formula says that Holmes ought not to believe that the maid did it in case
he believes that the evidence doesn’t support believing that the maid did it. The
subsequent step (8) is the crucial for our purposes. To get further, we need to
appeal to a logical feature of the deontic operator. More specifically, we need to
assume that it satisfies the principle ◯(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (◯X ⊃ ◯Y ).16 Instantiating X
with Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)) and Y with ¬Believe(M), we get (8):
16In the logic literature this is known as the axiom K, and it’s a very natural principle for a
deontic operator to satisfy. But see (Broome 2013, Ch. 7) for an argument to the conclusion that
a logic of requirements (and oughts) shouldn’t be closed under K.
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(8) ◯[Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)) ⊃ ¬Believe(M)] ⊃
(◯Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)) ⊃◯¬Believe(M)) (Deontic Principle)
Then we have two more applications of modus ponens:
(9) ◯Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)) ⊃◯¬Believe(M) from (7) and (8)
(10) ◯¬Believe(M) from (6) and (9)
And, as a final touch, we combine the formulas acquired in steps (5) and (10):
(11) ◯Believe(M)&◯¬Believe(M) conjunction, from (5) and (10)
This last formula is disconcerting because it entails that Holmes finds himself
in a normative dilemma, or a situation in which it ought to be the case that X and
it ought to be the case that Y , while it is impossible for both X and Y to obtain.17
If Holmes complies with either ought on line (11), he thereby violates the other.
So there’s no way he can have the attitudes he ought to have. And given that the
ought statements express demands of epistemic rationality, the derivation suggests
that there are rational dilemmas.
Most epistemologists have tried to resolve the puzzle in ways that keep clear of
dilemmas.18 In particular, they have suggested rejecting (MTE),19 rejecting (ER),20
17This is the standard definition of normative dilemmas—see e.g., (Goble 2009, p. 450) and
(Horty 2003, p. 557).
18The list of authors most likely to be sympathetic to embracing the derivation’s conclusion
would include Hughes (2017) and Priest (2002).
19See (Feldman 2005), (Horowitz 2014), (Kiesewetter 2017, Ch. 9), (Skipper 2019), (Tal f),
(Titelbaum 2015), (White 2007), among many others.
20See (Littlejohn 2018).
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rejecting (ILC),21 or treating the conflict as a clash between two irreducible types
of epistemic rationality.22 The derivation presented here provides a way to classify
these responses: The first move denies one of the premises, the second denies either
step (3) or (4), the third denies step (7), and the fourth rejects step (10).23
The real significance of the derivation, however, consists in it explicitly showing
that the normative component picked out by ◯ makes its own contribution to the
puzzle. In order to get to the disconcerting result, we had to rely on a logical feature
of ◯. On the intuitive level, this can be understood thus: There’s a nontrivial logic
governing the interaction between epistemic requirements, and the puzzle causes real
trouble only if it is further assumed—as most of the literatures has done hitherto—
that this logic is relatively strong.
But this assumption can and should be questioned, as one attractive and
underexplored route of response to the puzzle is to weaken the logic. And I’m sug-
gesting that we understand the conflicting-ideals view as taking just this route. Let
me emphasize that I am not suggesting that it simply denies that the epistemic
ought satisfies the deontic principle we used in the proof. Instead, my suggestion is
that we understand the view as not only changing the logic governing the interac-
tion between epistemic requirements, but also distinguishing it from the logic of the
21Authors who are often taken to reject (ILC) include Coates (2012), Lasonen-Aarnio (2020),
and Weatherson (ms). But Lasonen-Aarnio appears to be the only one to explicitly advocate the
rejection of (ILC) in response to the puzzle.
22See (Fogal f), (Silva 2017, especially, en. 11), and (Worsnip 2018).
23How exactly does it reject step (10)? Well, two types of rationality means two distinct norma-
tive domains, and, hence, also two distinct deontic operators. Worsnip, for instance, distinguishes
between the domains of evidence and coherence, and so implicitly also between the the oughts of
evidence and coherence. The ought occurring on line (6) is an ought of evidence, while the one
occurring on line (9) is an ought of coherence. Since the oughts are distinct, we can’t apply modus
ponens.
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epistemic ought. The result is a view of epistemic normativity, according to which
epistemic oughts are determined through the interaction of defeasible epistemic re-
quirements, or ideals. This response to the puzzle is hardly ad hoc. For, first, it
naturally generalizes to other puzzles involving conflicts between requirements. And
second, it parallels a familiar and well-respected move in the ethical literature on
moral conflicts.
What we are going to do next is define a concrete defeasible deontic logic as
a substitute for the implicitly assumed logic of ◯ and, then, see how it can help
us avoid the disconcerting result. As flagged above, I see this logic as the formal
backbone of the conflicting-ideals view.
3.2 A (formal) solution
3.2.1 A logic for conflicting ideals
The logic we’ll use isn’t really new. Its core is a well-known and studied defea-
sible consequence relation defined in terms of classical consequence and maximally
consistent subsets—I’ll explain the latter notion in due time. Nicholas Rescher and
Ruth Manor (1970) appear to have been the first to define and study consequence
relations of this sort, and Horty (1994, 2003) was the first to apply them in deontic
setting, in the context of the debate over the existence of moral dilemmas. They also
have close connections to Bas van Fraassen’s (1973) deontic logic, Raymond Reiter’s
(1980) default logic, and other logics from the defeasible logic paradigm.24 The con-
24See Horty (1994) and Makinson (2005).
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sequence relation we’ll define here is a close cousin of what’s called the disjunctive
account in (Horty 2003). For expository purposes, we will discuss its application not
only in the epistemic, but also in the moral domain.
The first thing we need to do is distinguish between a weaker and a stronger
sense of ought. This move is standard in the literature on moral dilemmas: Thus,
Roderick Chisholm (1964) writes about prima facie and absolute duties, van Fraassen
(1973) about imperatives and oughts, John Searle (1980) about obligations and
oughts, Philippa Foot (1983) about type 1 and type 2 oughts, Christopher Gowans
(1987) about what we ought and what we must do, and Horty (2003) simply about
weak and strong oughts. The terms used are different, but the underlying idea is
always the same: Take some situation that requires a nontrivial response on the
part of the agent. The first term of the pair would be used to pick out various
moral considerations the agent has and the responses they support; and the second
term would be used to describe what the agent’s response ought to be once all the
relevant considerations are taken into account and weighed against each other. For
illustration consider the well-known example from Sartre (1946) in which a French
youth at the time of Second World War is torn between the patriotic duty to fight
for his country and the filial duty to care for his distressed and aging mother. All the
parties to the debate about moral conflicts would agree—at least, once they left the
terminological differences behind—that there’s a weaker sense of ought, according
to which the youth ought to fight for his country and also ought to stay with his
mother. What they wouldn’t agree on is whether the youth ought to do both of
these things in the stronger sense of ought too—that is, whether he faces a genuine
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moral dilemma.
While drawing an analogous distinction between a weaker and a stronger sense
of the epistemic ought is less common, nothing stands in the way of doing it. What’s
more, if I am right, the conflict-ideals diagnosis of the various inherently unfortunate
or tragic epistemic scenarios discussed in the recent literature entails such a distinc-
tion, as well as the claim that ideals (or requirements) that come into conflicts in
such scenarios express the weaker epistemic oughts.25
Since our main interest is in epistemology, we will employ terminology that is
a better fit for the epistemic than the moral domain: We will refer to the weaker
oughts—whether they be epistemic or moral—as (defeasible) requirements or ideals
and to the stronger ones as all things considered oughts, or oughts without quali-
fication. In the ethical literature, it is common to take the stronger oughts to be
generated from the weaker ones. And that’s just how our logic will work: It will
generate all things considered oughts from the interaction between requirements.
Reserving the ◯ for the oughts, we will express requirements in the same
way we expressed rules in the previous chapters. Where X and Y are arbitrary
propositions, X
Y
says that there’s a demand that Y obtains under circumstances
X, or, alternatively, that, ideally, Y should obtain under circumstances X. Im-
portantly, this demand can get overridden. We will denote requirements using the
letter r (with subscripts). It will, again, be useful to have functions for picking
out the two parts of a requirement: Where r stands for the requirement X
Y
25Let me add a note of caution: Since the moral ought in its weaker sense is roughly synonymous
with the widely used notion of a moral reason, you might naturally expect that the epistemic
ought in its weaker sense must be roughly synonymous with the notion of an epistemic reason too.
However, in the present context the latter two are definitely not synonymous.
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, the output of Premise[r] is the proposition X and that of Conclusions[r] is
the proposition Y . Just like it was in the case of rules, Premise[r] specifies the
triggering conditions of r, or the circumstances under which it comes into force,
while Conclusion[r] specifies its satisfaction conditions, or the circumstances under
which the requirement’s demand gets fulfilled. We will, again, lift the second func-
tion from individual requirement to sets of them: Where R is a set of requirements,
Consequent[R] is the collection of the conclusions of all the requirements from R,
or Consequent[R] = {Consequent[r] ∶ r ∈R}.
Oughts will be generated from contexts, or triples of the form ⟨W,R,≤⟩, con-
sisting of a set of propositional formulas W, a set of requirements R, and a priority
relation ≤ over R. As a reminder, the relation ≤ satisfies reflexivity and transitivity.
Thus, for all requirements r, r′, r′′, we have r ≤ r, as well as, if r ≤ r′ and r′ ≤ r′′,
then r ≤ r′′. The expression r < r′ means that r ≤ r′ and not r ≤ r′, and r ≤ Q that
every requirement in the set of requirements Q has at least as much weight as r.
I should also note that the shape of W will differ, depending on the scenario we
are modeling: In case the scenario pertains to the moral domain, this set will con-
tain formulas expressing the descriptive facts of the situation; in case the scenario
pertains to the epistemic domain, it will contain formulas expressing facts about
evidential support.
Definition 3.1 (Contexts) A context c is a structure of the form ⟨W,R,≤⟩, where
W is a set of propositional formulas, R is a set of requirements, and ≤ is a preorder
on R.
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Notice that what we call contexts here are the same mathematical objects as the
weighted contexts we introduced back in Section 1.4.1. (We can drop the modifier
since all the contexts we will encounter in this chapter are weighted.) In light of
this, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that we will be reusing some of our definitions.
Before we turn to them, however, an example of a context is in order, a context
representing a scenario we have encountered before:
Drowning Child: You have promised your friend Taylor to have a din-
ner with her. Your route to the restaurant takes you past a pond, and,
as you are walking past it, you notice that a child has fallen in. The
child is crying in distress, and all your evidence suggests that it is going
to drown, unless you do something about it. However, if you rescue the
child, you will get your clothes wet and muddy, and won’t make it to
the dinner with Taylor.
Let Promise1 and Dine1 stand for the propositions, respectively, that you have
a made promise to dine with your friend, and that you dine with her, and let
Drowning and Save stand for the propositions that a child is drowning, and that
you save the child. The requirement
Promise1r1 =
Dine1
would then express the de-




the demand that you save the child, given the need. We can en-
code this scenario into the context c1 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ where W contains Promise1,
Drowning, as well as the formula ¬(Dine1&Save), which captures the constraint
that you can’t both keep your promise and save the child; where R contains the
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requirements r1 and r2; and where the second requirement takes priority over the
first, or r1 < r2.
The next two definitions will specify how we are to select those requirements
that are in force in a context. The first simply restates the definition of triggered
rules, and the second a generalizes the definition of binding rules from Section 1.4.1.
Definition 3.2 (Triggered requirements) Where c = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩ is a(n epistemic)
context, the requirements from R that are triggered in c are those that belong to the
set Triggered(c) = {r ∈R ∶W ⊢ Premise[r]}.
Definition 3.3 (Binding requirements) Where c = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩ is a context, the
requirements that are binding in c are those that belong to the set
Binding(c) = {r ∈R ∶ (i) r ∈ Triggered(c) and
(ii) there’s no Q ⊆ Triggered(c) such that
(1) r ≤ Q,
(2) W ∪Conclusion[Q] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r], and
(3) Conclusion[Q] is consistent with W}.
In English: To enter the set Binding(c) a requirement r must (i) be triggered, and
(ii) there can’t be a set of triggered requirements Q that are uniformly at least as
good as r, jointly consistent (with W), and such that they entail the negation of
r’s conclusion. Although it might not be obvious at first sight, this definition really
is a conservative generalization of that of binding rules. When discussing rules, we
made the simplifying assumption that a(n epistemic conflict) is a conflict between
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two rules. In the present context, this assumption can no longer be upheld, since
the clash of requirements in the Holmes scenario is, in fact, a clash between three
instances of requirements. For this reason, clause (ii) in the definition refers to a set
of requirements, instead of a single requirement that can preclude r from qualifying
as binding. Clause (ii:1) generalizes the expression r ≤ r′; and clauses (ii:2) and (ii:3)
generalize the notion of a contrary rule to the notion of a contrary set of rules. The
need for (ii:3) will become manifest as soon as we apply the definition to a particular
case, which is what we turn to next.
It’s not difficult to see that both requirements r1 and r2 are triggered in the
context c1, while only the latter qualifies as binding. Notice how r1 doesn’t qual-
ify because of the singleton set Q1 = {r1}. First, it is a subset of Triggered(c1).
Second, every requirement in it has at least as much weight as r1, that is, r1 ≤ Q1
holds true. And third, Conclusion[Q1] = {Save} is consistent withW = {Promise1,
Drowning, ¬(Dine1&Save)}, and together with W it entails ¬Dine1, the negation
of Conclusion[r1]. Of course, the fact that r2 does, while r1 does not qualify as
binding is the intuitive result. Now suppose that clause (ii:3) was not included in
the above definition. In that case, r2 wouldn’t qualify as binding either: For there is
a set of requirements that are triggered in c1 that satisfies clauses (ii:1) and (ii:2),
namely, Q2 = {r1, r2}.
The next question we must ask is how to get to all things considered oughts.
Intuitively, they should be determined by the satisfaction conditions of the require-
ments that are in force, or binding in the context—in the particular case at hand by
the satisfaction conditions of r2. Once we recall that Conclusion[⋅] tells us just what
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those satisfaction conditions are, the following definition should look very natural:
Definition 3.4 (Consequence, first pass) Where c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ is a context, the
all things considered ought statement
◯X follows from c if and only if W ∪Conclusion[Binding(c)] ⊢X.
This definition generalizes the corresponding definition from the section on weighted
rules, and it gives us the intuitively correct result for c1. Since Conclusion[{r2}]
equals {Save} and W ∪ {Save} entails Save and ¬Dine1, the formulas ◯Save and
◯¬Dine1 follow from the context. It turns out, however, that we need to amend
this definition if the logic is to deal with scenarios involving conflicts between re-
quirements that are either incommensurable, or of the same weight. This becomes
manifest once we try to apply the definition to another toy example from the prac-
tical domain:
Twins: Your friend Taylor has a twin Tyler you are also good friends
with. You have inadvertently promised to have a private dinner with
each of the twins at the same time. Both Taylor and Tyler are equally
important to you, and both would be equally disappointed by your can-
cellation.26
Let Promise1 and Dine1 be as before, and let Promise2 and Dine1 stand for the
propositions, respectively, that you have promised to dine with the second twin
Tyler and that you dine with him. The case itself can be encoded in the context c2 =
⟨W ,R,≤⟩ where W = {Promise1, Promise2, ¬(Dine1&Dine2)}; where R contains








, with r1 still saying that
you are under a standing demand to dine with Taylor, if you’ve promised to dine
with her, and r3 saying that you are under a similar demand vis-à-vis Tyler, if you’ve
made a promise to him; and where ≤ is empty. The formula ¬(Dine1&Dine2), again,
expresses the background constraint that it’s impossible for you to dine with both
twins. The two requirements r1 and r3 both get triggered in c2, and both qualify as
binding. And now there’s a problem: Combining their satisfaction conditions with
W in the way the definition requires results in an inconsistent set. Such sets entail
all formulas, and so our definition has the counterintuitive consequence that the
context c2 entails a formula of the form ◯X for any X whatsoever.27
What’s at the root of the problem? Well, it’s the fact that the definition
requires that we use all the statements in Conclusion[Binding(c)], a set that, in
general, can be inconsistent (or inconsistent withW). So we need some sort of restric-
tion. And our strategy will be to fall back from the entire set Conclusion[Binding(c)]
to its largest consistent parts. The formal concept we’ll be relying on is that of a
maximally consistent, or maxiconsistent, subset:28
Definition 3.5 (Maximally consistent subsets) Where G and H are two sets
of propositional formulas, a subset F of H, F ⊆ H, is said to be maxiconsistent with
27One might be tempted to think that we have gotten to this absurd result because we didn’t
express the scenario correctly: Instead of not assigning any (relative) weights to the requirements
r1 and r3, we should have assigned them the same weights. But, for better or worse, this alternative
way of formalizing the scenario doesn’t really solve the problem. If r1 and r3 have the same weight,
then neither of them qualifies as binding, leading to the conclusion that there’s no obligation
for you to keep either of the promises, and this seems counterintuitive. Another claim one might
make—in order to avoid the problem—is that requirements are never incommensurable and can
also never have the same weight. But while this claim would let us avoid the problem, it is also in
need of a substantial argument.
28More precisely, we’re relying on a generalization of the concept from (Makinson 2005, p. 30ff).
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G if and only if (i) F is consistent with G, and (ii) there is no consistent set F ′ such
that F ⊂ F ′ and F ′ ⊆ H.
The concept is of most use when G and H are individually consistent, while G ∪H
isn’t. Intuitively, a subset of H that’s maxiconsistent with G is as big a subset of H
as you can add to G without running afoul of inconsistency: Supplementing it with
even one additional formula from H would render the result inconsistent—this is
what clause (ii) ensures.
With this concept in hand, we can define which oughts follows from a given
context c by focusing not on the entire set Conclusion[Binding(c)], but on those
of its subsets that are maxiconsistent with W. The plural is not accidental. An
inconsistent set can have multiple maxiconsistent subsets, and our policy is to require
that a statement X follows from all such subsets if ◯X is to qualify as an all things
considered ought. That is:
Definition 3.6 (Consequence, final) Where c = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩ is a context, the all
things considered ought statement ◯X follows from c if and only if, for every subset
F of Conclusion[Binding(c)] that is maxiconsistent with W, we have W ∪F ⊢X.
Let’s revisit our examples. First, notice that nothing has changed with regard
to the context c1, capturing the Drowning Child scenario. There’s only one subset of
Conclusion[Binding(c1)] = {Save} that’s maximally consistent with W, namely,
{Save} itself, and so ◯Save and ◯¬Dine1 still follow from c1. This illustrates







qualify as binding, and we
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get Conclusion[Binding(c2)] = {Dine1,Dine2}. This set has two subsets that are
maxiconsistent with W, namely, {Dine1} and {Dine2}. What is it, then, that you
ought to do in the Twins case? Since neither Dine1, nor Dine2 follows from both
{Dine1,¬(Dine1&Dine2)} and {Dine2,¬(Dine1&Dine2)}, the context doesn’t en-
tail either ◯Dine1 or ◯Dine2. So it’s not the case that you ought to dine with the
first twin, nor is it the case that you ought to dine with the second. However, the
disjunction Dine1 ∨Dine2 does follow from both of these sets, and so the context
entails ◯(Dine1 ∨Dine2). This means that you can’t just walk away; you have to
keep one of your promises. There’s also a sensible rationale behind this recommen-
dation. If you comply with the ought—in either of the two ways—you keep as many
promises as is humanly possible in your situation. You also break as few promises
as you possibly can.
3.2.2 Back to the puzzle
With the logic at our disposal, we can return to the puzzle and Prof. Mo-
riarty’s Drug. We will discuss a couple of ways to capture it formally, starting
with one that doesn’t assign any weights to requirements. We will encode the sce-
nario into the context c3 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩. Its first element W will contain the formu-
las expressing the relevant facts about evidential support, E Z⇒ Believe(M) and
E Z⇒ Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)). Notice that this is the last component of the
puzzle (MTE). The context’s second element, in turn, will contain the relevant in-
stances of the requirements (ER) and (ILC). In Section 3.1.2, we expressed them as
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the strict requirements:
(3) [E Z⇒ Believe(M)] ⊃◯Believe(M),
(4) [E Z⇒ Believe(E /Z⇒ B(M))] ⊃◯Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)), and
(7) ◯[Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)) ⊃ ¬Believe(m)].









The requirement r4 says that, ideally, Holmes should believe that the maid did it in
the circumstances where his evidence supports believing that she did. Similarly, the
requirement r5 says that, ideally, Holmes should believe that his evidence doesn’t
support believing that the maid did it in circumstances where his evidence supports
this belief.
The requirement (ILC) is a little more tricky. We capture it as follows:
⊺r6 =
Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)) ⊃ ¬Believe(M) .
The symbol ⊺ here stand for an arbitrary tautology; and given that ⊺ follows from
any set of formulas, a requirement that has it in the antecedent is guaranteed to get
triggered. So, on our rendering of (ILC), there’s always a standing defeasible demand
that one’s second-order beliefs and first-order attitudes cohere with each other. It’s




. This is also a very natural way to represent wide-scope requirements in our frame-
work.29
All in all, then, we have the context c3 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ where W contains the
expressions E Z⇒ Believe(M) and E Z⇒ Believe(E /Z⇒ Beliece(M)), R contains the
requirements r4, r5, and r6, and ≤ is empty. But how does this help with solving
the puzzle? Well, recall that the problem was that we were able to conclude that
Holmes both ought to believe that the maid did it and ought to avoid having this
belief, ◯Believe(M) and ◯¬Believe(M). Now let’s see what all things considered
oughts follow from c3. As a first step, notice that r4, r5, and r6 all qualify as binding,
and that Conclusion[Binding(c3)] has three subsets that are maximally consistent
with W, namely,
{Believe(M), Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M))},
{Believe(M), Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)) ⊃ ¬Believe(M)}, and
{Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)), Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)) ⊃ ¬Believe(M)}.
A minute’s reflection reveals that the third set doesn’t entail Believe(M) and that
the first doesn’t entail ¬Believe(M). This means that neither of the problematic
oughts, ◯Believe(M) and ◯¬Believe(M), follow from c3. So it is not the case that
Holmes ought to believe that the maid did, nor is it the case that he ought not to
believe that the maid did it. However, as in the twins example, there’s a disjunction




◯([Believe(M)&Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M))] ∨
[Believe(M)&¬Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M))] ∨
[¬Believe(M)&Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M))]).
So Holmes can’t adjust beliefs as he pleases; he has to do it in one of the spec-
ified ways. Unpacking the formula, he ought to either (i) believe both that the maid
did it and that the evidence doesn’t support believing that she did; or (ii) believe
only that the maid did it; or (iii) believe only that the evidence doesn’t support
believing that the maid did it. Put differently, there are two relevant beliefs—that
the maid did it and that the evidence doesn’t support believing that she did—and
Holmes is as he ought to be as long as he holds at least one of them.
Notice that this disjunctive recommendation can be supported by a rationale
that parallels the one we appealed to in the twins case: By adjusting beliefs in any
of the three specified ways, Holmes would satisfy as many instances of rationality
requirements as he can and also violate as few of them as he can, given the situation.
In case you find this recommendation utterly implausible, note that the formal
model does not actually commit us to it. Equally well, it can deliver a stronger
recommendation, that is, that only one of (i)–(iii) be followed. This is the topic of
the next section.
Even though Holmes would end up violating a requirement no matter what he
does, this doesn’t mean that we should classify his response as irrational. Think back
to the twins case. Suppose you wind up calling off your rendezvous with the first
twin, Taylor, and dining with the second one, Tyler. There’s something unfortunate
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about your response—you have broken one of your promises—and yet it is an op-
timal response to the situation you were in. Similarly, we can suppose that Holmes
complies with (iii) and ends up believing that the evidence doesn’t support believing
that the maid did it. There’s something unfortunate about his response—he violates
the evidential requirement by not having a belief supported by the evidence—and
yet it is an optimal response to the situation he is in.
On the perspective that comes with the logic, requirements are defeasible.
So, when assessing the agent’s rationality, we should not be looking at whether
or not she complies with all the requirements that are in force in her situation—
formally, all the requirements in Binding(c)—but rather at whether or not the
agent complies with the generated oughts. Thus, if any of (i)–(iii) obtain, Holmes’
response is fully rational, and that’s enough to conclude that Moriarty’s Drug is not
a genuine dilemma.
So we have a solution to the puzzle that concedes that the possibility of rad-
ically misleading total evidence (MTE) leads to a conflict between the epistemic
requirement (ER) and the inter-level coherence requirement (ILC), and yet does
not qualify it as a dilemma. Its advantages over the alternatives should be obvious:
It lets us preserve (MTE), (ER), (ILC), as well as the unity of epistemic rationality.
The solution changes the logic governing the interaction between (ER) and
(ILC), or, what’s in effect the same thing, proposes that we think of them not as
strict requirements specifying what doxastic attitudes one ought to have all things
considered, but as defeasible requirements specifying what attitudes one should have
ideally, requirements that interact to jointly determine the all things considered epis-
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temic oughts—much like moral reasons are standardly taken to determine the all
things considered moral oughts. I think it is very natural to call these defeasible
requirements ideals and to think of the solution just developed as a mathemati-
cally precise characterization of the conflicting-ideals response to the puzzle. So my
suggestion is that we haven’t only solved the puzzle, but also taken some steps to-
ward making the conflicting-ideals view itself more transparent. That is, I think,
that it is best understood as a move away from the default metaepistemological
opinion, according to which epistemic requirements are strict and governed by some
rather strong, but never explicitly stated logic, toward the more unconventional
metaepistemological view, according to which epistemic requirements are defeasible
and governed by a comparatively weak logic. I don’t think this interpretation of
the view is standard: In the end, in the literature focusing specifically on the puz-
zle, Christensen (2007a, 2013) is usually interpreted as conceding the existence of
genuine rational dilemmas.30
3.2.3 Disjunctive oughts and weighted requirements
Given the logic from Section 3.2.1, the context c3 that we used to encode
Moriarty’s Drug entails a disjunctive ought, suggesting that Holmes can respond
to this scenario in three different, but equally rational ways. One may find this
worrisome on at least three grounds. First, one could feel that this diagnosis is
simply intuitively implausible. Second, one could insist that this makes the logic
a poor candidate for the formal backbone of the conflicting-ideals view, since the
30See footnote 8 for references.
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latter isn’t typically associated with disjunctive recommendations. And third, one
could point out that this commits one to permissivism—or the view that there are
at least some bodies of evidence sanctioning multiple rational responses—which we
may have independent reasons to reject.31 All of these worries cast doubt on the
solution. The main goal of this section, then, is to put them to rest by showing that
the solution is compatible with the claim that there’s only one rational response to
Moriarty’s Drug.
Once we have stepped away from the assumption that epistemic rationality
requirements have to be strict, it is natural to think that one requirement (or ideal)
can have more weight than another, or that a particular instance of a requirement
can have more weight than another. In particular, we might reasonably suspect that
the requirements in force in Moriarty’s Drug may have different (relative) weight.
And if these weights are indeed different, then we would, of course, want them to be
reflected in the context capturing the scenario. So it seems perfectly reasonable to
insist that the context c3 has to be supplied with a priority relation if the scenario is
to be captured in full, and that, once it is thus extended, Holmes will have only one
rational response.32 The difficult question, then, is what should this ordering be.
Perhaps, one might think that any assignment of relatives weights to instances
of epistemic requirements has to be uniform and motivated on independent grounds.
For us here this would mean that the ordering would need to be supported by an
argument for one of the following two claims: (ER) must always take precedence over
31For good discussions of permissivism and further pointers to the literature, see (White 2005)
and (Schoenfield 2014).
32Generally, adding an ordering on requirements results in a stronger consequence set, and so
an ordering on requirements in c3 would lead to Holmes having fewer rational responses.
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(ILC). Or (ILC) must always take precedence over (ER). However, both of these
claims are in tension with the spirit of the conflicting-ideals view and our solution to
the puzzle. To see why, suppose that we did hold that in every situation of conflict
between the defeasible (ER) and the defeasible (ILC) the former wins out. Now it is
very natural to ask what sort of work the defeasibility of (ER) is even doing and to
wonder if the resulting position isn’t better thought of as one that denies that (ILC)
is a genuine requirement. So I think that, once we have embraced the idea that
(ER) and (ILC) are ideals that occasionally come into conflict we can’t uniformly
prioritize one over the other.
What we can do, however, is hold that every particular conflict between in-
stances of (ER) and (ILC) gets resolved, with (ER) winning out in some of them
and (ILC) in others and with the winner being determined by the details of the case.
Notice that this is just what we observe in cases of conflict between requirements
in the moral domain. In the Drowning Child scenario it was clear that saving the
child and not keeping the promise was the only right thing to do. But this doesn’t
mean that considerations of benevolence are always more important than those of
promise-keeping. In fact, it’s very easy to think of scenarios where keeping a promise
and not doing the good seems like the only right thing to do. (Suppose a dog was
drowning instead of a child; or that you knew that the child wasn’t in real danger
and would only calm down a bit if you helped it.) So sometimes benevolence wins
out, and at other time promise-keeping does.33 And it seems perfectly reasonable to
33Interestingly, Ross appears to have thought that promise-keeping is standardly more important
than doing the good: “Ross [..] held that ordinarily considerations of promising should take prece-
dence over those of beneficence (it being more important ordinarily to keep one’s promise than to
do good); but he also supposed that there could be such a thing as a trivial breach of promise and
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hold that every particular conflict between benevolence and promise-keeping has a
correct resolution.
But what are we to say about assigning weights to the requirements in c3
in light of this? I think the correct answer here is that Moriarty’s Drug is too
underdescribed—and in a way that’s typical of other examples illustrating (MTE)
in the literature—for us to say what this ordering should be. We know that Holmes’
first-order evidence, or the clues that he finds at the manor, supports believing that
the maid did it, but we don’t know what exactly this evidence is. Similarly, we know
that Holmes knows how Moriarty’s drug works, but we don’t know what evidence
exactly this knowledge is based on. A full description of Holmes’ evidence would put
us in a position to say what the weights of the relevant instances of (ER) and (ILC)
are. But, in the absence of such a description, we can’t (and shouldn’t) say what
they are or what exactly the one rational doxastic response to Moriarty’s Drug is.
At this point one might object that, quite independently of the details sup-
pressed in the description, it is actually intuitively very clear that Holmes’ only
rational response in Moriarty’s Drug is to believe that his evidence doesn’t support
believing that the maid did it and not to believe that she did. But if there’s such
an intuition, it may stem from the implicit assumption that Holmes’ first-order evi-
dence has to be fairly complex and that only relatively elaborate reasoning can get
one from it to the conclusion that the maid did it—in the end, that’s what we typ-
ically see in murder mysteries. But suppose that the evidence pointing to the maid
a very large good to be done, in which case, he thought, the promise should be broken” (Dancy
2004, p. 27).
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as the likely culprit was overwhelming: She has a clear motive, there are no other
suspects, multiple witnesses report her having had obsessive thoughts of violence,
and, on top of that, there’s a video of the murder caught on a security camera with
the murderer looking just like the maid. Further, suppose that Holmes’ knowledge
of the drug’s effects was based on cases where the affected detectives reasoned about
complex bodies of evidence. Would we still say that it would be irrational for Holmes
to believe that the maid did? My own intuition says no.
Now let me close by discussing two sample assignments of weights to the re-
quirements r4, r5, and r6. The first would correspond to a fuller description we
started sketching in the previous paragraph. Let c4 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ be a context that is
like c3, except for its ≤ is not empty, but as follows: r6 < r5 < r4. Thus, both instances
of (ER) have more weight than the instance of (ILC), and the instance of (ER) con-
cerned with the first-order belief that the maid did it has more weight than the one
concerned with the second-order belief.34 A by now routine check will convince you
that only the two strongest requirements r4 and r5 get selected as binding, and that
the context c4 entails the formula ◯[Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M))&Believe(M)]. So
there’s only one way for Holmes to be rational: He must believe that the maid
did it, as well as believe that his evidence doesn’t support believing that she did.
34What justifies ordering the instances of (ER)? Well, I think it’s very plausible to think that,
when we have both E Z⇒ Believe(X) and E Z⇒ Believe(Y ), it doesn’t yet mean that E sup-
ports the beliefs Believe(X) and Believe(Y ) equally well. Further, it seem reasonable to hold
that the relative degree of support that the evidence lends to Believe(X) and Believe(Y ) is




E Z⇒ Believe(Y )
Believe(Y )
. In the particular case at hand, Believe(M) appears to be supported better
than Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M)), and so I rank r4 above r5.
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The second sample assignment would correspond to a different way of filling in
the details of the scenario, one where the first-order evidence is indeed complex
and calls for an elaborate chain of reasoning. Let c5 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ be the context ac-
quired by substituting the ordering r4 < r6 < r5 for the empty ordering of c3. Here
the instance of (ILC) has more weight than one of the instances of (ER), but not
the other. Yet again, only the two strongest requirements r5 and r6 get selected
as binding. This time, however, the context entails a different formula, namely,
◯[Believe(E /Z⇒ Believe(M))&¬Believe(M)]. So, again, there’s only one way for
Holmes to respond rationally: He must have the second-order belief and avoid be-
lieving that the maid did it.
Note that c4 and c5 are only illustrations. I’m not suggesting that one of them
reflects the correct assignment of weights (although it might). Instead, I’m suggest-
ing the following: If we want to insist that Holmes must have only one rational
response in Moriarty’s Drug, we can reasonably hold that the relative weights of the
requirements in play ensure that. So we are not committed to the disjunctive rec-
ommendation discussed at the end of Section 3.2.2. However, appealing to weighted
requirements isn’t strictly necessary, as we have a solution to the puzzle with or
without it.
3.3 Summary
The goal of this chapter was to present a solution to an important puzzle that
starts with acknowledging the possibility of total evidence that’s radically misleading
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about itself, (MTE), proceeds to a clash between two plausible and widely accepted
requirements of rationality, (ER) and (ILC), and arrives at the claim that there
are rational dilemmas. Aiming to avoid the conclusion, the existing responses to the
puzzle have proposed rejecting (MTE), rejecting one of the requirements, or treating
the conflict as a clash between two irreducible types of rationality. The main idea
behind my alternative solution was to substitute a defeasible deontic logic for the
relatively strong, but never explicitly stated logic governing the interaction between
(ER) and (ILC). The advantages of the solution are obvious: It lets us preserve
(MTE), (ER), (ILC), as well as the unity of epistemic rationality, all while steer-
ing clear of dilemmas. We saw that the use of the logic comes with an unorthodox
perspective on epistemic normativity, namely, one on which what one epistemically
ought to do is determined through the interaction of defeasible rationality require-
ments that apply to them. We also saw that such requirements can be understood
as epistemic ideals, and that the logic together with the perspective it gives rise
to fit nicely with the conflicting-ideals view. What’s more, the logic would seem to
make the view itself more transparent.
The work begun in this part of the dissertation could (and should) be taken in
three directions in the future. First, the framework we have discussed—that is, the
formal model and the new perspective on requirements—could be applied to many
other puzzles in which epistemic requirements come into conflict. Second, it could
be of use in the context of the meta-level debate about the existence of epistemic
dilemmas.35 And third, it should also be worthwhile to think about alternative ways
35See e.g., (Hughes 2017) and (Leonard 2020).
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of making sense of defeasible rationality requirements, that is, not as ideals. In the
end, the perspective that comes with the use of our formal model is general, and
the conflicting-ideals view may be only one attractive way of filling in its details.
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Part III DEFEASIBLE REASONING POLICIES
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Chapter 4: Conciliationism and the problem of self-defeat
This third part of the dissertation discusses another application of logics for
defeasible reasoning in epistemology, this time in the context of the debate about the
epistemic significance of disagreement. More specifically, it presents a generalization
of the model developed in the previous chapters and uses it to, first, get a better
handle on the conciliatory or conciliationist views on disagreement and the logical
structure of conciliatory reasoning such views advocate for, and, second, address
a pressing challenge for these views.1 On the view that comes with the model,
conciliationism is to be thought of as a (second-order) defeasible reasoning policy.
Think of your favorite question in philosophy. You’ve likely pondered on it for
a long time, and you must have an opinion on the matter. And odds are you know
someone who’s pondered on the question at least as much, whose credentials are as
good as yours, but who holds the opposite opinion. That is, you’re in disagreement
with an epistemic peer.2 Should this fact make you less confident that your take on
the issue is correct? According to the conciliatory views on disagreement we’ll be
exploring in this and the next two chapters it should. This answer has much intuitive
appeal: The matter is complex, you aren’t infallible, and one straightforward expla-
nation for the disagreement is that you’ve made a subtle mistake when reasoning.
1The most well-known advocates of conciliatory views include Christensen (2007b, 2011, 2016),
Elga (2007), Feldman (2005, 2006, 2009), and Matheson (2015c).
2Although there are number of accounts of epistemic peers in the literature, central to all
of them is the idea that your epistemic peer is your epistemic equal. Two kinds of equality are
standardly emphasized, namely, equality of evidence and equality of the peer’s capacity to process
this evidence. In what follows, I will rely on an intuitive understanding of the notion. For more on
it see, e.g., (Gelfert 2011), (Matheson 2015c, Ch. 2), (Matheson 2018), and (Mulligan 2015).
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An equally good explanation, of course, is that your opponent has made a mistake.
But given that there’s no good reason to favor the latter, reducing confidence still
seems appropriate.
In spite of their intuitive appeal, conciliatory views are said to run into prob-
lems when applied to themselves, or when attempting to answer the question of
what should one do in the context of disagreeing about the correct way to respond
to disagreement. The problems are most transparent and easiest to explain for the
more extreme conciliatory views. According to such views, when you hold a well-
reasoned belief that X and an equally informed colleague disagrees with you about
whether X, you should lower your confidence in X dramatically, or—to state it in
terms of categorical beliefs—you should abandon your belief and suspend judgment
on the issue.
Let’s imagine that you’ve reasoned your way toward such a view, and that
you’re the sort of person who acts on the views they hold. Imagine further that
you have a well-reasoned opinion on some other complex issue, say, you believe
that we have a libertarian free will. Now, to your dismay, you find yourself in a
crossfire: Your friend metaphysician Milo thinks that there’s no libertarian free will,
while your friend epistemologist Evelyn thinks that one shouldn’t abandon one’s
well-reasoned opinion when faced with a disagreeing peer. Call this scenario Double
Disagreement. The question now is how should you adjust your beliefs. For starters,
your conciliatory view appears to self-defeat, or call for abandoning itself. Just
instantiate X with it! There’s disagreement of the right sort, and so you should
abandon your view. And to make the matters worse, there’s something in the vicinity
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of inconsistency around the corner. What are you to do about your belief in free
will? Since there’s no antecedent reason to start by applying the conciliatory view
to itself, you’ve two lines of argument supporting opposing conclusions: That you
should drop your belief in the existence of free will and that it’s not the case that
you should. On the one hand, it’d seem that you should drop the belief, in light
of your disagreement with Milo and your conciliatory view. On the other, there’s
the following line of argument too. Your conciliatory view self-defeats, and, once
it does, your disagreement with Milo looses its epistemic significance. But if the
disagreement isn’t significant for you, then it’s fine for you to keep your belief in the
existence of free will. And if that’s so, then it certainly can’t be the case that you
should drop your belief.3
Of course, this is sketchy and quick, but you must agree that disagreement
about the correct way to disagree presents the proponents of strong conciliatory
views with two challenges. The first is that there are possible scenarios—of which
Double Disagreement is only one example—in which their views appear to issue
inconsistent directives.4 And the second becomes manifest once we realize that the
epistemic circumstances that the agent finds herself in in our imagined scenario
don’t appear to be all that different from the epistemic circumstances that many
advocates of (strong) conciliatory views actually find themselves in. In the end,
3It’s worth pointing out that your situation might be even worse. If we suppose, as seems
reasonable, that one shouldn’t be dropping one’s well-reasoned beliefs willy-nilly, then we can
reason to the conclusion that you should abandon your belief in the existence of free will and that
you should also keep it.
4The concern that conciliatory views, strong and weak, issue inconsistent directives or are
inconsistent is discussed in (Christensen 2013), (Decker 2014), (Elga 2010), (Littlejohn 2013, 2019),
(Matheson 2015a,c), and (Weatherson 2013).
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Evelyn has many real-world counterparts, including such illustrious philosophers
as Thomas Kelly (2005, 2010), Titelbaum (2015), and Ralph Wedgwood (2010).
So if we think that you should give up your conciliatory view in response to the
disagreement with Evelyn, we’d seem to have to say that many actual advocates of
conciliationism are not being rational in holding onto their views.5 The following
strikes me as uncontroversial: If one is forced to admit that one’s view can issue
inconsistent recommendations or that one can’t rationally hold one’s view, one is
in trouble.6 So, the proponents of strong conciliatory views face these challenges.
What’s more, Christensen (2013), Elga (2010), and others have forcefully argued
that issues stemming from disagreement about the correct way to disagree cause
problems for all types of conciliatory views, whether very strong or more moderate.7
But we’re not going to focus on moderate conciliatory views here. Instead,
we will devise a formal model implementing a very strong version of the view and
study the model’s behavior in such cases as Double Disagreement.8 This will let us
5This concern that a conciliatonist must abandon her views by her own lights is discussed in,
e.g., (Decker 2014), (Kelly 2005), (Littlejohn 2013), and (Matheson 2015a,c).
6Cf. (Christensen 2013), (Decker 2014).
7According to more moderate conciliatory views, when you hold a well-reasoned belief that X
and find yourself in a disagreement of the right sort, you should lower your confidence in X at least a
little. But by how much exactly? Well, typically such views require that, in answering this question,
you factor in your own competence in reasoning about X-like matters, as well as your colleague’s,
or, rather, your degree of confidence in these competences. But, then, it’s easy enough to imagine
a scenario prompting the self-defeat of even the more moderate views: Just suppose that you find
yourself disagreeing over X and that your confidence in your own competence in reasoning about
X-like matters is extremely low, while your confidence in your colleague’s competence in reasoning
about X-like matters is extremely high. See, e.g., (Christensen 2013), (Decker 2014), and (Elga
2010), (Littlejohn 2013) for more one this. For completeness, I should also note that the literature
talks about two more concerns associated with disagreeing about disagreement. According to the
first, a conciliationist has to abandon her view when repeatedly disagreeing about disagreement
with a stubborn opponent—see (Decker 2014), (Elga 2010), and (Weatherson 2013). And according
to the second, a conciliationist can’t maintain any stable view of the right way to respond to
disagreement—see (Christensen 2013) and (Weatherson 2013). Both of these concerns, however,
have to do with belief change over time, and both make a number of substantive assumptions
about the way conciliatory views work. I won’t have anything to say about these concerns here.
8In fact, the view we’re going to explore comes close to the infamous Equal Weights View,
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get a better understanding of the logical structure of conciliatory reasoning and its
behavior in cases involving disagreement about the correct way to disagree, as well
as, eventually, provide adequate responses to both concerns.
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. In Section 4.1,
we’ll be concerned with developing the model. We’ll embed the core idea behind
conciliationism into a defeasible reasoner, or a logic with a consequence relation at its
core. In Section 4.2 we’ll be concerned with expressing Double Disagreement in the
model. A formal version of the concern about conciliatory views issuing inconsistent
directives will emerge in Section 4.2.2. We’ll then address it, in two steps, in Chapters
5 and 6. The second concern—that one can’t hold a conciliatory view rationally,
given the current state of epistemic opinion—will resurface and get addressed in
Chapter 6.
4.1 Model conciliatory reasoner
4.1.1 Basic defeasible reasoner
This section defines a defeasible reasoner. The particular reasoner we’ll be
working with is a form of default logic, and it will generalize the model we used in
Part II.9 The core idea behind default logic is to supplement the standard (classical)
logic with a special set of rules representing defeasible generalizations, so as to be
according to which, in a case of disagreement about X, you are to give a peer’s confidence in X
the same weight as your own—see, e.g., (Elga 2007).
9The original formulation of default logic is due to Reiter (1980), but the current presentation
is based on the more user-friendly version of Horty (2012). It’s a well-known fact that default
logic is more general than the defeasible logic defined in terms of maximally consistent subsets and
classical consequence from Section 3.2.1—see e.g., (Horty 1994).
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able to derive a stronger set of conclusions from a given set of premises. As before,
our background language will be the language of ordinary propositional logic with
the usual connectives. As for the default rules, we are going to represent them in
a way that’s familiar from Chapter 1, that is, either in a tree-form or as pairs of
formulas. Thus, where X and Y are arbitrary propositions, both X
Y
and ⟨X,Y ⟩
will stand for the rule that lets us conclude Y form X by default. To take a simple
example, let B be the proposition that Tweety is a bird and F the proposition that
Tweety flies. Then B
F
says that we can conclude that Tweety flies as soon as we
have established that he is a bird. We will use the letter r to denote default rules,
and make use of the familiar functions Premise[⋅] and Conclusion[⋅] to pick out,
respectively, the premise and the conclusion of some given rule. If Xr =
Y
, then
Premise[r] = X and Conclusion[r] = Y . Yet again, we apply the second function
not only to individual default rules, but also sets of rules: Where S is a set of rules,
Conclusion[S] = {Conclusion[r] ∶ r ∈ S}.
We envision an agent reasoning on the basis of a two-part structure ⟨W ,R⟩
where W is a set of ordinary propositional formulas—the hard information, or the
information that the agent is certain of—and R is a set of default rules—the rules
the agent relies on in its reasoning. Just as we did in the previous chapters, we will
call such structures contexts and denote them by the letter c, with subscripts.
Definition 4.1 (Contexts) A context c is a structure of the form ⟨W ,R⟩, where
W is a set of propositional formulas and R is a set of default rules.
At this point an example is in order, and we’ll use the one that’s standard in the
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artificial intelligence literature, the Tweety Triangle. It unfold in two steps. In the
first, the reasoning agent learns that Tweety is a bird and infers that Tweety flies.
In the second, it learns that Tweety is a penguin, retracts the previous conclusion,
and infers that Tweety doesn’t fly.
Since there are two steps, there’ll be two contexts, c1 = ⟨W,R⟩ and c2 =
⟨W ′,R⟩. Let B and F be as before, and let P stand for the proposition that Tweety
is a penguin. The hard information W of c1 must include B and P ⊃ B, expressing
an instance of the fact that all penguins are birds. The set of rules R of c1, in




. The first lets the reasoner
infer that Tweety can fly, by default, once it has concluded that Tweety is a bird.
The second lets the reasoner infer that Tweety cannot fly, by default, once it has
concluded that he is a penguin. Thus, r1 and r2 can be thought of as instances of,
respectively, the idea that birds usually fly and the idea that penguins usually don’t.
As for c2 = ⟨W ′,R⟩, it is just like c1, except for its hard information also contains
P , saying that Tweety is a penguin. We want the reasoner to concludes F from c1
and ¬F from c2. The question now is how can we make it do that.
It’s worth saying upfront that the procedure for determining which formulas
follow from a given context we are about to specify will be slightly more involved
than the ones we have encountered in the previous chapters. Just like the others, it
will rely on an intermediary notion, which will let us select all and only those rules
of a given context that are in force or that apply in the case at hand. What will be
different, however, is how this intermediary notion is defined.
We will start by introducing the concept of a scenario based on a context.
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And a scenario based on a context c = ⟨W,R⟩ is defined simply as some subset
S of the set of rules R of this context. The intermediary notion selecting all the
intuitively acceptable rules of R will be called a proper scenario, and our definition
of a proper scenarios will emerge as a combination of three other notions, capturing
the conditions on default rules from R that are necessary and jointly sufficient for
a rule to be a part of a proper scenario. The first of these capture the familiar idea
that a rule must be triggered.
Definition 4.2 (Triggered rules, relativized) Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩ be a context and
S a scenario based on it. Then the default rules from R that are triggered in
the scenario S are those that belong to the set TriggeredW,R(S) = {r ∈ R ∶ W ∪
Conclusion[S] ⊢ Premise[r]}.
Let’s apply the function to the empty scenario ∅, against the background of the
context c1. It’s easy to see that Triggeredc(∅) = {r1}, as the hard information
W = {B,P ⊃ B} entails B = Premise[r1]. You may wonder why we need to relativize
the notion of a rule triggered in a context c to that of a rule triggered in a scenario
S based on a context c; and why I opted for W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢ Premise[r] in
this definition, as opposed to the simpler W ⊢ Premise[r].10 The short answer is
that we need it to handle situations where some default rules trigger further default
rules. Examples of such situations will follow shortly.
The need for a further condition on proper scenarios reveals itself once we apply
Triggered(⋅) to any scenario against the background of c2. A minute’s reflection
10Notice that in Chapters 1–3 we used the simpler expression.
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reveals that both rules r1 and r2 come out triggered in every scenario based on this
context. But the intuitively correct scenario based on it is {r2}, and so we need to
specify a further condition that would preclude the addition of r1 to {r2}. Here’s a
negative condition that does the trick:
Definition 4.3 (Conflicted rules) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a context, and S a scenario
based on it. Then the rules from R that are conflicted in the context of S are
those that belong to the set ConflictedW,R(S) = {r ∈ R ∶ W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢
¬Conclusion[r]}.
Notice that we have ConflictedW,R({r2}) = {r1}, as desired. Now consider the
following preliminary definition for proper scenarios:
Definition 4.4 (Proper scenarios, first pass) Let ⟨W,R⟩ be a context and S a
set of default rules. Then S is a proper scenario based on ⟨W,R⟩ just in case
S = {r ∈R ∶ r ∈ TriggeredW,R(S),
r ∉ ConflictedW,R(S)}.
The definition gives us the correct result in the case of c1. The singleton S1 = {r1}
comes out as the only proper scenario. However, the definition falls flat when applied
to c2. Both S1 and S2 = {r2} qualify as proper. There are multiple ways to resolve
the problem formally. The one I adopt here is motivated by the broader goal of
this chapter (namely, that we need the resources that will let us model conciliatory
views). We’ll make use of an idea we briefly touched upon back in Section 2.2.2.
Following Horty (2012), we will introduce a new type of rules, exclusionary default
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rules, which you can think of as rules the reasoner uses to decide which other rules
to take out of consideration.11 In order to be in a position to formulate such rules,
we extend the background language in two ways. First, we introduce names to refer
to rules: Every default rule rX is assigned a unique name rX—the Fraktur script
is used to distinguish names of rules from the rules themselves. And second, we
introduce a special predicate Out(⋅) into our language, with the intent that, where
r is a name of some default rule r, the statement Out(r) means that r is excluded
or taken out of consideration. For concreteness, we let r1 be the name of r1. Then
Out(r1) says that r1 is excluded.
With names and the new predicate in hand, we can state the second negative
condition for a rule’s inclusion in a proper scenario:
Definition 4.5 (Excluded rules) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a context, and S a scenario
based on this context. Then the rules from R that are excluded in the context of S
are those that belong to the set ExcludedW,R(S) = {r ∈ R ∶ W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢
Out(r)}.
Our full definition of a proper scenario, then, runs thus:12
Definition 4.6 (Proper scenarios) Let ⟨W ,R⟩ be a context and S a set of default
11In Section 2.2.2, we briefly discussed the relation between exclusionary rules and hedged rules.
In a nutshell, the idea was that we can model the same effects using both. The main reason I opt
for using exclusionary rules in this part of the dissertation is that they are easier to work with and
easier to visualize than hedged rules.
12I should point out that this definition ignores a technical problem that arises from the existence
of aberrant contexts that contain self-triggering chains of rules. The simplest of such context is
⟨W,R⟩ with W = ∅ and R = {
A
A
}. But nothing important hinges on this. See (Horty 2012, p.












Figure 4.1: Tweety Triangle
rules. Then S is a proper scenario based on ⟨W ,R⟩ just in case
S = {r ∈R ∶ r ∈ TriggeredW,R(S),
r ∉ ConflictedW,R(S),
r ∉ ExcludedW,R(S)}.




saying that the rule r1 must be taken out of consideration in case Tweety is a pen-
guin. This should make good sense. Penguins form a rather specific type of birds.
Once one learns that Tweety is a penguin, it wouldn’t be wise to base the conclusion
about his ability to fly on the idea that birds typically do. An easy check will con-
vince you that S1 is still the only proper scenario base on c1, and that S3 = {r2, r3}
is the only proper scenario based on c2. So the addition of r3 leaves us with a unique
proper scenario in each case. But note that this won’t hold in general, as there are
contexts with multiple proper scenarios.
In what follows, I’ll often represent contexts as inference graphs of the sort you
can see in Figure 4.1, which depicts the Tweety Triangle. Here’s how such graphs
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should be red. A double link of the form X Ô⇒ Y stands for the proposition X ⊃ Y .
As a special case, the link ⊺ Ô⇒ Y stands for the idea that Y is implied by an
arbitrary tautology, or simply that Y is true. A single link of the form X Ð→ Y
stands for a default rule of the form X
Y
, while a crossed out link of the form
X /Ð→ Y stands for a default rule of the form X
¬Y
. Finally, crossed out links
that stars from a node X and point to another link r represent an exclusionary
default of the form X
Out(r)
.
Now, with the notion of a proper scenario in hand, we can define a consequence
relation, specifying what conclusions follow from any given context:13
Definition 4.7 (Consequence) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a context. Then the statement
X follows from c, written as c ∣∼ X, just in case W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ X for each
proper scenario S based on c.
And with this, our basic defeasible reasoner is complete. We will interpret it as a
model reasoner: If it outputs X in the context c, then X is the correct response to
the situation that c represents.
4.1.2 Capturing conciliationism
The next step is to see how we can use the reasoner to model conciliatory
reasoning. Let’s start by taking a close look at a well-known case, Mental Math, in
which the conciliatory response seems particularly intuitive. It’s nicely described in
13Note that this is only one of the consequence relations that can be defined in the present
framework, the one that’s usually called skeptical—see (Horty 2012, Sec. 1.3.1). Not much hinges
on my choice of the consequence relation though: Almost all of the contexts we’re going to discuss
will have a single proper scenario, and, when there’s a single proper scenario, alternative definitions
of consequence produce the same results.
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the following passage from (Christensen 2010a):
Mental Math: My friend and I have been going out to dinner for many
years. We always tip 20% and divide the bill equally, and we always
do the math in our heads. We’re quite accurate, but on those occasions
where we’ve disagreed in the past, we’ve been right equally often. This
evening seems typical, in that I don’t feel unusually tired or alert, and
neither my friend nor I have had more wine or coffee than usual. I get
$43 in my mental calculation, and become quite confident of this answer.
But then my friend says she got $45. I dramatically reduce my confidence
that $43 is the right answer.14
Mental Math describes relatively complex reasoning, and we shouldn’t miss the
following three of its features. First, it consists of two distinct components, namely,
the mathematical calculations and the reasoning prompted by the disagreement.
Second, the agent’s initial confidence in $43 being the correct answer is based entirely
on her calculations, and is later reduced because the agent becomes suspicious of
them.15 And third, the disagreement is important precisely because it makes the
agent suspect that she may have made a mistake in her calculations. It’s legitimate
to think of the mathematical calculations as the agent’s first-order reasoning and her
deciding how confident to be in the conclusions arrived at through these calculations
as second-order reasoning.16
14(Christensen 2010a, pp. 186–7).
15Notice that this makes sense only on the condition that an agent can take her mathematical
reasoning to be fallible.
16It may also be worth pointing out hat conciliatory reasoning, in Mental Math and in other
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Bearing this in mind, let’s model the agent’s reasoning in our formalism. (We’ll
be making a couple of stabs, gradually refining the modeling.) The first thing we
need to do is introduce a new predicate to our language: Seems(⋅). Now, Seems(X)
expresses the idea that the agent has arrived at the conclusion X through her first-
order reasoning about whether X. Admittedly, I don’t have too much to say about
the reasoning presupposed by Seems(⋅), but it should be clear that it will depend
on X. If X is a mathematical proposition, Seems(X) is a result of mathematical
calculations of the sort we just saw. If X is a philosophical claim, Seems(X) is a
result of a careful philosophical investigation. Either way, the idea is that the agent
has reasoned to the best of her ability about some nontrivial matter and arrived at
X as a result. Note also that Seems(X) is compatible with ¬X. A fallible rational
agent knows that even her best reasoning doesn’t guarantee that the conclusion is
correct.
Still, situations in which an agent’s best reasoning leads her astray will pre-
sumably be rare, and the agent will typically go by her best first-order reasoning.
This motivates the following default rule schema:17




: If your best first-order reasoning outputs X, conclude
X by default.




cases, appears most intuitive when we think of the case at hand from a first-personal perspective.
This perspective will retain its significance in our formal model.
17Pollock (2008) discusses a similar schema, albeit in a different context.
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, where S stands for the proposition that my share of the bill is $43. Now note
that what the friend’s announcement brings into question is exactly the connection
between Seems(S) and S. My first-order mathematical calculations are usually
reliable, but I do make mistakes in some cases. The announcement, then, suggests
that this may be one them.
In order to model the effects of the announcement, we will make use of a
second predicate, Disagree(⋅). Let Disagree(X) express the idea that the agent
is in genuine disagreement about whether X. And I say genuine to distinguish
the disagreements that provide the agent with a compelling reason to suspect that
something may have gone wrong with her reasoning from what we might call merely
apparent disagreements, examples of which would include verbal disagreements and
disagreements with what the literature calls epistemic inferiors (people who are
clearly incompetent to form well-reasoned beliefs on the question the disagreement is
about). So Disagree(S) means that there’s genuine disagreement about whether my
share of the bill is indeed $43. As our first pass, we will try to capture the effects of the
friend’s announcement by means of the material implication Disagree(S) ⊃ Out(r4).
It says that, if there is genuine disagreement about whether S, then the rule r4 is
to be taken out of consideration. Accordingly, the core of conciliationism would be
captured by the following schema:
Conciliationist reasoning policy, first pass:
r∗(X) = Disagree(X) ⊃ Out(r(X)): If there’s genuine disagreement about







Figure 4.2: Mental Math, preliminary
We can try capturing Mental Math using the context c3 = ⟨W,R⟩ where W =
{Seems(S), Disagree(S), Disagree(S) ⊃ Out(r4)} and R = {r4}. (The context
is depicted in Figure 4.2.) An easy check will convince you that S doesn’t follow
from c3, as desired.
But c3 doesn’t capture all the complexities of Mental Math, as becomes clear
once we consider the following question. Does the agent know for a fact that there’s
genuine disagreement about the bill, or does she only surmise it? I think it’s obvious
that it is the latter. Admittedly, the case doesn’t describe the agent’s reasoning to
the existence of disagreement explicitly, but it is implicit in the background story:
They’ve been going out to dinner for years, their track record is equally good, and
so on. We may think that there’s an easy fix, and that all we need to do is substitute
the conciliationist schema for:
Conciliationist reasoning policy, second pass:
r∗∗(X) = Seems(Disagree(X)) ⊃ Out(r(X)): If your first-order reasoning
about the presence of disagreement about X suggests that there’s genuine
disagreement, stop relying on your first-order reasoning about X.
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While this is a step forward, it turns out to be insufficient. To see why, let’s consider
a case discussed in the following passage from (Mulligan 2015):
Second-Order Disagreement: Imagine that I disagree with my friend
Francis about the truth of some proposition Q. I believe that Q is true
and Francis believes that Q is false. Since I regard Francis as my epis-
temic peer with respect to Q, I revise my confidence in Q downward...
I subsequently hear something distressing from another friend, Richard,
though: He believes that I erred when I judged Francis to be my epis-
temic peer. In Richard’s opinion, Francis is not my epistemic peer. This
is problematic because I take [it] that Richard is my epistemic peer with
respect to assessments of epistemic peerhood.18
So here we have a case of genuine disagreement about whether there is disagreement
about whether Q, or a case of second-order disagreement. Let’s unpack the protag-
onist’s reasoning. She starts off thinking that there’s genuine disagreement about
whether Q between her and Francis, that is, the sort of disagreement that can only
obtain between epistemic peers. Then she learns that Richard disagrees with her
regarding Francis’ status. If Richard turned out to be right, Francis wouldn’t be her
epistemic peer, which would, in turn, mean that her first-order reasoning about the
existence of a genuine disagreement about whether Q rested on a mistake. What’s
crucially important for us to realize is that the protagonist’s disagreement with
18(Mulligan 2015, p. 69), I’ve changed the propositional letter from P to Q. Mulligan uses this
case to exhibit two paradoxes in conciliatory views, and then goes on to discuss another similar
case to exhibit a third one. The formal model developed here could help resolve these paradoxes,
but we won’t discuss the issue for reasons of space.
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Richard doesn’t show conclusively that her reasoning about whether there’s genuine
disagreement about whether Q rests on a mistake. Rather, it only indicates it is a
real possibility. In fact, here things aren’t any different from any old case of disagree-
ment: The protagonist has no way of knowing if she has made a mistake or not. Still,
the disagreement with Richard is enough to make the first-order reasoning about
the existence of genuine disagreement about whether Q suspect. Thus, we have a
scenario in which the agent’s best first-order reasoning suggests that there’s genuine
disagreement about Q, that is, Seems(Disagree(Q)) obtains, and yet she can’t jus-
tifiably reach the conclusion that there is genuine disagreement about Q, that is, she
can’t conclude Disagree(Q).19 But if that’s so, then the above conciliatory schema
Seems(Disagree(X)) ⊃ Out(r(X)) is much too strong. With it, the reasoner would
proceed from Seems(Disagree(Q)) to disregarding its first-order reasoning about
Q, but we have just seen that it shouldn’t even proceed from Seems(Disagree(Q))
to Disagree(Q).
Here we need to move from a strict connection between Seems(Disagree(X))
and Out(r(X)) to a defeasible one. And we’re going to implement this idea by
replacing the schema Seems(Disagree(X)) ⊃ Out(r(X)) with the two-link chain







first link makes the reasoner conclude, by default, that there’s genuine disagreement
about whether X whenever its first-order reasoning suggests that there’s genuine
disagreement about whether X. Notice that this is nothing but the by now familiar
19By the way, I do think that there can just as well be cases of even higher-order disagreement,















Figure 4.3: Mental Math, final




restricted to cases where this
reasoning concerns disagreement. And the second link makes the reasoner take the
rule of the form
Seems(X)
X
out of consideration, again, by default, once the
reasoner concludes that there’s genuine disagreement about whether X.20 I think
that exactly this second link should be seen as heart of conciliatory views we are
modeling.




: If you have concluded that there’s genuine disagree-
ment about whether X, stop relying on your first-order reasoning about X by
default.
With this our conciliatory reasoner is complete, or nearly complete—see the
following section. It’s worth taking a look at our final formalization of the paradigm
case of peer disagreement, Mental Math. We will now express it in the context c4 =
20This is not the only way to implement the idea, but it is the most perspicuous one. Alternative
implementations include changing the schema for
Seems(Disagree(X))
Out(r(X))
and splitting it into
Seems(Disagree(X))
Disagree(X)
and Disagree(X) ⊃ Out(r(X)). All three ways of implementing the idea
lead to the similar analyses.
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⟨W ,R⟩ withW consisting of Seems(S) and Seems(Disagree(S)) and R consisting













The first rule is familiar, but the remaining two are new. The rule r5 makes the
reasoner conclude that there’s genuine disagreement about whether S, by default,
if its first-order reasoning suggests that there’s such disagreement. And the rule
r6 makes the reasoner take r4 out of consideration, by default, once it concludes
there’s genuine disagreement about whether S. Figure 4.3 (left) depicts the context
graphically. An easy check will convince you that S does not follow from c4, or
c4 /∣∼ S, as desired.
In the literature on peer disagreement, the views that are contrary to concilia-
tory views are called steadfast. So you may naturally wonder how such views would
be represented in our model. My proposal is to represent them using a steadfast




. How would we model a steadfast response in Mental Math
then? Well, we would encode the scenario into the context c5 = ⟨W ,R⟩ which is just
like c4, except for the conciliatory rule r6 is absent from it. Figure 4.3 (right) depicts
this context graphically. It’s easy to see that S follows from c5, as does Disagree(S).
So the steadfast reasoner concludes that there’s genuine disagreement about whether











Figure 4.4: Second-Order Disagreement
We still need to capture the more complex case of Second-Order Disagreement.
Before we do it, however, let’s introduce some abbreviations. Henceforth, in graphs
Seems(⋅) will sometimes be abbreviated as S(⋅) and Disagree(⋅) as D(⋅). We will en-
code the case itself in the context c6 = ⟨W,R⟩. Its hard information W will consist
of Seems(Q), Seems(Disagree(Q)), and Seems(Disagree(Disagree(Q))), with
the last one expressing the proposition that the agent’s first-order reasoning sug-
gests that there’s genuine disagreement about whether there is genuine disagreement





















The meanings of these default rules are straightforward to understand, and Figure
4.4 contains the graph depicting c6. What conclusions does the reasoner draw from
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this context? Well, here we have
c6 ∣∼ Q,Disagree(Disagree(Q)) and c6 /∣∼Disagree(Q).
So the reasoner concludes Q, as well as that there’s genuine disagreement about
whether there’s genuine disagreement about whether Q, and it does not conclude
that there’s genuine disagreement about whether Q. What happens here is that the
second-order disagreement cancels the effects of the first-order disagreement and
reestablishes the link between Seems(Q) and Q. This phenomenon is known as
reinstatement in the logic literature: A rule r gets excluded, but, then, through
further instances of exclusion, r reemerges, or gets reinstated, to support its original
conclusion.21 Thus, on our analysis, the agent should take her disagreement with
Richard to nullify the effects of her disagreement with Francis, and she should go by
her first-order reasoning about whether Q. I think this makes good sense. Given that
we’re in categorical-belief setting, the only other sensible thing to say here would
be that the agent should suspend judgment about whether Q. But given that her
best (first-order) reasoning points to Q, she would seem to need a compelling reason
to suspend. Admittedly, a genuine disagreement regarding Q could serve as such a
reason, but then she has a compelling reason to suspend judgment on whether there
is genuine disagreement regarding Q.
Before we leave this section and return to disagreement about the correct
way to disagree, it’s worth taking a brief look at a case of the sort that are often
brought up against conciliationism to see how our model might handle it. Consider










Figure 4.5: Careful Checking
the following variation on Mental Math:
Careful Checking: I consider my friend my peer on matters of simple
math. She and I are in a restaurant, figuring our shares of the bill plus
20% tip, rounded up to the nearest dollar. The total on the bill is clearly
visible in unambiguous numbers. Instead of doing the math once in my
head, I take out a pencil and paper and carefully go through the problem.
I then carefully check my answer, and it checks out. I then take out my
well-tested calculator, and redo the problem and check the result in a few
different ways. As I do all of this I feel fully clear and alert. Each time I do
the problem, I get the exact same answer, $43, and each time I check this
answer, it checks out correctly. Since the math problem is so easy, and
I’ve calculated and checked my answer so carefully in several independent
ways, I now have an extremely high degree of rational confidence that
our shares are $43. Then something very strange happens. My friend
announces that she got $45 (Christensen 2011, p. 8).
In Careful Checking the intuition suggests, seemingly contra conciliationism, that
136
the agent should not reduce her confidence in S. It’s very unlikely that some-
one in her situation has gotten the same wrong answer each time, and I think
Christensen (2011) is absolutely right when he says that here the agent has good
reason to suspect that something screwy is going on with her friend. So Careful
Checking is not only a situation in which there is no genuine disagreement about
whether S, but also a situation in which the agent doesn’t arrive at the conclusion
that there’s such disagreement through her first-order reasoning. Or, to put it sim-
ply, Seems(Disagree(S)) doesn’t obtain. We can encode the case in the context
c7 = ⟨W,R⟩ with W = {Seems(S)} and R = {r4, r5, r6}, that is, a context that’s
just like c4 which we used to encode Mental Math, except for now the proposition
Seems(Disagree(S)) is absent from the hard information. Figure 4.5 depicts c7
graphically. Not surprisingly, we get the intuitive result c7 ∣∼ S.22
4.2 Disagreement about conciliationism
Having embedded conciliationism in our defeasible reasoner, we can return to
the problems stemming from disagreement about the correct way to disagree. Recall
the problematic scenario that we started with. For convenience, let’s restate it here,
22Some might find this way of dealing with the case dissatisfying. They might ask, “If, for any
case at hand, we’re allowed to decide whether the agent’s first-order reasoning suggests that there’s
genuine disagreement or not, don’t we have a response available to every case that causes trouble
for conciliationism?” I have two things to say in response to this question. First, this move isn’t
going to work for all seemingly problematic cases—for instance, it’s not going to help with Double
Disagreement. Second, in Chapter 6 we are going to implement the idea of degrees of confidence
in the model. This will let us capture formally such claims as, “The agent is more confident in
the conclusion of her-first order reasoning that her share of the bill is $43 than in the conclusion
of her-first order reasoning that there’s genuine disagreement about whether her share of the bill
is $43.” With these degrees in hand, we could represent the scenario more adequately, but the
reasoner would still draw the same conclusion.
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in first-personal terms:
Double Disagreement: I consider myself a somewhat able philosopher
with special interests in metaphysics and social epistemology. I’ve rea-
soned very carefully about the vexed topic of free will, and I’ve come to
the conclusion that we have libertarian free will. I’ve also spent a fair
amount of time thinking about the issues surrounding peer disagreement,
and as a result I’ve become convinced that conciliationism is correct and
that on has to give up one’s well-reasoned opinion when faced with a
disagreeing peer. Then, to my amazement, I discover that my friend
metaphysician Milo disagrees with me about the existence of free will.
What’s more, my friend epistemologist Evelyn disagrees with me about
conciliationism. In fact, she thinks it’s utterly misguided.23
Elga (2010), among others, has famously argued that cases like this show that
conciliatory views are inconsistent.24 His line of reasoning goes roughly as follows.
On the one hand, conciliationism seems to recommend that the agent abandons her
belief in the existence of libertarian free will and suspend judgment on the issue
in response to her disagreement with Milo. On the other hand, conciliationism also
seems to recommend that the agent does not abandon her belief in the existence
23This scenario is a variation on a case discussed by Matheson (2015a), see also (Christensen
2013).
24To be precise, Elga doesn’t discuss any case like Double Disagreement. Instead, he draws an
analogy between conciliatory views and the magazine Consumer Reports that reviews products,
as well as other consumer ratings magazines, and ends up giving inconsistent advice: To buy only
toaster X and to follow the advice of another magazine, Smart Shopper, that suggest buying only
toaster Y . However, the situation with magazines is supposed to be structurally analogous to some
case with disagreement about conciliationism, and that case must look something like Double
Disagreement.
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of libertarian free will. Why? Well, it recommends taking her disagreement with
Evelyn seriously. And once she does take it seriously, she should give up her belief
in conciliationism as the correct response to cases of disagreement. But once the
agent does that, her disagreement with Milo looses its epistemic significance for her.
And if this disagreement has lost its epistemic significance, then it must be okay for
the agent to retain her belief in the existence of free will. So it can’t be the case
that she has to abandon this belief. Thus, conciliationism, appears to support two
inconsistent conclusions, that the agent should suspend belief with regard to whether
free will exists and that it’s not the case that the agent should suspend belief with
regard to whether free will exists. From here, conciliationism is inconsistent, and so
it must be abandonend, or, at least, substantially modified.
While the above reasoning has some pull, it’s hard to deny that it could be a
little more precise. So let’s see if a formal analysis drawing on our model will support
it. The first thing we need to do is encode the case in a context, and here already we
face a difficulty. Part of the agent’s reasoning concerns conciliationism itself. To be
clear, we know how to model conciliatory reasoning, but we don’t know yet how to
model the reasoning that would put conciliationism as a reasoning policy into place.
As our first step, we’ll try treating conciliationism as an atomic proposition. So let
C stand for the idea that conciliationism is correct—think of C as placeholder to be
made precise later on—and let L stand for the idea that we have libertarian free will.
Now we can encode the scenario in the context c8 = ⟨W ,R⟩ where W is composed
of Seems(L), Seems(C), Seems(Disagree(L)), and Seems(Disagree(C)), and

















: If my best reasoning about free will suggest that L, I can




: If my best reasoning about the disagreement
between Milo and me suggests that there’s genuine disagreement regarding L,




: If there’s genuine disagreement regarding L, I must back




: If my best reasoning about the epistemic significance of




: If my best reasoning about the disagreement
between Evelyn and me suggests that there’s genuine disagreement regarding




: If there’s genuine disagreement regarding C, I must back
off from my first-order reasoning about C by default.
The context c8 is depicted in Figure 4.6. There’s only one proper scenario based on
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c8, namely, S4 = {r13, r14, r14, r17}. From here it’s but one step to see that c8 /∣∼ L
and c8 /∣∼ C. So the model suggests that the correct conciliatory response in Double
Disagreement is to withhold belief on the question about the existence of libertarian
free will, as well as the the question about the correctness of conciliationism. There is
nothing blatantly inconsistent here, but the suggested responses is at least somewhat
odd: Even though the reasoner withholds with regard to C, the derivation of L is
blocked for a distinctively conciliatory reason—the rule r12 is defeated by the rule
r14. This, however, shouldn’t be all that surprising. For, in c8, there’s no connection
between reasoning to the conciliatory reasoning policy and this policy itself, or the
rules implementing this policy. What our formalization is lacking is a connection
between C and the rules r14 and r17.
We’re now going to put this connection into place, proceeding in two steps.
In Section 4.2.1 we’ll be concerned with the relation between C and r14 and the
question of what happens if the support for C gets undermined. And in Section
4.2.2 we’ll turn to the connection between C and r17.
4.2.1 Reasoning to the conciliatory policy
To isolate the first task, let’s refocus on a different case, one that’s much like
Double Disagreement, except for now, instead of discovering that I’m in disagree-
ment with Evelyn, I find out that I’ve been given one of the infamous reasoning-
distorting drugs:
Disagreement on Drugs: I consider myself a somewhat able philoso-
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pher with special interests in metaphysics and social epistemology. I’ve
reasoned very carefully about the vexed topic of free will, and I’ve come
to the conclusion that we have libertarian free will. I’ve also spent a fair
amount of time thinking about the issues surrounding peer disagreement,
and as a result I’ve become convinced that conciliationism is correct and
that on has to give up one’s well-reasoned opinion when faced with a
disagreeing peer. Then I discover that my friend metaphysician Milo
disagrees with me about the existence of free will. What’s more, I find
out, from a very reliable source, that someone has slipped a drug into my
morning coffee, a drug that’s known to screw up one’s reasoning in mat-
ters pertaining to issues in epistemology, while leaving one’s reasoning
about matters pertaining to metaphysics intact.
Let Drug express the idea that I’ve been given the drug, having the described
effects. Now we can encode the scenario into c9 = ⟨W ,R⟩ where W = {Seems(L),
Seems(Disagree(L)), Seems(C), Seems(Drug)} andR contains the familiar rules




. The new element
Seems(D) expresses the idea that I’ve arrived at the conclusions that I’ve been
given the drug through appropriate first-order reasoning; and the new rule r18 says if
that’s what my first-reasoning suggests, then I’d better stop relying on the reasoning
affected by this drug.25 The context is depicted in Figure 4.7. Note, though, that c8
is only a preliminary formalization.
25Note that we could split r18 into two default rules, with one taking the reasoner from
Seems(Drug) to Drug and the other from Drug to Out(r15). Nothing of importance would












Figure 4.7: Disagreement on Drugs, preliminary
If we think about the case intuitively, we’d seem to have to say that the agent’s
conclusion that conciliationism is correct is what makes her adopt the conciliatory
reasoning policy. In the model, the conclusion is represented by the propositional








. And in the particular case of c8 the schema has




. So it seems reasonable to
arrange things in such a way that C is just what makes the reasoner adopt the rule
r14, just what puts this rule into place.
As the first step toward enabling the reasoner to adopt new rules, we’ll extend
the background language with a new predicate Reasonable(⋅). Think of it as the
opposite of the predicate Out(⋅). If Out(r) says that the rule r should be taken out
of consideration, then Reasonable(r) says that r is a reasonable rule to follow, or
that r should be among the reasoner’s stock of rules for reasoning. The expression
Reasonable(r14) then expresses the idea that the rule r14 in particular is a reasonable
rule to follow.
We’ll need to update the reasoner so that it can reason with the new pred-













Figure 4.8: Disagreement on Drugs, final
Reasonable(r14) in the context c8. One straightforward thing we can do is add
the rule Cr19 =
Reasonable(r14)
to the context’s set of rules. Notice that it lets the
reasoner conclude, by default, that r14 is a reasonable rule to follow, once it has con-
cluded that conciliationism is correct. This results in the context c9 = ⟨W ,R⟩ with
W = {Seems(L), Seems(Disagree(L)), Seems(C), Seems(Drug)} and R = {r12,
r13, r14, r15, r18, r19}. See Figure 4.8 for the corresponding graph. Notice that the
graph contains a dashed link. Henceforth, we will use such links to represent those
rules that the reasoner can start relying on only after it has concluded that they are




If we run the reasoner on c9, we see that neither L, or Reasonable(r14) follow
from it. But this is, of course, the wrong result. For, first, intuitively, in Disagreement
on Drugs the agent should conclude that we have libertarian free will—or, at least,
that’s something we might argue for. Second and more importantly for our present
concerns, L doesn’t follow because it is excluded by d14, and so the reasoner follows
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a rule, even though it hasn’t deemed this rule a reasonable one to follow.
In order to make the new predicate and rules like r19 do real work, we have to
change the inner workings of the defeasible reasoner. And here my general strategy
is to let the reasoner employ any default rule r only on the condition that it can
also infer a proposition of the form Reasonable(r), where r is the unique name of
r. This will run analogously to the way it works for a rule’s triggering conditions.
Currently, the reasoner can use a rule r only in case it can infer its triggering
condition, Premise[r]. Henceforth, however, it will use a rule r only in case it can
infer both Premise[r] and Reasonable(r). And just like it worked for triggering
conditions, there will be two ways for the reasoner to infer a formula of the form
Reasonable(r), either from the hard informationW , or by means of other rules. One
implication of this is that we will often have to include such formulas inW. But this
should make good sense: The presence of Reasonable(r) in W can be understood in
terms of the reasoner being committed to r from the outset of its reasoning.
Recall that, in Section 4.1.1, we defined the central notion of a proper scenario
by specifying three conditions for a rule’s inclusion in such a scenario. We will now
amend this definition by adding a fourth condition—a condition requiring that the
default rule is deemed reasonable:
Definition 4.8 (Reasonable rules) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a context, and S a scenario
based on it. Then the rules from R that are reasonable (to follow) in the context
of the scenario S are those that belong to the set ReasonableW,R(S) = {r ∈ R ∶
W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ Reasonable(r)}.
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With this definition in hand, we can update the definition of a proper scenario, as
follows:
Definition 4.9 (Proper scenarios, updated) Let ⟨W,R⟩ be a context and S a
scenario based on it. Then S is a proper scenario based on ⟨W ,R⟩ just in case




With this simple change we’re done. There’s no need to change the definition of
consequence. The following observation shows that the reasoner that can reason
with the predicate Reasonable is a conservative generalization of the original one—
the proof of the observation is in the Appendix:
Observation 6 Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩ be a context in which no Reasonable-formulas occur.
Then there exists a context c′ = ⟨W,R⟩ where Reasonable-formulas do occur such
that
X follows from c if and only if X follows from c′,
for all X in which the predicate Reasonable doesn’t occur.
Our final rendering of Disagreement on Drugs is the context c10 = ⟨W,R⟩. The
set W contains all the formulas the hard information of c9 did, together with the










Figure 4.9: Disagreement with Evelyn
outset: Reasonable(r12), Reasonable(r13), Reasonable(r15), Reasonable(r18), and
Reasonable(r18). What conclusions does the reasoner draw from c10? Well, there’s
only one proper scenario based on it, namely S5 = {r12, r13, r18}, and so we have
c10 ∣∼ L and c10 /∣∼ C. Thus, our analysis suggests that the correct response to the
scenario is to back off from the belief in conciliationism and be steadfast with regard
to the belief in the existence of libertarian free will.
4.2.2 The (formal) inconsistency problem
Now let’s refocus on the other half of the story in Double Disagreement.
Consider the abridged version in which I reason my way to the conclusion that
conciliationism is correct and then discover that my friend epistemologist Evelyn
sincerely believes that it isn’t. Our preliminary formalization made use of the for-












. (See Figure 4.6.) We
found it lacking as it did not connect C and r17. Now, however, we know how to
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connect them. Crucially, we must introduce a new rule Cr20 =
Reasonable(r17)
which lets the reasoner conclude, by default, that r17 is a reasonable rule to follow,
once it concludes that C. And, then, we must also supplement the hard informa-
tion with statements saying that r15, r16, and r20 are reasonable. The result is
the extended context c11 = ⟨W ,R⟩ with W = {Seems(C), Seems(Disagree(C)),
Reasonable(r15), Reasonable(r16), Reasonable(r20)} and R = {r15, r16, r17, r23}. It
is depicted in Figure 4.9.
It turns out that there are no proper scenarios based on c11.26 This is bad
news for the advocates of conciliatory views, since no proper scenarios means that
we get c11 ∣∼ X for any formula X whatsoever. Recall that, on our definition of
consequence, a formula X is said to follow from a context c = ⟨W ,R⟩ if and only
if W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢ X for every proper scenario based on c. When there are
no proper scenarios, every formula satisfies the right-hand side of the biconditional
vacuously, and so every formula follows from the context.27
26This can be verified by enumeration, going through all of the subsets of R one by one. Or
we can save ourselves from the tedious exercise, restricting attention to the antecedently viable
scenarios. Three things should be uncontroversial. First, given that r16 is triggered byW and is not
threatened by anything, it’d have to be included in every proper scenario based on c11. Second, r17
can be in a scenario only in case r20 is—otherwise r17 wouldn’t be triggered. And third, r20 can be
in a proper scenario only in case r15 is. There are four scenarios satisfying these three conditions:
{r16}, {r15, r16}, {r15, r16, r20}, and {r15, r16, r17, r20}. The first three aren’t proper as they fail to
include all triggered default rules—e.g., r15 is triggered in the context of {r16}, but not included
in it. And {r15, r16, r17, r20} doesn’t qualify as proper because it excludes one of its own elements,
r15.
27Notice that this outcome depends on the way we defined logical consequence, and, more specif-
ically, that our definition requires that X follows from every proper scenario based on the context.
There’s another natural and widely used definition of consequence—often called credulous—which
requires that X follows from some proper scenario based on the context, and one might wonder
whether this alternative definition runs into this problem too. The answer is that it runs into a
similar problem: When there are no proper scenarios based on a context, no formula whatsoever
will follow from it on the credulous consequence. At first sight this might look like an improvement.
Perhaps, it is correct to suspend judgment in response to the disagreement with Evelyn. However,
it’s important to notice that the reasoner’s suspension of judgment is universal : For starters, it















Figure 4.10: Double Disagreement, final
What’s more, the situation doesn’t get any better when we look at the context
that captures the entire story recounted in Double Disagreement. Merging c10 and
c11, we acquire our final formalization of the scenario, the context c12—see Figure
4.10 for a graph. Yet again, there are no proper scenarios based on c12, and we get
c12 ∣∼ X for all X. What this means is that our carefully designed model reasoner
suggests that the correct conciliatory response to Double Disagreement is to conclude
everything.
Recall that we started with an informal description of the problem of self-
defeat for strong conciliatory views and noted that it seemed to split into two. The
first problem appeared to be that conciliatory views issue inconsistent directives in
possible scenarios of a certain structure; and the second that nobody could ratio-
nally hold a conciliatory view in the actual world. The problem that c12 gives rise to
seems to be naturally thought of as a formal version of the first problem: Advancing
ism, which we intuitively want it to draw in the case at hand. What’s more, were we to supplement
c11 with information utterly unrelated to conciliationism and disagreement, such as Perceive(R)
with the corresponding rule
Perceive(R)
R
, the reasoner would suspended judgment on it too.
So the alternative definition of consequence seems to fare no better than the one we are using.
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a model (conciliatory) reasoner which suggests that concluding everything is the
correct response to scenarios of a certain shape is much like advancing a (concil-
iatory) view that sometimes issues inconsistent directives. Now that we have this
problem in front of us in plain sight, we don’t only see that the worries about the
behavior of conciliatory views in contexts involving disagreement about the correct
way to disagree are legitimate, but can also start addressing them.
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Chapter 5: From default logic to formal argumentation
As we saw, our carefully designed model reasoner suggests that the correct
conciliatory response to Double Disagreement—a scenario involving a disagreement
about how to disagree—is to conclude everything. This might seem to corroborate
Elga’s (2010) conclusion that conciliationism is inherently flawed. However, concili-
ationism’s turning on itself is only a part of the reason why the problematic result
obtains. The other part is the way default logic handles what we’ll call self-defeating
chains or vicious cycles of rules. If we look at the context c11, representing the sec-
ond half of the Double Disagreement scenario—see Figure 5.1—it’s very natural to
single out the chain of rules r15-r20-r17 as its problematic component. What hap-
pens is that the rule r15 puts r17 into place, via r20, and thereby undermines its own
support. This chain forms a vicious cycle, and it’s just a general fact about default
logic that it can’t adequately handle contexts that contain cycles of this sort.1
Unfortunately, there’s no straightforward fix to default logic that would let it
generate meaningful consequences for c11, c12, and other contexts containing self-
defeating chains. However, there’s a roundabout way of getting to such consequences
1This aspect of default logic is discussed in (Horty 2012). Horty sees the existence of contexts
containing vicious cycles as a technical problem—which it is—and hints at two general strategies
for dealing with it. The first is to restrict the background language in a way that would preclude
the possibility of default rules forming vicious cycles. And the second is to leave the language as
is, but to modify the reasoner in a way that would let it generate meaningful conclusions in the
presence of such cycles—see (Horty 2012, pp. 59–61). The first strategy is a no-go for us, since
it would let us escape the unfortunate consequences of c11 only by disallowing us to formalize
the scenario as c11. Our question is whether or not conciliationism’s turning on itself results in
inconsistent commands, and so adopting this strategy would be question-begging. But the second










Figure 5.1: Disagreement with Evelyn, again
that takes a recourse through a different and more general formal framework called
abstract argumentation theory. As the seminal work of Phan Minh Dung (1995) es-
tablished, various logics for defeasible reasoning—including default logic—can be
seen as special cases of argumentation theory. Part of this means is that one can for-
mulate an argumentation theory-based reasoner that picks out the same consequence
relation as the default logic-based reasoner we formulated above. What we’re going
to do next, then, is devise such a reasoner. Why? Well, because a simple tweak to it
will give us a (more) sophisticated reasoner capable of handling theories with cycles
in an adequate way.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The relatively tech-
nical Sections 5.1–5.3 introduce abstract argumentation, relate it to default logic,
and devise the argumentation theory-based reasoner. Section 5.4 returns to Double
Disagreement and explains how the sophisticated reasoner handles it.
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5.1 Argument frameworks
While in default logic conclusions are derived on the bases of contexts, in
argumentation theory they are derived on the basis of argument (or argumentation)
frameworks. Formally, such frameworks are pairs of the from ⟨A,↝⟩, where the first
element A is a set of arguments—really, a set whose elements can be anything—and
the second element ↝ is a defeat relation among these arguments. Thus, for any two
arguments S and S ′ in A, the relation ↝ can tell us whether S defeats S ′ or not.2
We’ll denote argument frameworks with the letter F . What argumentation theory,
then, does is provide a number of sensible ways for selecting the set of winning (or
undefeated) arguments of any given framework F , the set which, then, determines
the conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of F .3 In light of the fact that
the frameworks we will focus on will be constructed from contexts, argumentation
theory will let us determine the conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of any
given context c.
Recall that our default logic-based reasoner relies on the notion of a proper
scenario to determine the consequences of a context. This notion specifies some-
thing like the necessary and sufficient conditions for a default rule’s counting as
admissible or good—that the rule be reasonable, triggered, not conflicted, and not
excluded—and the reasoner can be thought of as selecting the good rules in one
single step. Notice that nothing would seem to stand in the way of selecting such
2Technically, the defeat relation↝ is a subset ofA×A. Thus, argument frameworks are relatively
simple mathematical objects, namely, directed graphs.
3I should note that, in general, a framework can have multiple winning argument sets.
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rules in a more stepwise fashion. That is, instead of jumping from a context to the
scenario containing all and only the admissible rules, we could first select all scenar-
ios whose members satisfy the positive conditions—reasonable and triggered—and,
then, later filter out the scenarios whose members do not satisfy the remaining neg-
ative conditions—conflicted and excluded. Or, to restate the idea using our formal
notation, starting with a context c = ⟨W,R⟩, in the first step we would select all
and only those scenarios S ⊆R such that, for every r in S,
W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ Reasonable(r) and W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ Premise[r],
and, in the second step, we would filter out all of those scenarios S for which it holds
that there’s some r in S such that
W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r] or W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ Out(r).
After taking these two steps, we’d have access to all and only the good default rules.
Now, the application of argumentation to contexts can be naturally thought of as
proceeding in these two steps. The scenarios selected in the first step will just be the
arguments of the argument framework based on the given context. And the scenarios
that remain standing after the second step will be the winning (or the undefeated)
arguments of the framework. So here’s our definition of an argument based on a
context:
Definition 5.1 (Arguments) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a context and S a scenario based
on it, S ⊆ R. Then S is an argument based on c just in case S ⊆ TriggeredW,R(S)
and S ⊆ ReasonableW,R(S). The set of arguments based on c is the set Arguments(c)







Figure 5.2: Sample context with a vicious cycle
To see this definition at work, let’s apply it to an abstract toy example. Con-
sider the context c13 = ⟨W ,R⟩ where W contains the statements Reasonable(r1),








. The context is depicted in Figure 5.2. As one can easily verify, there
are eight scenarios based on c13, namely,
S0 = ∅, S4 = {r1, r2},
S1 = {r1}, S5 = {r1, r3},
S2 = {r2}, S6 = {r2, r3},
S3 = {r3}, S7 = {r1, r2, r3}.
Two of these scenarios, S2 and S6, fail to qualify as arguments. And the reason is
that they both contain an element, the rule r2, that’s not triggered. Indeed, one
glance at the graph depicting c13 in Figure 5.2 is enough to see that r2 won’t be
triggered in any scenario based on c13 that fails to contain r1. This leaves us with six
arguments that will comprise the first element A of the argument framework based
on c.
The next step is to specify the conditions under which one argument defeats
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another, and that’s just what our next definition does.
Definition 5.2 (Defeat) Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩ be a context and S and S ′ two arguments
based on it. Then S defeats S ′, written as S ↝ S ′, if and only if there is some rule r ∈
S ′ such that either W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r], or W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢
Out(r).
Notice how the core ideas behind the notions of conflicted and excluded rules are
repurposed in this definition: A rule r came out conflicted in the context of a
scenario S just in case W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r], and now an ar-
gument S defeats another argument S ′ if there is a rule r in S ′ such that W ∪
Conclusion[S] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r]; and similarly for exclusion. Now let’s see the def-









} and S1 = {
⊺r1 =
A
}. Notice that the set
Conclusion[S7] entails Out(r1) and that r1 is in S1. So, according to the definition,
S7 defeats S1. What’s more, r1 is an element of S7, meaning that the argument S7
self-defeats.4
Now we have all that’s needed to specify how to construct argument frame-
works from contexts.
Definition 5.3 (Context-based argument frameworks) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be an
epistemic context. Then the argument framework F(c) based on c is the pair ⟨A,↝⟩
4It may be worth pointing out that any argument S based on some context c = ⟨W,R⟩
that happens to contradict the hard information W will end up self-defeating. It’s easy to
see why this holds: By assumption, W together with Conclusion[S] is inconsistent, that is,
W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢ . But given that inconsistent sets entail all formulas, it must hold that














Figure 5.3: Argument framework for the sample context
where A = Arguments(c) and ↝ is the set {(S,S ′) ∈ A ×A ∶ S defeats S ′}.
The graph representing the argument framework F(c13) constructed from c13 is
depicted in Figure 5.3. Here’s how it should be read. The nodes of the graph, S0,
S1, and so on, are the arguments in A, and the pointed edges between them are the
relations of defeat. Nodes with edges pointing to themselves are the arguments that
happen to self-defeat.
It’ll also be useful to introduce some shorthand notation here. Let F = ⟨A,↝⟩
be an arbitrary argument framework and Γ and Γ′ two sets of arguments from A.
When there’s an argument S in Γ that defeats some argument S ′ from A, we will
write Γ ↝ S ′; and when there’s a pair of arguments S and S ′ such that S is in Γ,
S ′ is in Γ′, and S ↝ S ′, we will write Γ ↝ Γ′. As an illustration, in the case of
F(c13), we have {S0,S7} ↝ S5, while we do not have {S0,S7} ↝ S3; and we have
{S0,S7}↝ {S1,S3,S4}, while we do not have {S0,S7}↝ {S3}. Further, when there’s
no argument S in Γ such that S defeats S ′, we will write Γ   S ′; and when there’s
no pair of arguments S and S ′ such that S is in Γ, S ′ is in Γ′, and S ↝ S ′, we will
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write Γ  Γ′.
5.2 Selecting winning arguments
In this section, we turn to argumentation theory proper. As mentioned above,
in it the winning argument set of a framework—or, rather, sets, as one framework
can have multiple winning sets—are selected only on the basis of the defeat relation
among arguments. In the literature, the collection of definitions that lets one select
winning sets is standardly referred to as admissibility semantics. You may find it
helpful to think of this semantics as serving a function that’s similar to the one
served by the notion of a proper scenario in the context of default logic. There’s
one important difference, however. Where default logic didn’t offer any choice, the
admissibility semantics provides a number of different sensible ways of selecting
winning arguments. We will focus on two such here, beginning with what we’ll call
stability semantics.
Definition 5.4 (Stability semantics) Let F = ⟨A,↝⟩ be an argument framework
and Γ a set of arguments from A. Then:
(i) Γ is conflict-free if and only if there are no two arguments S, S ′ in Γ such
that S ↝ S ′,
(ii) Γ is stable, or a stable extension of F , if and only if
(1) Γ is conflict-free, and
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(2) Γ defeats all the arguments that are not in it, that is, for all S ∈ A/Γ,
Γ↝ S.
Stability semantics is closely related to default logic, and we will state the precise
connection between the two in a moment. For now, let me just point out that there
are no stable argument sets based on the framework F(c13), just like there are no
proper scenarios based on the context c13. As you may have guessed, this is due to
the self-defeating chain of rules r1-r2.
The alternative to the stability semantics we are going to make use of is what
we’ll call preference semantics :
Definition 5.5 (Preference semantics) Let F = ⟨A,↝⟩ be an argument frame-
work and Γ a set of arguments from A. Then:
(i) Γ is conflict-free if and only if there are no arguments S, S ′ in Γ such that
S ↝ S ′.
(ii) An argument S in A is defended by Γ if and only if, for all S ′ (with S ′ in
A/Γ) such that S ′ ↝ S, we have Γ↝ S ′.
(iii) Γ is a complete extension of F if and only if
(1) Γ is conflict-free, and
(2) Γ contains all of the arguments it defends.
(iv) Γ is preferred, or a preferred extension of F , if and only if Γ is a maxi-
mal complete extension of F , that is, if and only if there’s no other complete
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extension Γ′ of F such that Γ ⊂ Γ′.
Now let’s apply this definition to F(c13). The largest conflict-free set of arguments
is {S0, S1, S3, S5}. However, it does not defend all of its members: Both S4 and S7
defeat S5, and there’s nothing in the set that defeats either of them. There are a few
sets that are both conflict-free and defend all of their members, namely, ∅, {S0},
{S3}, and {S0,S3}. However, only one of them qualifies as a complete extension,
namely, {S0,S3}. Why do the other sets fail to qualify? Take {S0} as an example.
A complete set is supposed to contain all the arguments it defends, and a minute’s
reflection should suffice to see that {S0} does not contain an argument it defends,
namely, S3. What’s more, the set {S0,S3} also happens to be the unique preferred
extension of F(c13).
Abstract as it might look, preference semantics has a clear intuitive ratio-
nale. Any conflict-free set of arguments that defends itself—that is, any complete
extension—is a desirable state to occupy: It is consistent, and it has a rejoinder to
every attack on it. And there’s a clear sense in which a preferred set of arguments is
an even more desirable state to occupy: It is still consistent; it still has a rejoinder
to every attack on it; and it’s also as big of an argument set of this sort as there can
be. So if we’re looking to select a winning argument set of some framework F , then
preferred extensions seem to be very natural candidates.5
5It’s worth pointing out that argumentation theory offers alternative ways of selecting winning
sets of arguments too. The one that’s at least as important as the stability and preference semantics
results in selecting the so-called grounded extensions. A grounded extension is dual to preferred
extensions: It is the (set theoretically) minimal complete extensions of a given argument framework.
Just as it is in the case of preferred extensions, and not in the case of the stable ones, grounded
extensions are guaranteed to exist, whether or not the underlying argument frameworks contains
self-defeating arguments. Given that our goal here is to formulate a defeasible reasoner that draws
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We have given labels to various kinds of sets of arguments, but we still haven’t
made clear the conditions under which a formula follows from such a set. The fol-
lowing definition rectifies the omission:
Definition 5.6 Where F(c) is an argument framework constructed from some con-
text c = ⟨W ,R⟩ and Γ is a set of arguments based on F(c), a statement X is a conclu-
sion of Γ if and only if there is some argument S in Γ such thatW∪Conclusion[S] ⊢
X.
With this definition in place, we have all the elements we need to define two
distinct consequence relations. Both will specify when a formula X follows from a
context c. Both take a circuitous route, utilizing the resources of argumentation the-
ory. The only difference between them is that the first relies on stability semantics,
while the second relies on preference semantics:
Definition 5.7 (Consequence, stable) Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩ be a context. Then the
statement X follows from c according to stability semantics—written c ∣∼s X—just
in case it is a conclusion of every stable extension of the argument framework F(c).
Definition 5.8 (Consequence, preferred) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a context. Then the
statement X follows from c according to preference semantics—written c ∣∼p X—just
in case it is a conclusion of every preferred extension of the argument framework
F(c).
sensible conclusions in the presence of self-defeating chains of rules, nothing of importance would
change had we opted for the grounded extensions instead of the preferred ones. It’s noteworthy
that the grounded extension and the unique preferred extension of F(c13) coincide. There are
argument frameworks whose grounded and preferred extensions come apart, but, given what our
aims are in this chapter, we need not concern ourselves with them.
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The promised connection between default logic and stability semantics can
now be stated in the form of an observation—the proof of which can be found in
the Appendix:
Observation 7 Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩ be a context and X an arbitrary formula. Then X
follows from c in default logic, c ∣∼ X, if and only if X follows from c according to
stability semantics, c ∣∼s X.
Thus, stability semantics expresses default logic in argumentation-theoretic terms,
and so inherits both its virtues and its vices. We have seen one of its vices: Default
logic collapses in the presence of self-defeating chains. Having the tools of argu-
mentation theory at our disposal, we can get an insight into why this happens.
When an argument contains a self-defeating chain of rules, it ends up self-defeating.
Recall that stable extensions are conflict-free argument sets that defeat all the ar-
guments that aren’t in them. Now suppose that we have some argument framework
F = ⟨A,↝⟩, that S is some self-defeating argument from A, and that Γ is a would-be
stable extension of F . How would Γ relate to S? Clearly, Γ can’t include S. Other-
wise, it wouldn’t be conflict-free. So Γ must defeat S. However, unless F is based
on a context of a very particular structure, there’s just not going to be an indepen-
dent argument in Γ—that is, an argument that’s neither a subset, nor a superset
of S—that would defeat S. And if there’s no such argument, Γ can’t qualify as a
stable extension. The rather demanding character of stability semantics becomes
manifest once we contrast it with preference semantics. Where preference semantics
only requires that a winning argument set has a rejoinder to every attack on it,
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stability semantics requires that a winning set attacks every argument that isn’t in
it.
I propose that we switch from the consequence relation picked out by both
default logics and the stability semantics to the consequence relation picked out by
the preference semantics. The move is not ad hoc, because there is a clear sense in
which preference semantics is a conservative generalization of stability semantics,
and, thus, also of default logic. This sense is captured by the following observation—
the proof of which can, again, be found in the Appendix:
Observation 8 Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a context and F(c) = ⟨A,↝⟩ an argument frame-
work constructed from it. If F(c) does not contain either odd cycles of defeat or
infinite chains of defeat, then c ∣∼s X if and only if c ∣∼p X.
One consequence of this is that preference semantics gives the same results as default
logic in all contexts that do not contain any self-defeating chains of rules.6 When
such chains are present, default logic will return the trivial set, while preference
semantics will return more reasonable consequences. The toy context c13 is a case in
point. When we run default logic on it, we get c13 ∣∼X for any formula X whatsoever,
while, when we rely on the preference semantics, we get the more reasonable c13 ∣∼p B
and c13 /∣∼p A. Here, as well as in general, preference semantics effectively disregards
the self-defeating chains of rules and draws conclusions on the basis of only those
rules that are independent of such chains.
6How exactly does this follow from the observation? Well, the presence of a self-defeating chain
of rules in c typically means that the argument framework F(c) constructed from c contains at least
one self-defeating argument—this doesn’t happen only in those cases where not a single arguments
of F(c) subsumes the chain. But self-defeating argument are (odd) cycles of defeat. So if F(c) has



















Figure 5.4: Context c13 and the corresponding framework F(c13)
At this point we could return to Double Disagreement and the problem it gave
rise to. But before we do that, I want to introduce an alternative way of thinking
about defeat between arguments.
5.3 Minimal arguments and basic defeat
There’s an intuitive sense in which some arguments are basic and others are
not. To see this, let’s take another look at our running example c13 and the corre-
sponding argumentation framework F(c13), depicted side by side in Figure 5.4 for
convenience. The scenarios S1 = {r1}, S3 = {r3}, S4 = {r1, r2}, S5 = {r1, r3}, and
S7 = {r1, r2, r3} all qualify as arguments based on c13, but there seems to be a qual-
itative difference between the first three, S1, S3, and S4, on the one hand, and S5
and S7, on the other. For one, S1, S3, and S4 are the (set-theoretically) smallest
arguments allowing us to derive, respectively, A, Out(r1), and B. Let’s compare S1
and S7. While we have both W ∪Conclusion[S1] ⊢ A and W ∪Conclusion[S7] ⊢ A,
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only in the case of S1 can we say that there’s no smaller argument that would let
us derive A. Also, S5 and S7 can be naturally thought of as aggregates of the basic
arguments: S5 combines S1 and S3, while S7 combines S1, S3, and S4.
What’s more, we can identify a correspondingly basic defeat relation between
arguments. There is, again, a clear intuitive sense in which the real action hap-
pens between the smallest argument to the conclusion Out(r1), namely, S4, and the
smallest argument containing r1, namely, S1. In the graph depicting the framework
F(c13) in Figure 5.4, this relation is represented by the highlighted arrow. The de-
feat relations obtaining between the other arguments seem to depend on this one,
and in a way we can capture precisely: For any two arguments S, S ′ in F(c13), we
have S ↝ S ′ only if the basic argument S4 is a part of S, S4 ⊆ S, and the basic
argument S1 is a part of S ′, S1 ⊆ S ′.
The goal of this section is to capture this intuitive sense of basicness—basic
arguments and basic defeat—in a mathematically precise way, and to show how it
leads to an alternative (yet extensionally equivalent) characterization of the defeat
relation between arguments.
We’ll be exploring an alternative way of constructing argument frameworks
from contexts. Nothing changes with regard to arguments. In specifying the relation
of defeat, the first step is to find a way to select those arguments from c that appear
basic intuitively. Notice that an argument that’s basic with respect to one rule or
one formula doesn’t have to count as basic with respect to another default rule or
formula. Consider our running example again. The scenario S4 = {r1, r2} seems basic
with respect to both the rule r2 and the formula Out(r1), since there’s no smaller
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argument that would either contain r2, or let us derive Out(r1). However, S4 is
not basic with respect to r1 and the formula A, since there’s the smaller S1 = {r1}
which contains r1 and let’s us derive A. What this means is that the formal notion
capturing the intuitive idea of basicness must be relativized, to a rule or a formula.
But otherwise, the basic, or minimal, arguments just are the (set-theoretically)
smallest arguments we can find:
Definition 5.9 (Minimal arguments, with respect to rules) Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩
be a context and r a rule from R. Then the r-minimal arguments, in the context of
c, are those arguments that belong to the set
MinimalF(c)(r) = {S ∈ Arguments(c) ∶ r ∈ S and
/∃ S ′ ∈ Arguments(c) such that
(1) r ∈ S ′ and
(2) S ′ ⊂ S}.
Definition 5.10 (Minimal arguments, with respect to formulas) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩
be a context and X a formula of our language. Then the X-minimal arguments, in
the context of c, are those arguments that belong to the set
MinimalF(c)(X) = {S ∈ Arguments(c) ∶ W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢X and
/∃ S ′ ∈ Arguments(c) such that
(1) W ∪Conclusion[S ′] ⊢X and








Figure 5.5: Multiple basic arguments
The plural in the definitions is not accidental. In general, there can be multiple
r- or X-minimal arguments, as our next (abstract) example makes plain. Con-
sider the context c14 = ⟨W,R⟩ with W = {A, B, Reasonable(r4), Reasonable(r5),





, and Cr6 =
D
.
One glance at the inference graph depicting this context—see Figure 5.5—is enough
to realize that there are two alternative ways of reaching D, by means of the chain
r5-r6 and by means of the chain r4-r6. And, indeed, when we apply Definition 5.10
to this context, two arguments come out as D-minimal, {r4, r6} and {r5, r6}. What’s
more, the same two arguments qualify as r6-minimal.7
Now let’s turn to basic defeat. While our next definition might look somewhat
involved, all it does is capture the intuition we started with. For one argument S to
basic-defeat another argument S ′, there has to be a rule r such that S ′ is r-minimal
and S is either ¬Conclusion[r]- or Out(r)-minimal.
7In all of the examples we considered thus far, the r-minimal arguments coincided with the
Conclusion[r]-minimal ones. To see that this doesn’t hold in general, consider some context c





r′1 = A . Here will not
have MinimalF(c)(A) ≠MininimalF(c)(r1) ≠MininimalF(c)(r′1), unless W ⊢ A.
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Definition 5.11 (Basic defeat) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be an ordinary context and S and
S ′ two arguments of the framework F(c). Then S basic-defeats S ′, written as S ↝b
S ′, if and only if there is some rule r ∈R such that
(i) S ′ is in MinimalF(c)(r) and
(ii) either (1) or (2):
(1) W∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r] and S is in MinimalF(c)(¬Conclusion[r]),
(2) W ∪Conclsuion[S] ⊢ Out(r) and S is in MinimalF(c)(Out(r)).
Returning to the running example c13, it’s easy to see that the only two arguments
that stand in the basic-defeat relation are S4 and S1. For S4 is the only element of the
set MinimalF(c13)(Out(r1)) and S1 is the only element of the set MinimalF(c13)(r1).
In light of the fact that Conclusion[S4] entails Out(r1), we have S4 ↝b S1.
With the basic defeat relation in place, we can extrapolate it to arguments of
arbitrary complexity, as follows:
Definition 5.12 (Defeat, alternative definition) Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩ be a context
and S and S ′ two arguments based on it. Then S defeats S ′, written S ↝a S ′, if and
only if there is an S ′′ ⊆ S and an S ′′′ ⊆ S ′ such that S ′′ ↝b S ′′′.
It’s not difficult to see that this definition lets us reestablish the defeat relations of
the argument framework F(c13). This is not a coincidence, as our next observation















Figure 5.6: Double Disagreement, again
Observation 9 Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a context and S and S ′ arguments from the argu-
ment framework F(c) constructed from it. Then S defeats S ′, according to Definition
5.2, S ↝ S ′, if and only if S defeats S ′, according to Definition 5.12, S ↝a S ′.
Since Definitions 5.2 and 5.12 characterize the same notion, we can go back and forth
between the two ways of thinking about defeat. That being said, in what follows
we’ll mostly work with the alternative characterization, as it is the easier to get an
intuitive grip on.8
5.4 Back to Double Disagreement
Recall the Double Disagreement scenario in which the reasoning agent is con-
fronted with two disagreeing peers: The metaphysician Milo disagrees with her about
the existence of free will, and the epistemologist Evelyn disagrees with her about
the truth of conciliationism. We encoded this scenario in the context c12, depicted
8Also, in Chapter 6, we’ll be adding another twist to our model, letting one rule r support
its conclusion to greater degree than another rule r′ supports its conclusion, and there we will be











{r13, r14, r15, r19}
S13
{r13}
Figure 5.7: Core arguments from F(c12)
again in Figure 5.6. Our original model reasoner let us derive any formula X on the
basis of this c12, suggesting that the correct response to the scenario is to conclude
everything. We then observed that this unfortunate result obtains due to the pres-
ence of the vicious cycles of rules r15-r20-r17 paired with the fact that default logic
isn’t well-suited for dealing with cycles of this sort.
Now let’s see if the more sophisticated reasoner—our conservative generaliza-
tion of default logic—does any better. Since c12 is a fairly complex context, it would
be difficult to explore the entire argumentation framework F(c12) constructed from
it. Luckily, however, we do not need to do that. For our purposes, it will suffice to
look at its fragment. More specifically, we’ll be interested in the fragment containing
its most informative minimal arguments, together with the defeat relations between
them. This includes:
the C-minimal argument S8 = {r15};
the Out(r15)-minimal S9 = {r15, r16, r17, r20}, which defeats S8, itself, and S12;
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the Disagree(C)-minimal S10 = {r16};
the L-minimal S11 = {r12};
the Out12-minimal S12 = {r13, r14, r15, r19}, which defeats S11; and
the Disagree(L)-minimal argument S13 = {r13}.
Figure 5.7 depicts the fragment graphically. The lightly shaded region represents the
preferred extension of F(c12)—or, rather, its relevant fragment. It’s not difficult to
see why the defeat relations obtain: The argument S9 supports the formula Out(r15),
suggesting that the rule r15 be taken out of consideration, and this rule is an element
of S8, S9 itself, and S12. Similarly, the argument S12 supports the formula Out(r12),
suggesting that r12 be taken out of consideration, and this rule is an element of
S11. As the picture makes clear, the arguments S8 and S11 are not included in the
preferred extension of F(c12). And this means that neither C, nor L follow from the
context, or that we get c12 /∣∼p C and c12 /∣∼p L.
(It might also be worthwhile to discuss the manner in which the new reasoner
handles vicious cycles in terms of rules, as opposed to in terms of arguments: What
it does, in effect, is disregard all the rules involved in a vicious cycle (r15, r17, and
r20), as well as the rules that are not part of the cycle themselves, but are affected
by rules that are, either directly or indirectly (r19 and r12). And for the rest, the
new reasoner proceeds like the original one, drawing conclusions on the basis of the
remaining rules that are reasonable, triggered, not conflicted, and not excluded. So
the only rules that end up getting selected in the case of c12 are r13 and r16.)
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The fact that neither C, nor L follow from c12 means that the new reasoner—
henceforth the reasoner, without qualification—suggests that the correct response
to Double Disagreement is to abandon both the belief in conciliationism and the
belief in the existence of free will. What should we make of this response? Well,
the first thing to note is that it is perfectly consistent. The conciliatory view our
model captures is rather extreme, and yet it doesn’t issue inconsistent directives
in situations involving disagreement about the correct way to disagreement. It can,
thus, serve as an existence proof showing that Elga’s (2010) conclusion regarding
conciliatory views is mistaken. It’s not the case that such views lead to inconsistency,
when they turn on themselves.
But the fact that a view doesn’t issue inconsistent directives, of course, doesn’t
make the view plausible, let alone show that it is correct. And there would seem to
be two reasons to feel uneasy about the reasoner’s response. The first is its recom-
mendation to abandon the belief in conciliationism. And the second is its apparent
incoherence: If one is to drop the belief that conciliationism is correct, why would
one conciliate in response to the disagreement about the existence of free will? The
main goal of the next chapter will be to put this feeling of uneasiness to rest. I think
that the reasoner’s recommendation is actually correct, at least for the context it’s
given. The problem is that the story recounted in Double Disagreement is under-
described. In particular, I think that it is missing crucial information regarding the
agent’s relative degrees of confidence in the conclusions of its (first-order) reasoning
about conciliationism, free will, and the existence of disagreements about these two
matters. By embedding the scenario in c12, we have implicitly filled in the missing
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information in a particular way. Once we will have made this information explicit,
the reasoner’s recommendations will look much more plausible—or so, at least, I
will argue.
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Chapter 6: Adding degrees of confidence
Let’s start with two observations. First, a lot of the literature on peer disagree-
ment formulates conciliatory views in terms of degrees of confidence, as opposed to
categorical beliefs. What’s more those pulled to conciliatory views typically put more
trust in the more moderate versions of such views, according to which a disagree-
ment with an epistemic peer should make one somewhat less confident that one’s
take on a complex issue is correct, as opposed to making one lower one’s confidence
dramatically. This is, of course, in stark contrast with the view implemented in our
reasoner. Second, while we have been talking about Double Disagreement without
mentioning the agent’s (relative) degrees of confidence in her first-order reasoning
about conciliationism, free will, and the existence of genuine disagreement about
these two matters, it seems very intuitive that they should play some role in deter-
mining the correct doxastic response. For instance, if the agent’s rational degree of
confidence in the reasoning which has lead her to adopt conciliationism is lower than
her rational degree of confidence in the reasoning which has lead her to conclude
that the disagreement with Evelyn (regarding conciliatonism) is genuine, then, in-
tuitively, she should give up her belief in conciliationism. If, on the other hand, the
agent’s rational degree of confidence in her reasoning about conciliationism is lower
than her rational degree of confidence in her reasoning about the disagreement with
Evelyn, then, intuitively, it’s too much to require that she gives up her belief in con-
ciliationism. And, of course, similar considerations apply to the agent’s (relative)
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degrees of confidence in her reasoning about free will and the disagreement about
it.
What these observations suggest is that degrees of confidence may have an
important role to play in our thinking about conciliatory views, as well as their
behavior in Double Disagreement-like scenarios. If that’s correct, then any model of
conciliationism isn’t fully adequate, as long as it doesn’t take degrees of confidence
into account. So we must add another twist to our model reasoner. As it turns out,
enabling it to take into account (relative) degrees of confidence doesn’t only shed
light on the reasoner’s surprising recommendation we discussed at the end of the
last chapter, but also results in what I think is a fully adequate treatment of Double
Disagreement-like scenarios.
To avoid a possible misunderstanding, let me emphasize that, throughout this
chapter, when I talk about degrees of confidence what I have in mind are always
rational degrees of confidence, or the degrees confidence that are justified in the
agent’s epistemic situation, or rational for the agent to have given her epistemic
situation.1 These shouldn’t be confused with phenomenal feelings of confidence—
although it’s plausible to think that the two are related.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The more technical
Sections 6.1–6.2 upgrade the model reasoner, drawing on the work of Pollock (1995,
2001, 2010). Section 6.3, then, returns to Double Disagreement, fills in the (missing)
information about the agent’s relative degrees of confidence in a couple different
1Cf. to Christensen’s (2010b) “rational credences”, Kelly’s “reasonable credences”, Lackey’s
(2010a, 2010b) “degrees of justified confidence”, and Lasonen-Aarnio’s (2013) “correct credences”.
Using some such notion as rational degree of confidence without providing an analysis of it is fairly
standard in epistemology.
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ways, shows how it can be captured formally, and explores the reasoner’s responses to
the scenario with this information. Finally, Section 6.4 discusses how the reasoner’s
recommendations correlate with the differences in the relative degrees of confidence,
explains why this helps solve the problem of self-defeat, and contrasts the resulting
solution with the other existing solutions from the literature.
6.1 Basic principles: Weakest Link and Winner Takes All
The input to our defeasible reasoner consists of statements of the form “My
best first-order reasoning about whether X suggests that X” from which it can
defeasibly infer X. We have just noted that agents can be more or less confident
in their first-order reasoning, and that this can affect how they should respond to
the situation at hand. Consequently, we must assign different degrees of confidence,
“strengths”, or “weights” to the input states, depending on how confident the mod-
eled agent is in her reasoning; and these strengths must be factored into computing
the correct response to the context at hand.2
The reasoner we formulated in Chapter 5 determines the correct response to a
context roughly as follows. It begins by constructing an argument framework, con-
sisting of arguments and defeat relations among them, proceeds to select the winning
arguments, and then outputs the conclusions supported by those arguments. But
throughout this process, the reasoner takes all arguments to support their conclu-
sions to the same degree. In order to factor degrees of confidence into the model, we
will relativize the relation of support between arguments and conclusions to degrees









Figure 6.1: Weakest Link Principle
of support. Once we are done, it won’t necessarily hold that any two arguments
support their conclusions equally well, or to the same degree. Instead, what will
typically happen is that one argument supports its conclusion to a greater degree,
or more strongly, than the other argument supports its conclusion. The (relative)
degrees of support will, then, have an effect on how conflicts between arguments are
resolved and, thus, also on which arguments come out winning.
The idea that one (defeasible) argument can support its conclusion more
strongly than another is both very natural and familiar.3 My implementation of
this idea in the model will draw on two basic principles that I take over from the
work of Pollock.4 I call these principles the Weakest Link and Winner Takes All.
The Weakest Link Principle, as its name suggest, says that an argument is
only as good as its weakest element. A good way to get an immediate grasp on the
principle is to see it at work. Consider the context c15 = ⟨W,R⟩ with W empty and








, and Ar4 =
C
.5
The corresponding graph is depicted in Figure 6.1. Notice the numbers next to the
3See e.g., (Dunne et al. 2011), (Grossi & Modgil 2015), (Modgil & Prakken 2013), (Pollock
2001, 2010), and (Prakken & Sartor 1997).
4See (Pollock 1995, 2001, 2010), especially, (Pollock 1995, Sec. 4.3)
5The questions about the reasonableness of the rules in R is orthogonal to the concerns of this
section. So we can safely ignore the Reasonable-formulas and the reasonableness requirement.
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arrows standing for rules. We use them to represent the relative strengths of rules.
The fact that r2 is associated with the number 1 doesn’t mean anything by itself,
but the fact that r2 is associated with 1, while r3 is associated with 4 means that
r3 is stronger, or that it has more weight, than r2. So what numbers do for us, in
effect, is linearly order the rules: r2 (associated with 1) is the weakest default rule;
it is followed by the slightly stronger r4 (2); then comes the even stronger r1 (3);
and, finally, the rule r3 (4) is the strongest.
Now let’s compare the scenarios S1 = {r1, r2, r4} and S2 = {r1, r2, r3}.6 Notice
that we have W ∪ Conclusion[S1] ⊢ C and W ∪ Conclusion[S2] ⊢ ¬C. So the two
scenarios are naturally thought of as arguments supporting opposing conclusions,
and they both qualify as arguments in the technical sense of Section 5.1. Having
attached numbers to rules, we can ask about the support that each of the two
arguments confers on their respective conclusions. And this is where the Weakest
Link Principle comes into play, saying that the support S1 confers on C is 2, while
the support S2 confers on ¬C is 1. Why is that? Well, in the context of S1, we can
reach C by means of the chain r1-r4. This chain’s weakest link is r4 and its relative
strength is 2. Similarly, in the context of S2, we can reach ¬C by means of the
chain r2-r3. This chain’s weakest link is r2 and its relative strength is 1. Thus, the
case for C is stronger than the case of ¬C, and in spite of the fact that the rule
r3 which directly supports ¬C is stronger than the rule r4 which directly supports
C. It’s worth emphasizing that the Weakest Link Principle is very general, letting
one determine argument strengths in simple contexts like c15, as well as much more
6If numbers are ignored, both S1 and S2 qualify as proper scenarios based on c15.
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complex ones.
But while the Weakest Link Principle lets us determine the relative strengths
of arguments, it doesn’t tell us how to handle conflicts between them. And we don’t
need to move past c15 to see this: The argument S1 comes out stronger than the
argument S2, and so, intuitively, S1 should win out. However, an important question
remains: What is the overall or, what we might call, the all-things-considered degree
of support of C, or its degree of support after all the relevant information? There
are two candidate answers here, which seem to be equally plausible prima facie.
First, we might say that the all-things-considered support of C should equal the
degree of support that the strongest argument for C confers on it. This method
for resolving conflicts is the principle I referred to as Winner Takes All above. And
second, we might say that the degree of support that the strongest argument confers
on C should be taken as a starting point and that it should then be attenuated, in
one way or another, by the argument for ¬C. Now, the Winner Takes All response
is the one that Pollock gives, and it is the one that I will adopt here. This is not
because I have a knockdown argument against the alternative, but because I only
know how to capture the Winner Takes All formally.7
Note that we’ll use the Winner Takes All method to resolve conflicting between
7There’s formal work that could prove useful in capturing the alternative method for conflict
resolution, namely, the recent and very interesting research on numerical argumentation networks—
see e.g., (Barringer et al. 2012), (Gabbay 2012). Unfortunately, it is still in its infancy stage, and
many complex issues need to be resolved before we could apply it in the present context. Chief
among them is the questions of how to assign numerical weights when the underlying network—and
you can just think of an inference graph here—contains cycles—see (Barringer et al. 2012, Sections
3–4). Pollock does offer an argument against the second response. His idea is that it commits one
to the composition or accrual of reasons, or the view that two arguments for a conclusion can
result in a higher degrees of support than either of the two arguments alone—we touched on this
idea back in Section 2.1.3. Pollock thinks that we have independent reasons to reject this idea—see







Figure 6.2: Winner Takes All for undermining defeat
arguments of the sort we just saw in c15, as well when determining whether the
support that some argument confers on a conclusion is excluded, or undermined, by
another one. Let’s say that we have two arguments S and S ′, that S supports some
proposition X, and that S ′ contests the support that S confers on X by supporting
the proposition Out(r), where r is the name of the rule r that is one of the links in
the chain of rules in S that leads to X. Let’s also say that the relative strength with
which S supports X is m, while the strength with which S ′ supports Out(r) is n.
(See Figure 6.2 for a schematic representation.) To apply the method here is to say
that S ′ cancels all the support that S lends to X if n is greater or equal to m, and
that S ′ has no effect on S otherwise.8
Now that we have a feeling for how the Weakest Link and Winner Takes All
work, we can relativize support to degrees of support in the model.
8It’s worth mentioning that there’s an alternative to the Winner Takes All here: We could let
the excluder do its work, no matter what its strength. Pollock considers the possibility and rejects
it on the basis of its being “perverse”—see (Pollock 1995, pp. 103–4). For an argument to the
opposite conclusion, see (Horty 2012, pp. 204–10).
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6.2 Adding degrees to the model
To represent the information that a rule r supports its conclusion to a greater
degree, or more strongly, than another rule r′ we will use a device we have relied on
in previous applications: a priority ordering on rules.9 Let the statement r ≤ r′ mean
that the premise of the rule r′, Premise[r′], confers at least as much support on its
conclusion, Conclusion[r′], as the premise of the rule r, Premise[r], confers on its
conclusion, Conclusion[r]. For the sake of simplicity, in what follows we will often
drop the reference to rule premises and conclusions, reading r ≤ r′ as saying that r′
is at least as strong or has at least as much weight as r. As in Parts I–II, we require
that the relation ≤ satisfies the properties of reflexivity and transitivity.10 But, in
addition to this, here we will also require that ≤ satisfies the connectivity property,
r ≤ r′, r′ ≤ r, or both,
according to which any two default rules are always comparable with respect to their
strengths. Requiring that ≤ satisfies connectivity should make good sense, given what
sort of information it’s supposed to represent. For any two considerations conferring
support to different conclusions, we’d seem to always be able to ask which of the
9When introducing the Weakest Link Principle above, I represented the information about the
relevant strengths of rules using natural numbers. This was the easiest way to convey the basic
intuition behind the principle. But one might wonder why I switch to a priority ordering here,
instead of continuing to use natural numbers. The answer is that this is potentially misleading.
Consider an abstract case that requires us to focus on three rules of increasing strength, r, r′,
and r′′, and that their relative strengths are represented using the numbers 1, 2, and 15. Quite
naturally, one is led to think that r′′ is much stronger than r′, while r′ is only a little bit stronger
than r. So the use of numbers suggests that there’s more structure beyond their ordinal ranking,
or the fact r′′ is stronger than r′ which, in turn, is stronger than r. However, in the formal model
only ordinal ranking matters.







r2 < r4 < r1 < r3
Figure 6.3: Weakest Link Principle, again
two confers more.11 We will, again, make use of our shorthand: When we have r ≤ r′
without r′ ≤ r, we will write r < r′. And when we have both r ≤ r′ and r′ ≤ r (for
distinct rules), we will write r ∼ r′.
In the remainder of this chapter, we’ll be working with weighted context, or
ordinary contexts extended with a priority relation on rules.
Definition 6.1 (Weighted contexts) A weighted context c is a structure of the
form ⟨W ,R,≤⟩ where ⟨W ,R⟩ is an ordinary context and ≤ is a reflexive, transitive,
and connected relation (or a connected preorder) on R.
Recall the context c15 = ⟨W,R⟩. The information we previously captured using
natural numbers can now be expressed using a preorder ≤ on R. The result is the
weighted context c16 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩, whereW and R are as before and ≤ is the ordering
r2 < r4 < r1 < r3. The context is depicted in Figure 6.3.
With the information about the relative strengths of rules at our disposal, we
can use it to compare scenarios, including those that qualify as arguments. Our next
11Cf. (Horty 2012, Section 1.1.2) who opts for a strict partial order, instead of a weak preorder,
and explicitly rejects connectivity. But his context is different from ours, as Horty uses default logic
to model reasons and reason interaction in different domains. Pollock (1994, 1995, 2001) sticks to
the epistemic domain and requires connectivity, just as we do here.
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definition will let us compare scenarios, according to the Weakest Link Principle:12
Definition 6.2 (Weakest Link) Let c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ be a weighted context and S
and S ′ two scenarios based on it. Then S ′ is at least as good as S, written as S ⪯ S ′,
if and only if there is a rule r ∈ S such that, for all r′ ∈ S ′, r ≤ r′.
Let’s apply the definition to c16, starting with the arguments S1 = {r1, r4} and
S2 = {r2, r3}. It’s not difficult to see that the latter argument S2 contains a rule,
namely, r2, that’s weaker than both rules in S1—we have r2 < r1 and r2 < r4. And
this means that S1 is at least as good as S2, or that S2 ⪯ S1. Now, S ⪯ S ′, by
itself, doesn’t exclude the possibility that S ′ ⪯ S and that both arguments support
their conclusions equally well. However, it’s clear that in the particular case at
hand S1 ⪯ S2 doesn’t hold. While one of the elements of S2, namely, the rule r3, is
stronger than both elements of S1 (r1 < r3 and r4 < r3), its other element, the rule
r2, is weaker than both of them (r2 < r1 and r2 < r4). Consequently, we have S2 ⪯ S1
and not S1 ⪯ S2, or S2 ≺ S1 in our shorthand.
Notice that Definition 6.2 can be used to compare any two scenarios. Our next
example illustrates why this might seem problematic. When discussing minimal or
basic arguments in Section 5.3, we considered the context c14 = ⟨W,R⟩ with W







.13 We will now extend this context in three distinct ways. First, its
12The definition specifies how to lift a relation on rules to a relation on sets of rules. Not
surprisingly, there are many alternative ways of lifting a relation on elements to sets of elements—
see Barberà et al. (2004) for a thorough survey. The question of how our analysis might change
if we opted for a different lifting procedure—perhaps, that of Brass (1991) or Horty (2012)—will
have to be left for future work.
13We ignored the Reasonable-formulas then, and we will ignore them here as well. Nothing










r4 < r7 < r5 ∼ r6
Figure 6.4: Multiple minimal arguments, extended
hard information W will now also include E. Second, its set of rules will now also
include the rule Er7 =
Out(r6)
. And third, there will now be a priority relation on
the rules, namely, r4 < r7 < r5 ∼ r6. The result is the weighted context c17 = ⟨W,R,≤⟩,
which is depicted in Figure 6.4. Now let’s zoom in on the arguments S3 = {r4, r5, r6}
and S4 = {r7}. The argument S3 supports the conclusion D, while the argument S4
supports the conclusion Out(r6), challenging the support that S3 confers on D. If
we compare S3 and S4 using Definition 6.2, we must conclude that S4 is a stronger
argument than S3, or that S3 ≺ S4. For S3 contains an element, the rule r4, that’s
weaker than all the elements of S4. However, this result might seem counterintuitive:
The argument S3 lets us reach D without making use of r4, that is, by means of
the chain r5-r6. Thus, it might seem that our definition doesn’t deliver the correct
result when it ranks S4 higher than S3.
But the fault here does not actually lie with Definition 6.2, but, rather, with the
fact that we are juxtaposing S3 and S4. The argument S3 is actually a combination
of two basic arguments supporting D, namely, S5 = {r4, r6} and S6 = {r5, r6}. When
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we juxtapose S5 and S6 with S4, we get the intuitive result, or the result that one
would expect the Weakest Link Principle to deliver, S5 ≺ S4 and S4 ≺ S6. The upshot
is simple: It’s important that the definition capturing the principle gets applied to
minimal arguments. This is why it’s more natural to use the notion of basic defeat as
our springboard for specifying the notion of defeat that takes into account varying
degrees of support. Just like we did in Section 5.3, we will first specify the conditions
under which one minimal argument defeats another and then extrapolate the relation
of defeat to arguments of arbitrary complexity:
Definition 6.3 (Basic defeat, with the weakest link) Let c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ be a
weighted context and S and S ′ two arguments from the argument framework F(c)
based on it. Then S basic-defeats S ′, written as S ↝wb S
′, if and only if there is some
rule r in S ′ such that
(i) S ′ is in MinimalF(c)(r) and
(ii) either
(1) W∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r] and S is in MinimalF(c)(¬Conclusion[r]),
or
(2) W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ Out(r) and S is in MinimalF(c)(Out(r)),
and S ′ ⪯ S.
The only difference between this definition and Definition 5.11 (Basic defeat) from
Section 5.3 is the additional requirement that the defeating argument is at least as
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strong as the defeated one. An easy check suffices to see that we get S4 ↝wb S5 and
S6 ↝wb S4, while we do not get S4 ↝
w
b S3. With this, we are done. Having incorporated
the Weakest Link Principle into the notion of basic defeat, we can simply reuse the
definition of (nonbasic) defeat from Section 5.3:
Definition 6.4 (Defeat, with the weakest link) Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a context
and S and S ′ two arguments based on it. Then S weakest-link-defeats S ′, S ↝w S ′,
if and only if there is an S ′′ ⊆ S and an S ′′′ ⊆ S ′ such that S ′′ ↝wb S
′′′.
Our next definition specifies how to construct argument frameworks from
weighted contexts. Not surprisingly, the only difference is that now we rely on the
weakest-link-defeat.
Definition 6.5 (Argument frameworks for weighted context) Let c = ⟨W,R,≤
⟩ be a weighted context. Then the argument framework F(c) based on c is the pair
⟨A,↝w⟩ where A is the set Arguments(c) and ↝w is the set {(S,S ′) ∈ A × A ∶
S weakest-link-defeats S ′}.
We can apply stability and preference semantics to frameworks built from
weighted contexts just as we applied them to frameworks built from ordinary ones.
So nothing needs to be changed here. The observation with the statement of which
we close this section makes it plain that the addition of weights to contexts is a
conservative extension of our original framework—the proof is in the Appendix:
Observation 10 Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be an ordinary context and c′ = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩ be the















Figure 6.5: Double Disagreement, once more
weight—so, for all r, r′ ∈R, r ∼ r′. Then F(c) = F(c′).
6.3 Double Disagreement with degrees
Now let’s see how the tools developed in Sections 6.1–6.2 can help us with
Double Disagreement, which we captured by the context c12 = ⟨W,R⟩, depicted
graphically here one final time—see Figure 6.5. At the end of Chapter 5, we saw
that our (sophisticated) defeasible reasoner doesn’t conclude either C or L from c12,
suggesting that the correct response to Double Disagreement is to abandon one’s
belief in conciliationism, as well as one’s belief in the existence of free will. We
also noted that there appears to be something incoherent about this response: Why
would the agent conciliate in response to the disagreement about libertarian free
will if it is to abandon the belief in concliationism? I suggested that we find this
response counterintuitive because the scenario is underdescribed. I also promised
that the reasoner’s recommendations will look more compelling, once we supply the
original description of Double Disagreement with the information missing from it
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and enable the reasoner to take it into account.
The missing information, of course, concerns the reasoning agent’s relative
degrees of confidence in her first-order reasoning about conciliatonism, free will,
and the disagreements about these two matters, expressed by the propositions
Seems(C), Seems(L), Seems(Disagree(C)), and Seems(Disagree(L)). It seems
intuitive to expect that these degrees of confidence, and they alone, would deter-
mine the relative degrees of support of the arguments that can be constructed from
c12. But how can we make this work? How are we to translate degrees of confidence
into degrees of support? As a first step toward answering these questions, note that








, as well as those of
the form C
Reasonable(r′(X))
. Our task is to express the degrees of confidence
as an ordering on these different types of rules. One thing appears to be clear: The
relative degrees of confidence must correspond directly to the relative weights of the
first type of rules. Thus, if we want to capture the version of Double Disagreement
where the agent is more confident of its reasoning about conciliationism than its
reasoning about free will, we would assign r15 more weight than r12, or set r12 < r15.
But what about the remaining two types of rules? Notice that due to the
structure of the context c12, all arguments in F(c12) that contain a rule of the
form C
Reasonable(r′(X))





arguments that contain a rule of the form
Disagree(X)
Out(r(X))




, as well as the rule r15. Why is this important?
Well, since our reasoner relies on the Weakest Link Principle to determine argument
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that they contain. So there’s a clear sense in which what really
matters for the relative degrees of support of the arguments and, thus, also for the
overall conclusions the reasoner draws are the relative weights of the four rules that
have this form, namely, r12, r13, r15, and r16.
This is almost all that matters, but not quite. The calculations of support
that the arguments from F(c12) confer on their conclusions will depend on one
further assumption that I want to be explicit about. We can call it No Support Lost.






. Due to the Weakest Link Principle, S7 can support
the formula Reasonable(r14) only as strongly as r15 supports the conclusion C.
However, it’s in principle possible that the support conferred on Reasonable(r14) is
much weaker than the support conferred on C. This would happen in all the cases
where the weight of r19 is much lower than that of r15. These are exactly the sorts
of cases that our assumption will rule out.
No Support Lost:





must be at least as high as the weights of the rules of the form
Seems(X)
X
that they depend on.
The intuitive notion of dependency between rules that this assumption appeals to
can be made precise in terms of the relations between the arguments in F(c12): If
there’s no argument S in F(c12) that contains r but not r′, then r depends on r′. The
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No Support Lost assumptions strikes me as very intuitive. Whats’ more, nothing of
importance appears to hinge on us making it.14 Having stated the assumption ex-
plicitly, we can turn to the question of how the reasoner’s recommendations depend
on the relative weights of the four crucial rules. I will provide a general answer to this
question at the beginning of the next section. The remainder of this section will ex-
plore a few ways of extending c12 with specific orderings on rules, expressing various
versions of Double Disagreement. It can be skipped without loss of continuity.
We begin with a couple of versions of Double Disagremeent where the agent’s
degree of confidence in her reasoning about conciliationism is higher than her degree
of confidence in there being a genuine disagreement about it. The first ordering we’ll
be looking at is ≤1.
≤1: r12 < r14 ∼ r13 < r16 ∼ r17 < r15 ∼ r19 ∼ r20
This particular ordering represents a version of Double Disagreement where the
reasoning agent is most confident in Seems(C), followed by Seems(Disagree(C)),
then by Seems(L), and least confident in Seems(Disagree(L)). Notice that this





the same relative weight as the rules they depend on—or, more precisely, the weak-
est of rules of the form
Seems(X)
X
they depend on. This is only for the sake
of simplicity. Nothing would change if these rules were assigned different relative
weights, at least as long as No Support Lost wasn’t violated.
Extending c12 = ⟨W ,R⟩ with ≤1 results in the weighted context c18 = ⟨W ,R,≤1⟩
14Without the assumption, things are messier. The question of how dropping the assumption











{r13, r14, r15, r19}
S13
{r13}
r12 < r14 ∼ r13 < r16 ∼ r17 < r15 ∼ r19 ∼ r20
Figure 6.6: Core arguments from F(c18), given ≤1
and the corresponding argument framework F(c18). We’ll be looking at a fragment
of this framework that contains its most informative minimal arguments, namely:
the C-minimal argument S8 = {r15};
the Out(r15)-minimal S9 = {r15, r16, r17, r20};
the Disagree(C)-minimal S10 = {r16};
the L-minimal S11 = {r12};
the Out12-minimal S12 = {r13, r14, r15, r19}; and
the Disagree(L)-minimal argument S13 = {r13}.
The fragment is depicted graphically in Figure 6.6. Notice that there are fewer defeat
relations among argument, when compared to the corresponding fragment of the
framework F(c12) constructed from c12. Let’s start by zooming in on the C-minimal
argument S8 and the Out(r15)-minimal argument S9. In F(c12), S9 defeated S8, but
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it doesn’t do so here. The reason is that the crucial condition of the Definition 6.4
(Section 6.2) is not satisfied: It’s simply not the case that S8 ⪯ S9. For S8 ⪯ S9 to
obtain, there would have to be a rule in S8 that’s weaker than every rule in S9. But
S8 contains only one rule, r15, and S9 happens to include r16 which is weaker than
r15. As a result, S9 doesn’t defeat S8. Similarly, S9 no longer defeats S12. The other
defeat relations remain. First, given that S9 ≤ S9, the argument S9 still self-defeats.
And second, the Out(r12)-minimal argument S12 still defeats the L-minimal S11. It’s
easy to see that the rule r12 from S11 is weaker than all of the rules from S12, or
that S11 ⪯ S12.
Since both S8 and S12 are no longer defeated by S9, they get included in the
preferred extension of F(c18), as the picture illustrates. Further, given that S8 is in
the preferred extension, while S11 is not, the formula C follows from c18, while L does
not. Advocates of conciliatory views should be pleased with this result: In spite of the
disagreement about conciliationism, our reasoner suggests that the correct doxastic
response is to stick to one’s belief in conciliatonism and to abandon one’s belief in
libertarian free will.
One might expect that any ordering assigning the rule r15 more weight than
the rule r16 will lead to this result. But the next ordering ≤2 demonstrates that this
doesn’t hold true.
≤2: r16 ∼ r17 < r13 ∼ r14 < r12 < r15 ∼ r19 ∼ r20
The ordering ≤2 encodes a version of Double Disagreement where the agent is most











{r13, r14, r15, r19}
S13
{r13}
r16 ∼ r17 < r13 ∼ r14 < r12 < r15 ∼ r19 ∼ r20
Figure 6.7: Core arguments from F(c19), given ≤2
least confident in Seems(Disagree(C)).
Let c19 = ⟨W,R,≤2⟩ be the result of extending c12 with this ordering. The rele-
vant fragment of the argument framework F(c19) is depicted in Figure 6.7. Similarly
to what we saw in the case of F(c18), the argument S9 self-defeats without defeating
either S8 or S12. What’s different here is the relation between the L-minimal S11 and
the Out(r12)-minimal S12. Since S11 consists of only one element r12 that’s stronger
than some of the element of S12, we don’t get S11 ⪯ S12, meaning that S12 doesn’t de-
feat S11. Since both S8 and S11 are in the preferred extension of F(c19), both C and
L follow from the context c19. Thus, our reasoner suggests that the correct response
to the case at hand is to stick to one’s belief in conciliationism, as well as to one’s
belief in free will. At first blush, this recommendation might look incoherent: Why
would an agent who believes that conciliationism is correct respond to the disagree-
ment about L like a steadfaster? But we shouldn’t forget that c19 captures a version
of Double Disagreement where the agent is more confident of its reasoning about
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free will than its reasoning about the existence of a genuine disagreement about it.
Given this, the reasoner’s recommendation actually seems perfectly sensible. In the
end, we can easily imagine the reasoning agent going through the following line of
thought: I do believe that conciliationism is correct. However, that doesn’t mean
that I should abandon my beliefs in response to every disagreement. I would aban-
don my belief in free will in response to my disagreement with Milo if I was at least
as confident in it being a genuine disagreement as I am of my reasoning about free
will. But I’m not.
An even more surprising result is revealed by the third ordering we’ll be looking
at:
≤3: r16 ∼ r17 < r14 ∼ r15 ∼ r19 ∼ r20 < r12 < r13
Extending c12 with ≤3 gives us the weighted context c20 = ⟨W,R,≤3⟩. The argu-
ment framework F(c20) constructed from it happens to coincide with the framework
F(c19), the fragment of which we have just looked at. The preferred extensions of
F(c20) and F(c19) are also the same. So our reasoner’s recommendation for c20 is,
again, to hold onto the belief in conciliationism, as well as to the belief in the ex-
istence of free will. But, contrary to ≤2, the ordering ≤3 assigns more weight to r12
than it does to r13, meaning that we’re dealing with a version of the scenario where
the agent is less confident in its reasoning about libertarian fee will than there being
a genuine disagreement about it. So one may, again, feel that the recommendation
is incoherent. However, it too turns out to be perfectly sensible: Since ≤3 assigns











{r13, r14, r15, r19}
S13
{r13}
r14 ∼ r15 ∼ r17 ∼ r19 ∼ r20 < r12 < r13 < r16
Figure 6.8: Core arguments from F(c21), given ≤4
confident in its reasoning about free will than its reasoning about conciliationism.
And we can easily imagine her thinking as follows: After thinking about the epis-
temic significance of disagreement, conciliationism seems to me to be correct. If it
is, I should abandon my belief in the existence of free will in response to my dis-
agreement with Milo. However, I am more confident of my reasoning about free will
than my reasoning about conciliationism, and it would be foolish to distrust the
conclusion of my reasoning about free will on the basis of a view I am less confident
in than this reasoning.
So much for the versions of Double Disagreement where the agent is more con-
fident in conciliationism than there being a genuine disagreement about it. The final
two orderings we’re going to explore model cases where the agent has more confi-
dence in the disagreement about conciliationism being genuine than conciliationism
itself. The first of them is ≤4.
≤4: r14 ∼ r15 ∼ r17 ∼ r19 ∼ r20 < r12 < r13 < r16
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Once we add ≤4 to c12, we acquire the weighted context c21 = ⟨W,R,≤4⟩, with the
corresponding argument framework F(c21). Figure 6.8 depicts the relevant fragment
of this framework. It’s not difficult to see that here we have S8 ⪯ S9. So the defeat
relation between S9 and S8 stays in place, as do the relations between S9 and itself
and S9 and S12. Now consider the L-minimal S11 and its potential defeater S12.
Since S12 contains elements that are weaker than r12, S12 does not defeat r11. The
preferred extension of F(c21) includes S11, but does not include S8. Therefore, L
does, but C does not follow from c21.
The reasoner’s recommendation to the particular version of Double Disagree-
ment modeled is both intuitive and well in line with the ideas about the behavior
of conciliatory views in the literature—more on this in the next section. As it turns
out, however, not every ordering that assigns more weight to r16 than to r15 lead to
it. This is witnessed by ≤5.
≤5: r12 < r13 ∼ r14 < r15 ∼ r17 ∼ r19 ∼ r20 < r16
Extending c12 with ≤5 results in the weighted context c22 = ⟨W,R,≤5⟩. The relevant
fragment of F(c22) is depicted in Figure 6.9. Notice that this is the same graph that
we saw in Section 5.4 before we turned to degrees of confidence. The addition of ≤5 to
c12 has, thus, left the defeat relations between arguments intact. Since neither S8, nor
S11 are in the preferred extension of F(c22), the reasoner’s recommended response
is to abandon both one’s belief in conciliationism and one’s belief in free will. Are
we, then, back to where we started? Clearly not. For, having taken the degrees of











{r13, r14, r15, r19}
S13
{r13}
r12 < r13 ∼ r14 < r15 ∼ r17 ∼ r19 ∼ r20 < r16
Figure 6.9: Core arguments from F(c22), given ≤5
incoherent recommendation in all versions of Double Disagreement. What’s more,
now we also have a better grasp on the conditions under which it does. The ordering
≤5 expresses a situation where the agent’s degree of confidence in her reasoning about
the existence of free will is lower than both her degree of confidence in her first-order
reasoning about conciliationism and her degree of confidence in there being a genuine
disagreement about free will. Is it really incoherent for the agent to abandon both
of these belief if those are her relative degrees of confidence? I don’t think it is, but
I will defer the explanation to the next section.
6.4 Discussion
Now that we have seen how the agent’s relative degrees of confidence get
captured by an ordering on the rules of c12 and that we have looked at a few
examples, we can give a fully general answer to the following question: How do the
reasoner’s recommendations depend on these degrees of confidence? Or, to put the
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same question in different terms, what are the reasoner’s recommendations for all the
different versions of Double Disagreement? We’ll start with the recommendations
regarding the belief in conciliationism, and then proceed to the recommendations
regarding free will—which is, of course, a proxy for recommendations regarding any
other theoretical question. It’ll be useful to introduce some simple formal notation
here: Recall that Seems(X) expresses the proposition that the agent has reasoned
about whether X to the best of her ability, arriving at the conclusion that X. Now,
Seems(X) ≤ Seems(Y ) will express the idea that the agent is at least as confident
in the conclusion of her reasoning about whether X as she is about the conclusion
of her reasoning about whether Y ; and Seems(X) < Seems(Y ) will be a shorthand
for Seems(X) ≤ Seems(Y ) and not Seems(Y ) ≤ Seems(X).
The recommendation regarding the belief in conciliationism depend only on
the relative degrees of confidence in Seems(C) and Seems(Disagree(C)). The rea-
soner suggests that one is to abandon one’s belief in conciliationism, if one’s degree
of confidence in one’s (first-order) reasoning about conciliationism is only as high
as one’s degree of confidence in there being a genuine disagreement about it—or,
formally, if Seems(C) ≤ Seems(Disagree(C))—and that one is to retain this be-
lief otherwise—that is, if Seems(C) > Seems(Disagree(C)). These recommenda-
tion appear to be perfectly intuitive. Turning to the recommendations regarding
free will, what matters here are the relative degrees of confidence in Seems(C),
Seems(L), and Seems(Disagree(L)). The reasoner suggests that one is to aban-
don one’s belief in the existence of free will, in case one’s degree of confidence
in one’s (first-order) reasoning about it is only as high as one’s degree of confi-
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dence in there being a genuine disagreement about it and one’s degree of con-
fidence in one’s (first-order) reasoning about conciliationism; and that one is to
retain this belief otherwise. Or, more formally, one is to abandon the belief in L if
Seems(L) ≤ Seems(Disagree(L)) and Seems(L) ≤ Seems(C); and one is to retain
it if either Seems(L) > Seems(Disagree(L)) or Seems(L) > Seems(C).
The reasoner’s recommendations have two surprising features. The first is that
the question of whether one is to retain the belief in free will turns out to depend
on the relative degrees of confidence in one’s first-order reasoning about free will
and conciliationism. And the second surprising feature is that this question does not
depend on whether or not conciliationism turns on itself, or whether or not one is
to abandon one’s belief in conciliationism. Why are these two features surprising?
Well, because they are in stark contrast with the majority view on the behavior of
conciliatory views in the literature.
Let’s start with the first feature—which is actually independent of the wor-
ries about the behavior of conciliatonism in Double Disagreement-like scenarios.
The proponents of conciliatory views readily take on board the idea that the correct
doxastic response to a typical disagreement situation—a conciliatory agent finds her-
self disagreeing about free will with an epistemic peer—will depend on the agent’s
(initial) degrees of confidence in free will: The higher the agent’s pre-disagreement
degree of confidence in free will is, the higher her rational post-disagreement degree
of confidence will be. Some proponents of conciliatory views might also accept the
idea that the correct doxastic response to a typical disagreement scenario will de-
pend on the agent’s pre-disagreement degree of belief in conciliationism: The more
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confident the agent is in the correctness of conciliationism, the lower her rational
post-disagreement degree of confidence in the existence of free will will be. But even
though the proponents of conciliatory views think that the degrees of confidence
play a role in determining the correct doxastic responses, they also proceed under
the assumption that the roles of these degrees are independent of each other: In
particular, they largely take it for granted that the agent is to lower her confidence
in the existence of free will, no matter how it compares to her confidence in con-
ciliationism.15 We have seen already that it’s not difficult to make intuitive sense
of an agent who retains her belief in free will, in spite of finding herself in a dis-
agreement about free will and believing that conciliationism is correct: She’s just
more confident of her (first-order) reasoning about free will than her (first-order)
considerations about conciliationism. This prompts the question of why does the
peer disagreement literature assume the contrary. I suspect that this due to the fact
that it tends to operate with informal models of conciliatory views that do not dis-
tinguish between the agent’s doxastic attitudes and the domain-specific reasoning
that leads to them.
And now for the second surprising feature and the literature focusing specif-
ically on the problem of self-defeat. The majority view among those thinking that
the problem has a solution can be stated in one sentence: If the correct doxastic
15Although this claim is correct, we might need to add some further qualifications to it to make
it fit all the various views and ideas from the literature. For instance, at least some conciliation-
ists, including Christensen (2009) and Matheson (2015a,c), would acknowledge the existence of
correlations between the degrees of confidence in conciliatonism and free will. Matheson, in par-
ticular, would say that the agent should retain full confidence in free will in any case where she
has overwhelming (misleading) evidence that conciliationism is false. Still, this doesn’t change the
fact that he proceeds under the assumption that the relative degrees of confidence in free will and
conciliationism play no role in the typical scenarios.
200
response to at least some Double Disagreement-like scenarios involves abandoning
one’s belief in concliationism, then it also involves retaining one’s belief in the exis-
tence of libertarian free will. The proposed solutions to the problem, then, fall into
two camps: those that deny the antecedent of this sentence, and those that concede
that it is true. The first camp comprises the solutions of Tomas Bogardus (2009),
Christensen (2013), Elga (2010), and John Pittard (2015). Bogardus argues that we
have a special rational insight into the truth of conciliationism which makes it im-
mune to any disagreement about it.16 Christensen admits that conciliationism can
turn on itself, and that it does turn on itself in Double Disagreement-like scenarios.
However, he also argues that this doesn’t mean that one is to abandon one’s belief
in conciliationism. What Disagreement-like scenarios show instead is that there are
inherently unfortunate or tragic epistemic situations—of which they are but one
type of example—such that even the optimal response to them involves a violation
of some rationality ideal.17 But, still, the optimal response involves retaining the
belief in conciliationism and lowering the degree of confidence in free will. Elga, in
turn, takes the self-defeat challenge to be fatal for standard conciliatory views, but
he also goes on to defend self-exempting partially conciliatory views that demand
conciliation in response to any disagreement, except for disagreements about such
views themselves.18 Finally, Pittard argues that all types of conciliatory views self-
16See (Bogardus 2009, especially, pp. 332–3).
17An agent who retains her belief in conciliationism in a Double Disagreement scenario, in
particular, is bound to violate either the ideal of Respecting evidence of error—by not forming the
belief that her level of confidence in conciliationism is too high—or the ideal of Level-connection—
by forming this belief, but retaining full confidence in conciliationism. See (Christensen 2013,
especially, pp. 90–6).
18See (Elga 2010, especially, Sections 7–8).
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exempt—and not only partially conciliatory ones, as suggested by Elga—because
they do not issues a clear recommendation for how to respond to a disagreement
about conciliationism, in spite of all the seemings to the contrary.19
The second camp comprises the solution of Jonathan Matheson (2015a,b,c),
and, thus, may appear to be less well-represented. However, I suspect that most
advocates of conciliatory views assume that some solution that goes along the lines
of Matheson’s has to work. Now, Matheson suggests that Double Disagreement-like
scenarios come in two kinds: those where conciliatory views do not turn on them-
selves and those where they do. In the former type of scenarios, the agent is to
retain the belief in conciliationism and to lower her confidence in the existence of
libertarian free will. In the latter type of scenarios, the agent is to abandon the
belief in conciliationism and to retain the belief in free will. While Matheson does
admit that, in the second type of cases, conciliationism actually recommends aban-
doning both itself and the belief in the libertarian free will, he also think that the
agent is to follow only the first recommendation. Why? Well, Matheson suggests
that the first recommendation is higher-order—or a recommendation for which rec-
ommendations to follow—and that it, therefore, has the ability to undercut the
second one. What’s more, he also thinks that the agent is to follow her evidence in a
19Here’s Pittard’s (2015) idea in a little more detail: He starts off suggesting that what’s basic to
all sorts of conciliatory views is a commitment to showing epistemic deference. So, when a concili-
ationist disagrees with someone, they are to exhibit deference to this person. In a standard case of
disagreement over some neutral proposition Q the deferential response is clear: A conciliationist is
to reduce her confidence in Q. A similar response may seem appropriate in Double Disagreement-
like scenarios too, but here Pittard bring in the distinction between two dimensions or “levels”
at which one’s response to a disagreement can be deferential—the belief level and the reasoning
level—and argues that no response to a disagreement about the correct way to disagree can show
deference at both levels. If a conciliationist tries to be deferential at the level of belief, she is being
nondeferential at the level of reasoning, and vice versa.
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“downstream direction” beginning by following the higher-order recommendations
and then proceeding to the lower-order ones.20 So an agent who follows her evi-
dence in an unfortunate scenario will follow only the higher-order recommendation
of conciliationism and never encounter the lower-order one, ending up abandoning
the belief in conciliationism and sticking to the belief in the existence of free will.21
So the majority view in the literature is that the seemingly incoherent doxastic
response—believing neither conciliationism, nor free will—is never correct. The one
exception to it is Clayton Littlejohn (2019) who, at least, entertains the thought
that there may be nothing wrong with such responses. This is illustrated by the
following passage:
[..A] conciliatory thinker can continue to suspend when peers disagree
without having any attitudes at all towards [conciliationism]. The two
things recommended (i.e., being conciliatory on some contested propo-
sitions, suspending on [conciliationism]) are perfectly possible to do to-
gether. Thus, they aren’t incompatible. The [self-defeat] objections sim-
ply misses its intended target (Littlejohn 2019, p. 4).22
Since Littlejohn’s defense of these responses is confined to drawing an analogy with
20This is supposed to follow from evidentialism, or, roughly, the view centered around the
evidentialist requirement we discussed in Chapter 3.
21See (Matheson 2015a, especially, Section 4) and (Matheson 2015c, pp. 153–7).
22The text actually says, “The simple [self-defeat] objection simply misses its intended target.”
Littlejohn goes on to discuss the “subtle” objection, as well as to provide a response to it. His
discussion makes it clear that the subtle objection depends on two principles, and that any plausible
view on rational belief and its connection to first- and higher-order evidence will accept at most one
of them. In light of the way we have been thinking about conciliationism, the principle Littlejohn
dubs rational conversion would seem to be particularly suspect. But either way, the subtle objection
is not something that we need to worry about here.
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the practical domain, I think he is best read as appealing to a burden of proof here.23
As long as the opponents of conciliatory views haven’t explained what’s wrong with
the apparently incoherent responses, the advocates of the views don’t even have
anything to worry about.
But let’s leave considerations about burdens of proof aside and take a closer
look at those versions of Double Disagreement for which the reasoner recommends
the seemingly incoherent response. In a typical scenario where this happens, the
agent’s degree of confidence in her (first-order) reasoning about free will will be
lower than her degree of confidence in conciliationism, as well as her degree of
confidence in her disagreement with Milo—that is, the disagreement regarding free
will—being genuine.24 What’s more, her degree of confidence in her reasoning about
conciliationism can only be as high as her degree of confidence in there being a
genuine disagreement about it. Now let’s try putting ourselves into the agent’s shoes.
It seems easy enough to imagine her entertaining the following train of thought: I’ve
thought about the epistemic significance of disagreement to the best of my ability,
and, as far as I can tell, conciliationism is correct. If it is indeed correct, I shouldn’t
trust my reasoning about free will—as my disagreement with Milo provides a good
reason to think that my reasoning about it might rest on a mistake. I’m also more
confident in my reasoning about conciliationism than my reasoning about free will.
And yet my disagreement with Evelyn suggests that the former may rest on a
23Here’s the analogy: As there appears to be nothing incoherent in the idea that we ought to act
like utilitarians while believing nothing about the virtues of the utilitarian framework, there seems
to be nothing incoherent in the idea that we ought to be conciliatory while suspending judgment on
whether the norms prescribing conciliatory responses are correct—see (Littlejohn 2019, pp. 4–5).
24In an atypical case the agent is equally confident.
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mistake. Clearly, my conclusion regarding conciliationism is either correct or not.
If it is—in spite of the evidence to the contrary—I shouldn’t trust my reasoning
about free will. And if it is not, then the reasoning that I’m more confident in
than my reasoning about free will has led me astray. Should I trust the reasoning
I’m less confident in if the reasoning I was more confident in turned out to be
mistaken? Perhaps, it’s safer not to. Perhaps, in the end it is safer to suspend
judgment on whether libertarian free will exists. Now, while one might find this train
of thought overly cautious, it seems perfectly sensible and coherent! And this actually
completes my response to the worry that conciliatory views can issue inconsistent
(or incoherent) recommendations in scenarios involving disagreements about the
correct way to disagree. It may be a problem for some conciliatory views, but not
the one we have developed here.
There’s one loose end left to tie up. At the outset of Chapter 4 we noted
that the self-defeat problem breaks down into two sub-problems: the worry that
conciliatory views can issue inconsistent directives and the worry that such views
might self-defeat in the actual world. Now we have a response to the first worry. But
what can we say in response to the second one?
The short answer is not that much. However, our formal analysis would seem
to let us sharpen the statement of the worry, as well as to mitigate it somewhat, by
showing that it’s scope is not as wide as one might have thought. The worry itself
boiled down to, you will recall, the claim that many—perhaps, even all—actual pro-
ponents of conciliationism find themselves in the sorts of circumstances where they
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can’t rationally hold onto their conciliatory views.25 Now, if our formal analysis is
on the right track, then one can’t rationally believe that conciliationism is correct
in case one’s rational degree of confidence in one’s reasoning about it is only as
high as one’s rational degree of confidence in there being a genuine disagreement
about conciliationism—or in case Seems(C) ≤ Seems(Disagree(C)). This means
that an actual advocate of conciliationism is in trouble only in case she should
be more confident in her disagreement with people like Kelly (2005, 2010), Titel-
baum (2015), and Wedgwood (2010) than she should be in her own considerations
about conciliationism. It seems intuitively plausible that there are some individuals
whose relative degree of confidence in conciliationism and the disagreement about it
are, respectively, higher and lower than they should be. These individuals, if there
are any, are indeed being irrational in sticking to their conciliatory views. And it
seems equally plausible that there are other individuals whose (relevant) degrees of
confidence are close to what they should be and who are more confident in their
considerations about conciliationism than the disagreement about it. These individ-
uals are perfectly well justified in sticking to their conciliatory views. So, ultimately,
our response to the second worry should, I think, run as follows: The answer to the
question of whether some particular advocate of conciliationism is being irrational
in holding onto her view will depend on the particular details of her epistemic sit-
uation, and it, thus, is an empirical matter.26 Also, it would seem that, as long as
the person in question can explain why she is more confident in the arguments that
25Decker (2014) thinks that this is the real problem that the Double Disagreement-like scenarios
reveal.
26Cf. (Matheson 2015a, p. 149).
206
have led her to adopt conciliationism than in the arguments for the claim that her
disagreement with the likes of Kelly is genuine, she is on safe grounds.27
6.5 Summary
Let’s take a brief look back at this part of the dissertation. What we have
done in it, in effect, is work out a view of conciliationism as a second-order de-
feasible reasoning policy saying, roughly, the following: If your best (first-order)
reasoning suggests that X and it’s rational for you to think that you’re a party
to a genuine disagreement about whether X, you should not conclude that X un-
der normal circumstances. The phrases “it’s rational for you to think” and “under
normal circumstances” have precise content in the model. We also used the model
to address one of the main challenges to conciliatory views: Given that there are
disagreements about the correct way to disagree, conciliatory views would seem to
self-defeat.
We noted that this challenge gives rise to two sub-problems. The first is that,
through turning on themselves, conciliatory views would seem to issue inconsistent
directives. The second is that actual advocates of conciliationism would seem to
be irrational in holding onto their views. The bulk of the three chapters was con-
cerned with working out a response to the first problem: Our first model conciliatory
27There’s good reason for the advocates of conciliationism to be pleased with this result of our
analysis. Some of have thought that all actual advocates of conciliationism are not holding their
views rationally, which is the likely cause of the seemingly desperate suggestion that one can
concede that one’s view is not a view one can rationally believe without conceding that one’s view
is mistaken—see (Christensen 2009, p. 763) and (Littlejohn 2013, p. 175). (It’s worth noting that
in a later article Christensen admits that this is not a viable strategy—see (Christensen 2013, p.
82).) But our result is compatible with the claim that most actual advocates of concilaitionism are
rational in sticking to their conciliatory views.
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reasoner—based on default logic—appeared to corroborate the inconsistency worry,
since it suggested that the correct (conciliatory) response to scenarios involving
disagreements about the correct way to disagree is to conclude everything. Then,
drawing on the tools of formal argumentation theory, we went on to formulate a
model reasoner that generalized the original one. This more sophisticated reasoner
suggested that the correct response to the unfortunate scenarios is to abandon the
belief in conciliationism, all while responding to disagreements in the distinctively
conciliatory way. Having pointed out that the apparent incoherence of this recom-
mendation is due to the fact that the underlying scenarios were underdescribed, we
proceeded to extend the reasoner in one final way, enabling it take into account (rel-
ative) degrees of confidence in the conclusions of the first-order, or domain-specific,
reasoning. This put us in the position to represent the nuances of various scenarios
involving disagreements about the correct way to disagree, and it allowed the rea-
soner to take these nuances into account when drawing conclusions. As we saw, while
sometimes unorthodox, all of the reasoner’s recommended responses were perfectly
sensible, including the one that had appeared incoherent before. Thus, we have a
response to the first problem. What’s more, our analysis appears to mitigate the





Observation 1 Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a regular hedged context. Then there is a regular
weighted context c′ = ⟨W ′,R′,≤⟩ such that
(1) W ′ =W;
(2) for every rule r′ ∈R′, there’s a counterpart rule r ∈R;
(3) X is a reason for Y in c if and only if X is a reason for Y in c′;
(4) X is defeated as a reason for Y by a consideration Z in c if and only if X is
defeated as a reason for Y by Z in c′; and
(5) ◯X follows from c if and only if ◯X follows from c′.
Proof.
Take an arbitrary regular hedged context c = ⟨W,R⟩. We will construct a (regular)
weighted context from it. As a first step, we define an ordering on rules from R,
using the hedges of these rules, as follows. For any two rules r, r′ ∈R, let
r ⪯ r′ if and only if ¬Premise[r′] ∈Hedge[r].
Now let c′ be the weighted context ⟨W ′,R′,≤⟩, where
- W ′ =W ,
- R′ = { X
Y
: X : Z
◯Y
∈R}, and
- r ≤ r′ if and only if counterpartc(r) ⪯ counterpartc(r′).
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Claim 1: X is a reason for Y in c if and only if X is a reason for Y in c′.
Left-to-right: Suppose X is a reason for Y in c. Then there’s a rule X : Zr =
◯Y
in R such that r ∈ Triggered(c). Since r gets triggered in c, we have W ⊢X. Given
how c′ is constructed, we can be sure that there’s a rule r′ ∈ R′ of the form X
Y
.
Since W ′ =W, the rule r′ must be triggered in c′, which suffices to conclude that X
is a reason for Y in c′.
The other direction is similar.
Claim 2: X is defeated as a reason for Y by Z in c if and only if X as a reason for
Y is defeated by Z in c′.
Left-to-right: Suppose X is defeated as a reason for Y by Z in c. This entails
that there’s a rule X : Zr =
◯Y
in R such that r ∈ Triggered(c). What’s more,
¬Z ∈Hedge[r] andW ⊢ Z. In light of Claim 1, we know that there’s a rule Xr′ =
Y
inR′ that’s triggered in c′, and, hence, that X is a reason for Y in c′. Now, Constraint
(2) on regular hedged contexts tells us that there must be a rule r∗ ∈ R such that
contraryc(r, r∗) and Premise[r∗] = Z. By construction of c′, we can be sure that
there’s a rule r′′ ∈ R′ such that counterpartc(r′′) = r∗. What’s more, we have W ′ ⊢
Premise[r′′] = Z, contraryc′(r′, r′′), and r′ ≤ r′′. (Why the latter? Well, it’s entailed
by the fact that ¬Premise[r∗] ∈Hedge[r].) And this is enough to conclude that Z
defeats X as a reason for Y in c′.
Right-to-left: Suppose X is defeated as a reason for Y by Z in c′. This en-
tails that there’s a rule Xr =
Y
in Triggered(c′) and a rule Zr′ =
W
such that
r∗ ∈ Triggered(c′), contraryc′(r, r∗), and r ≤ r∗. By construction, there are hedged
rules r′ and r′′ ∈ R such that counterpartc(r) = r′, counterpartc(r∗) = r′′, and
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¬Premise[r′′] ∈ Hedge[r′]. But since Premise[r′′] = Z and W ⊢ Z, the formula X
gets defeated by Z as a reason for Y in c.
Claim 3: ◯X follows from c if and only if ◯X follows from c′.
Left-to-Right: Suppose ◯X follows from c. This means that there’s a rule r ∈R
such that Conclusion[r] = ◯X and r ∈ Admissible(c), that is, W ⊢ Premise[r]
and there’s no ¬Z ∈Hedge[r] such that W ⊢ Z. By the construction of c′, we know
that there’s a rule r′ ∈ R′ such that r′ = counterpartc′(r). If r′ ∈ Binding(c′), then
we are done. So suppose the opposite. Given that Premise[r] = Premise[r′] and
W ⊢ Premise[r], it has to be the case that r′ ∈ Triggered(c′). But given that
it’s not in Binding(c′), there must be another rule r′′ ∈ Triggered(c′) such that
contraryc(r′, r′′) and r′ ≤ r′′. This means that r′ is defeated in the context of c′,
and, in light of Claim 2, entails that r must be defeated in the context of c, giving
us a contradiction.
Right-to-left: Suppose that ◯X follows from c′. This means that there’s a
rule r ∈R′ such that Conclusion[r] =X and r ∈ Binding(c′), which, in turn, means
that W ′ ⊢ Premise[r] and that there is no r′ ∈ R′ such that r′ ∈ Triggered(c′)
and r ≤ r′. By construction of c′, we can be sure that there’s a rule r′ ∈ R such
that r′ = counterpartc(r). If we can show that r′ ∈ Admissible(c), then we are
done. So let’s suppose that it isn’t. Given that W ′ ⊢ Premise[r], it must hold that
W ⊢ Premise[r′] and that r′ ∈ Triggered(c). So r′ is not admissible because there’s
a Z such that ¬Z ∈ Hedge[r] and W ⊢ Z. But, in light of Claim 2, this is enough
to conclude that r must be defeated in the context of c, giving us a contradiction.
qed
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Observation 2 Let c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩ be a regular weighted context. Then there is a
regular hedged context c′ = ⟨W ′,R′⟩ such that
(1) W ′ =W;
(2) for every rule r′ ∈R′, there’s a counterpart rule r ∈R;
(3) X is a reason for Y in c if and only if X is a reason for Y in c′;
(4) X is defeated as a reason for Y by a consideration Z in c if and only if X is
defeated as a reason for Y by Z in c′; and
(5) ◯X follows from c if and only if ◯X follows from c′.
Proof.
Take an arbitrary regular weighted context c = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩. We will construct a (reg-
ular) hedged context from it. Let c′ = ⟨W ′,R′⟩, where
- W ′ =W , and
- R′ is acquired from (R, ≤) by the following simple procedure.
For every rule r ∈R,
1. Let Rr = {r′ ∈R ∶ r ≤ r′ and contraryc≤(r, r′)};
2. set Z = {¬X ∶ ⟨X,Y ⟩ ∈Rr};





Claim 1: X is a reason for Y in c if and only if X is a reason for Y in c′.
Left-to-Right: Suppose X is a reason for Y in c. This means that there’s a
rule Xr =
Y
in R and r ∈ Triggered(c). By construction of c′, we can be sure that
there’s a rule X : Zr′ =
◯Y
in R′ and that W ′ ⊢X. Hence, X is a reason for Y in c
too.
The other direction is straightforward.
Claim 2: X is defeated as a reason for Y by a consideration Z in c if and only if
X is defeated as a reason for Y by Z in c′.
Left-to-Right: Suppose that X is defeated as a reason for Y by Z in c. This
entails that there’s a rule Xr =
Y
in Triggered(c). Given how c′ is constructed, we
can be sure that r has a counterpart X : Zr′ =
◯Y
in c′ and that r′ is triggered in
c. Since X is defeated by Z, there must also be a rule Zr∗ =
W
in R such that
r∗ ∈ Triggered(c), contraryc(r, r∗), and r ≤ r∗. By the construction of c′, we can be
sure that ¬Z ∈ Hedge[r′] and that W ′ ⊢ Z. As a consequence, X is defeated as a
reason for Y by Z in c′.
The other direction is similarly straightforward.
Claim 3: ◯X follows from c if and only if ◯X follows from c′.
Left-to-Right: Suppose that ◯X follows from c. This means that there’s a
rule r ∈ R such that Conclusion[r] = X and r ∈ Binding(c), with the latter fact
implying that W ⊢ Premise[r] and that there’s no rule r′ ∈ Triggered(c) such that
contraryc(r, r′) and r ≤ r′. Now, by the construction of c′, there’s a rule r′ ∈R′ with
r′ = counterpartc′(r). In case we can show that r′ ∈ Admissible(c′), we are done. So
suppose that it isn’t. Since W ′ ⊢ Premise[r′], the rule r′ is not admissible because
214
of its hedge. So there’s a ¬Z ∈ Hedge[r′] such that W ′ ⊢ Z. This, in turn, means
that the rule r′ is defeated in c′, and, by Claim 2, we can be sure that r too must
be defeated in c. This gives us a contradiction.
Right-to-Left: Suppose ◯X follows from c′. This means that there’s a rule
r ∈ R′ such that Conclusion[r] = ◯X and r ∈ Admissible(c), that is, W ′ ⊢
Premise[r] and, for no ¬Z ∈ Hedge[r], do we have W ′ ⊢ Z. By construction,
there has to be a rule r′ ∈ R such that counterpartc(r) = r′. If we can show that
r′ ∈ Binding(c), then we are done. So suppose that it isn’t. It’s straightforward to
see that W ⊢ Premise[r′]. And, therefore, there must be a rule r′′ ∈ R such that
r′′ ∈ Triggered(c), contraryc(r′, r′′), and r′ ≤ r′′. So r′ is actually defeated in c. By
Claim 2, r must be defeated in c as well, contradicting the original assumption.
qed
Observation 3 Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a regular hedged context and r a rule from R
that’s triggered in c. Then, if r is defeated in c, it is rebutted.
Proof.
Suppose r is defeated in c. This means that there’s some Z such that ¬Z ∈Hedge[r]
and W ⊢ Z. In light of the second constraint on regular hedged contexts, we know
that Hedge[r] ⊆ {¬Premise[r′] ∶ r′ ∈ R and contraryc(r, r′)}. So we can be sure
that Z = Premise[r′] where r′ is a rule that’s contrary to r. But, then, r is rebutted
by Z. qed
Observation 4 Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩ be a hedged context subject to the following con-
straint: For any two rules r, r′ ∈R such that contraryc(r, r′), either ¬Premise[r′] ∈
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Hedge[r] or ¬Premise[r] ∈Hedged[r′]. Then there’s a mixed context c′ = ⟨W ′,R′,≤⟩
such that
(1) W ′ =W;
(2) for every rule r′ ∈ R′, there’s a counterpart rule r ∈ R;
(3) X is a reason for Y in c if and only if X is a reason for Y in c′;
(4) X is rebutted as a reason for Y by a consideration Z in c if and only if X is
rebutted as a reason for Y by Z in c′;
(5) ◯X follows from c if and only if ◯X follows from c′.
Proof.
Take an arbitrary hedged context c = ⟨W,R⟩. We will construct a mixed context
from it. As a first step, we define an ordering on rules from R, using the hedges of
these rules, as follows. For any two rules r, r′ ∈R, let
r ⪯ r′ if and only if ¬Premise[r′] ∈Hedge[r].
Now let c be the mixed context ⟨W ′,R′,≤⟩, where
- W ′ =W,
- R′ is acquired from R by the following procedure:
For every rule
X : ZOldr =
◯Y
from R,
1. Let Rr = {r′ ∈R ∶ r ≤ r′ and contraryc≤(r, r′)};
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2. set Z = {¬Premise[r′] ∶ r′ ∈Rr};




- Finally, for any two r, r′ ∈ R′, set r ≤ r′ if and only if counterpartc(r) ⪯
counterpartc(r′).
Claim 1: X is a reason for Y in c if and only if X is a reason for Y in c′.
Left-to-right: Suppose that X is a reason for Y in c. This means that there’s
a rule X : Zr =
◯Y
in R and that this rule is not undermined in c. This means that
there’s no Z such that ¬Z ∈ Z, Z ≠ Premise[r′] for every rule r′ in R, and W ⊢ Z.




Since W ′ =W, this rule is triggered in c′. If we can show that it is not undermined
c′, then we are done. So supposed it is undermined in c′. Then there has to be a
some Z such that ¬Z ∈ Z ′ and W ′ ⊢ Z. But given how c′ was constructed, ¬Z can
be an element of Z ′ only in case Z ≠ Premise[r′] for every r′ ∈R. Since Z ′ ⊆ Z and
W ′ =W , we also have ¬Z ∈ Z and W ⊢ Z. And this is a contradiction.
The other direction is similar.
Claim 2: X is rebutted as a consideration for Y by Z in c if and only if X is
rebutted as a consideration for Y by Z in c′.
Left-to-right: Suppose X is rebutted as a reason for Y by Z in c. This entails
that there’s a rule X : Zr =
◯Y
in R such that r ∈ Triggered(c), and that this rule
is not undermined in c. In light of Claim 1, we can be sure that X is a reason for
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and there’s no Z such that ¬Z ∈ Z ′ and
W ⊢ Z. Now, given that X gets rebutted, there has to be rule r∗ in R such that
contraryc(r, r∗), W ⊢ Premise[r∗], and ¬Premise[r∗] ∈ Z. By the construction of
c′, there must be a corresponding rule r′′ ∈R′ such that counterpartc(r′′) = r∗. From
here, it’s easy to see that W ⊢ Premise[r′′], contraryc′(r′, r′′), and r′ ≤ r′′. And so
the rule r′ is rebutted by r′′ in c′. This, in turn, implies that X is rebutted as a
consideration for Y by Z in c′.
The other direction is, again, not much different.
Claim 3: ◯X follows from c if and only if ◯X follows from c′.
Left-to-Right: Suppose ◯X follows from c. This means that there’s a rule r ∈R
such that Conclusion[r] = ◯X and r ∈ Admissible(c), that is, W ⊢ Premise[r]
and there’s no ¬Z ∈ Hedge[r] such that W ⊢ Z. Taking into account the way





r′ = counterpartc′(r). If r′ ∈ Optimal(c′), then we are done. So suppose the opposite.
Given that Premise[r] = Premise[r′] and W ⊢ Premise[r], we can be sure that
r′ ∈ Triggered(c′). Since r′ is not among the rules in Optimal(c′), it must either
be undermined or rebutted by another rule. Suppose that it is undermined, or that
there’s a Z such that W ′ ⊢ Z and ¬Z ∈ Z ′. Given that Z ′ ⊆ Z and W ′ =W, we can
conclude that W ⊢ Z and ¬Z ∈ Z. And this means that r ∉ Admissible(c). Suppose
that r′ is rebutted by another rule. In light of Claim 2, we can conclude that r must
be rebutted in the context c. Either way we get a contradiction.
Right-to-left: Suppose that ◯X follows from c′. This means that there’s a
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rule Y : Zr =
X
in R′ such that r ∈ Optimal(c′), which means that W ′ ⊢ Y ,
that there’s no r′ ∈ R′ such that r′ ∈ Triggered(c′) and r ≤ r′, and that there’s
no Z such that ¬Z ∈ Z and W ⊢ Z. By construction of c′, we can be sure that




in R such that r′ = counterpartc(r). If we can show that
r′ ∈ Admissible(c), then we are done. So let us suppose that it is not. Given that
W ′ ⊢ Y , the r′ is triggered in c. So r′ is not admissible because there’s a Z such
that ¬Z ∈ Z ′ and W ⊢ Z. There are two options now, either ¬Z ∈ Z or ¬Z ∉ Z. If
the former, then the rule r is undermined in c′, implying that r is not optimal in
c′. If ¬Z ∉ Z, then, by the construction of c′, there has to be a rule r′′ in R′ such
that contraryc′(r, r′′) and r ≤ r′′. But if that’s the case, then r cannot be among the
optimal rules of c′. So we have a contradiction.
qed
Observation 5 Let c = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩ be a mixed context subject to the following con-
straint: For any two rules r, r′ ∈R such that contraryc(r, r′), either r ≤ r′ or r′ ≤ r.
Then there is a hedged context c′ = ⟨W ′,R′⟩ such that
(1) W ′ =W;
(2) for every rule r′ ∈ R′, there’s a counterpart rule r ∈ R;
(3) X is a reason for Y in c if and only if X is a reason for Y in c′;
(4) X is rebutted as a reason for Y by a consideration Z in c if and only if X is
rebutted as a reason for Y by Z in c′;
(5) ◯X follows from c if and only if ◯X follows from c′.
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Proof. (Sketch)
Take an arbitrary mixed context c = ⟨W,R,≤⟩. We will construct a hedged context
from it. Let c′ = ⟨W ′,R′⟩, where
- W ′ =W , and
- R′ is acquired from (R, ≤) by the following simple procedure.
For every rule
X : ZOldr =
Y
from R,
1. Let Rr = {r′ ∈R ∶ r ≤ r′ and contraryc≤(r, r′)};
2. set ZNew = {¬Premise[r′] ∶ r′ ∈Rr};
3. and, finally, replace r ∈R for the hedged rule
X : ZOld ∪ZNew
◯Y
.
The proofs of clauses (2)–(4) run parallel to the proofs of Observations 1, 2 and 4.
qed
Observation 6 Let c = ⟨W ,R⟩ be a context in which no Reasonable-formulas occur.
Then there exists a context c′ = ⟨W,R⟩ where Reasonable-formulas do occur such
that
X follows from c if and only if X follows from c′,
for all X in which the predicate Reasonable doesn’t occur.
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Proof.
Take an arbitrary context c = ⟨W,R⟩. Now set c′ to be the context ⟨W ′,R⟩ where
W ′ =W ∪ {Reasonable(r) ∶ r ∈R}.
Left-to-right: Take some arbitrary formula X that follows from c, according to
the original definition of consequence. Then we know that, for every proper scenario
S based on c, we haveW∪Conclusion[S] ⊢X. Now zoom in on one such proper sce-
nario S. By the definition of the notion, for all r ∈ S, we have r ∈ TriggeredW,R(S),
r ∉ ConflictedW,R(S), and r ∉ ExcludedW,R(S). Now let’s refocus on the new con-
text c′. It’s not difficult to see that S qualifies as a proper scenario based on c′.
Since all the original information is present in c′, we can be sure that, for all r ∈ S,
we have r ∈ TriggeredW ′,R(S), r ∉ ConflictedW ′,R(S), and r ∉ ExcludedW ′,R(S).
What’s more, by the construction of c′, we know that, for every r ∈ S, there’s a
formula of the form Reasonable(r) in the hard information of c′. Hence, for every
r ∈ S, we have r ∈ ReasonableW ′,R(S). So S is proper. The same applies to other
proper scenarios based on c, and so X follows from c′, according to the modified
definition.
Right-to-left: Suppose that X doesn’t contain the predicate Reasonable and
that X follows from c′, according to the modified definition of consequence. Then for
every proper scenario S based on c′, it holds that W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢X. Take an
arbitrary S. Then, by the definition of proper scenario, we know that, for all R ∈ S,
r ∈ TriggeredW ′,R(S), r ∉ ConflictedW ′,R(S), and r ∉ ExcludedW ′,R(S). Since, by
construction, c′ doesn’t contain any information that doesn’t have to do with the
new predicate Reasonable and wouldn’t be contained in c, it’s easy to see that, for
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all r ∈ S, r ∈ TriggeredW,R(S), r ∉ ConflictedW,R(S), and r ∉ ExcludedW,R(S). So
S qualifies as a proper scenario based on c, implying that W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢X.
The same applies to the other proper scenarios of c′, and so X follows from c,
according to the original definition.
qed
Observation 7 Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a context and X an arbitrary formula. Then X
follows from c in default logic, c ∣∼ X, if and only if X follows from c according to
stability semantics, c ∣∼s X.
Proof.
Left-to-right: Suppose that c ∣∼ X. The, for every proper scenario S based
on c, we have W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢ X. Let’s zoom in one such S. Since S ⊆
ReasonableW,R(S) and S ⊆ TriggeredW,R(S), the set S is an element of Arguments(c).
Now we will show that that S defeats every argument S ′ in Arguments(c) such
that S ′ /⊆ S. So consider an arbitrary S ′ of this sort. Zoom in on S ′′ = S ∩ S ′. Now
take some rule r from S ′ such that r ∈ ReasonableW,R(S ′′), r ∈ TriggeredW,R(S ′′).
Such an r has to exist because S ′ ∈ Argument(c) and S ′′ ⊂ S ′. In light of the fact
that r ∈ ReasonableW,R(S ′′) and r ∈ TriggeredW,R(S ′′), it has to be the case that
r ∈ ReasonableW,R(S), r ∈ TriggeredW,R(S). So, given that S is a proper scenario,
it must be the case that either r ∈ ConflictedW,R(S) or r ∈ ExcludedW,R(S). So
either W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r] or W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢ Out(r). But
in either case we get S ↝ S ′. Set Γ = {S ′ ∈ Arguments(c) ∶ S ′ ⊆ S}. Since S de-
feats every S ′ in Arguments(c), the set of arguments Γ defeats every argument it
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doesn’t contain. And given that S is a proper scenario, Γ has to be consistent. So Γ
is a stable extension of F(c). What’s more, X follows from Γ, as it contains S and
W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢X. Notice that we can run the same argument for every other
proper scenario based on c. Consequently, c ∣∼s X.
Right-to-left: Suppose that c ∣∼s X. This means that, for every stable extension
Γ of F(c), it holds that Γ contains some argument S such thatW∪Conclusion[S] ⊢
X. Let’s now focus on one such stable extension Γ.
The first step is to show that this Γ has a maximal element, that is, an ar-
gument S such that, for all S ′ ∈ Γ, we have S ′ ⊆ S. To show that this holds, we
use a proof by contradiction. Suppose that there’s no single maximal element in Γ.
Now take some S ∈ Γ such that there’s no S ′ ∈ Γ with S ⊂ S ′. Consider an arbitrary
rule r from R such that r ∉ S, but r ∈ ReasonableW,R(S) and r ∈ TriggeredW,R(S).
Since S is maximal, S ∪ {r} ∉ Γ. And given that Γ is stable, it must hold that
Γ ↝ S ∪ {r}. So there has to be some argument S ′ ∈ Γ such that S ′ ↝ S ∪ {r}. The
expression S ′ ↝ S ∪ {r} means that there has to be some rule r′ in S ∪ {r} such
that W ∪ Conclusion[S ′] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r′] or W ∪ Conclusion[S ′] ⊢ ¬Out(r′).
However, if the rule r′ in question is anything but r itself, then we would also
have S ′ ↝ S, making Γ inconsistent. So the argument S ′ is such that either W ∪
Conclusion[S ′] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r] or W ∪ Conclusion[S ′] ⊢ ¬Out(r). Notice that
has to be such an argument S ′ for every r with r ∉ S, but r ∈ ReasonableW,R(S)
and r ∈ TriggeredW,R(S)—if there are any such rules at all.
Now let’s zoom in on a different set S ∈ Γ such that there’s no S ′ ∈ Γ
with S ⊂ S. So S ≠ S. Consider S ∩ S. Take the rule r such that r ∈ S,
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r ∈ TriggeredW,R(S ∩S), and r ∈ TriggeredW,R(S ∩S). Since S and S are both
in Arguments(c) and S /⊆ S, such a rule r must exist. But given the proof in the
previous paragraph, we can be sure that has to be an argument S ′ ∈ Γ such that
either W ∪ Conclusion[S ′] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r] or W ∪ Conclusion[S ′] ⊢ Out(r).
Since r ∈ S, we have S ↝ S which entails, contrary to our assumption, that Γ is
inconsistent. So Γ must have a maximal element after all.
It’s not difficult to see that the maximal element of Γ, call it, S, is such that, for
all S ′ ∈ Argument(c) with S ′ /⊆ S, it holds that S ↝ S ′. Consider some S ′ that fits the
description. Given that Γ is stable, we know that Γ↝ S ′. So there’s some argument
S ′′ ∈ Γ such that S ′′ ↝ S ′, meaning that W ∪Conclusion[S ′′] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r] or
W∪Conclusion[S ′′] ⊢ Out(r) for some rule r ∈ S ′. But since S is maximal, it must be
the case thatW ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r] orW ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ Out(r)
for some rule r ∈ S ′. Consequently, S ↝ S ′. Another thing that should be clear is
that W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ X: If there’s an argument in Γ that lets us conclude X,
then X follows from the maximal element too.
The final step is to show that the maximal element S of Γ is a proper scenario
based on c. What we need to establish, then, is that





⊆ : Take an arbitrary r from S. Since S is in Argument(c), we know that r ∈
ReasonsableW,R(S) and r ∈ TriggeredW,R(S). Now supposed there was a rule
r ∈ ConflictedW,R(S). In that case, S would self-defeat, and Γ couldn’t be a stable
extension. So r ∉ ConflictedW,R(S). Analogous considerations apply to the possi-
bility of r being excluded in the context of S.
⊇ : Take an arbitrary rule r such that r is an element of ReasonableW,R(S)
and TriggeredW,R(S) and r is not an element of either ConflictedW,R(S), or
ExcludedW,R(S). Now suppose, toward a contradiction, that r ∉ S. Let S ′ = S ∪
{r}. Since S ′ ⊆ TriggeredW,R(S ′) and S ′ ⊆ ReasonableW,R(S ′), S ′ must be in
Argument(c). What’s more, we do not have S ↝ S, and so Γ /↝ S ′. This is enough
to conclude that Γ is not a stable extension after all.
This shows that S is proper. Since we can run the same argument for every
other stable extension, we know that c ∣∼X.
qed
Observation 8 Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a context and F(c) = ⟨A,↝⟩ an argument frame-
work constructed from it. If F(c) does not contain either odd cycles of defeat or
infinite chains of defeat, then c ∣∼s X if and only if c ∣∼p X.
Proof.
We will show that an argument set Γ is a stable extension of F(c) if and only if it
is a preferred extensions of F(c). The result follows immediately.
Left-to-right (Dung 1995): This direction holds independently of the assump-
tion. Let Γ be a stable extension of F(c). So, for all S ∈ A/Γ, Γ ↝ S. It’s easy to
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see that Γ is complete: Consider an argument S such that Γ defends S. If S ∈ Γ,
we’re done. So suppose S ∉ Γ. Since Γ is stable, we have it that Γ↝ S. Thus, there’s
an argument S ′ ∈ Γ such that S ′ ↝ S. Given that Γ defends S, there has to be an
S in Γ such that S ↝ S ′. But this would mean that Γ is not conflict-free, which
contradicts it being stable. Now let’s verify that Γ is not only a complete extension,
but also a maximal complete extensions: Suppose that it wasn’t. There would be
another complete extension Γ′ such that Γ ⊂ Γ′. Let S be an argument such that
S ∉ Γ and S ∈ Γ′. Since Γ is stable, Γ ↝ S, and so Γ′ ↝ S. Then, however, Γ′ is not
conflict-free, which contradicts it being complete.
Right-to-left: Suppose that Γ is a preferred, but not a stable extension of F(c).
So Γ is a maximal complete extension, and yet there is some argument S1 ∈ A such
that S1 ∉ Γ and Γ   S1. Since Γ is complete and S1 is not in Γ, there has to be
an argument S2 such that S2 ↝ S1 and Γ   S2. Either S2 ∈ Γ or S2 ∉ Γ. If the
former, Γ↝ S1. So S2 ∉ Γ. Since Γ is complete and S2 is not in Γ, there has to be an
argument S3 such that S3 ↝ S2 and Γ   S3. This means that there’s the following
chain of defeat in F(c): S3 ↝ S2 ↝ S1. Either S3 ∈ Γ, or S3 ∉ Γ. If S3 is in Γ, then
Γ ↝ S2, contradicting a fact established before. So S3 ∉ Γ. Since Γ is complete and
S3 ∉ Γ, there has to be an argument S4 such that S4 ↝ S3 and Γ   S4. And we can
apply the same line of reasoning to S4 and further, but it has to stop eventually,
given that, by assumption, there are no infinitely ascending chains of defeat. So we
will end up with the following possibly very long, but finite chain:
Sn ↝ Sn−1 ↝ ⋯↝ S3 ↝ S2 ↝ S1.
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and we will have established on the way that, for all i with 1 ≤ i < n, Si ∉ Γ. But
given that Γ is preferred, Sn ∈ Γ.
qed
Observation 9 Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be a context and S and S ′ arguments from the argu-
ment framework F(c) constructed from it. Then S defeats S ′, according to Definition
5.2, S ↝ S ′, if and only if S defeats S ′, according to Definition 5.12, S ↝a S ′.
Proof.
Right-to-left: Suppose that S ↝a S ′. This implies that there are arguments S and
S in the set Arguments(c) such that S ⊆ S, S ⊆ S ′, and S ↝b S. From here,
either W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r] or W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢ Out(r) for
some rule r from S. Since S ⊆ S and S ⊆ S ′, it follows that W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢
¬Conclusion[r] or W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ Out(r) for some rule r from S ′. And this
is enough to conclude that S ↝ S ′.
Left-to-right: Suppose that S ↝ S ′. This means that there is a rule r ∈ S ′
such that either W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r], or W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢
Out(r). Without loss of generality, suppose that W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢ Out(r).
Now take the (set-theoretically) smallest argument S in Arguments(c) such that
W ∪ Conclusion[S] ⊢ Out(r) and S ⊆ S. Since S is in Arguments(c), we know
that S exists. It’s easy to see that S is in the set MinimalF(c)(Out(r)): If not, then
there must be another set S ⊂ S in Arguments(c) such thatW∪Conclusion[S] ⊢
Out(r). In that case, however, we’d also have S ⊂ S, contradicting our assumption
that S is the smallest arguments that’s also a subset of S that entails Out(r)
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with W. Given our definition of basic defeat, S ↝b S ′′, for any S ′′ such that
S ′′ is in MinimalF(c)(r). Let S be the (set-theoretically) smallest argument from
Arguments(c) with both r ∈ S and S ⊆ S ′. Since S ′ is in Arguments(c), we can
be sure that S exists. It’s, again, easy to see that S is among the arguments in
MinimalF(c)(r), from which it follows that S ↝b S. Finally, given that S ⊆ S and
S ⊆ S ′, we also have S ↝a S ′. qed
Observation 10 Let c = ⟨W,R⟩ be an ordinary context and c′ = ⟨W ,R,≤⟩ be the
same context with a connected preorder ≤ assigning all the rules r in R the same
weight—so, for all r, r′ ∈R, r ∼ r′. Then F(c) = F(c′).
Proof.
The sets of arguments of F(c) and F(c′) are clearly the same. So it remains to show
that the defeat relations among the arguments in them coincide.
Left-to-right: Take two arbitrary arguments S and S ′ from F(c) with S ↝ S ′.
In light of Observation 9, we know that S ↝a S ′. So the set Arguments(c) must
contain two arguments S and S such that S ⊆ S, S ⊆ S ′, and S ↝b S. This,
in turn, means that S is an element of MinimalF(c′)(r), as well as that either (i)
W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ ¬Conclusion[r] and S is in MinimalF(c′)(¬Conclusion[r]),
or (ii) W ∪Conclusion[S] ⊢ Out(r) and S is in MinimalF(c′)(Out(r)). Since in c′
all rules are assigned the same weight, for all r ∈ S and all r′ ∈ S, r ≤ r′. And given
that S is not empty, there is some rule r ∈ S such that r ≤ r′ for every rule r′ ∈ S.
This is enough to conclude that S ⪯ S. From here, we have S ↝wb S
 and, after
another step S ↝w S ′.
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